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Foreword 
Public services have been decentralised in most countries where Australia provides aid. This means 
Australia, like other donors, must be willing and able to engage effectively with developing country 
governments at all levels to improve service delivery. To ensure sustainable improvements, this 
engagement should carefully coordinate support for governance reforms with assistance to strengthen 
or expand service delivery systems. 
As the World Bank has observed, done well, decentralisation can result in more efficient and effective 
services for communities. However, done poorly, or where the context is inappropriate, 
decentralisation may have negative effects.  
This evaluation builds on ODE’s 2009 evaluation of Australian aid for service delivery. It answers 
important questions about whether Australian aid has appropriately considered the role of subnational 
authorities, including specific issues identified in 2009. It assesses how well Australian aid has 
addressed the challenges of decentralisation, with a focus on the major sectors of education, health 
and infrastructure. 
This evaluation utilized a clear methodology, applied it consistently, and draws together a range of 
evidence to provide a balanced account of Australian aid performance. It concludes that Australian aid 
is beginning to respond to the challenges of supporting service delivery in decentralised contexts, but 
notes that results are mixed and there is room for further improvement. 
The evaluation suggests Australia needs to improve its country-level analysis, program planning and 
design to better address decentralisation. In particular, there is a need to carefully assess short-term 
service delivery needs against long-term structures and incentives for governments to achieve 
sustainable service delivery and meet sovereign responsibilities. Australia needs to get the right 
balance of engagement with different levels of government, and appropriately address both supply 
and demand aspects of service delivery, especially to improve equity. 
I am pleased to see the improvements in Australian aid approaches to decentralisation since 2009, 
and look forward to seeing further progress in response to the findings and recommendations of this 
evaluation. 
 
 
Jim Adams 
Chair, Independent Evaluation Committee 
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Executive summary  
The Australian aid program supports partner governments to provide basic services for human 
development. In 2014-2015, close to half the aid budget will be spent on education (23 per cent), 
health (16 per cent) and infrastructure (ten per cent). Australia needs to protect these aid 
investments so that improvements in service systems are sustained into the future, and are 
replicated within and across partner countries.  
In many of Australia’s partner countries, responsibilities for basic services have been transferred from 
the central government to lower levels of government; a process known as decentralisation. Working 
strategically within decentralised contexts is critical to providing successful Australian aid. 
Decentralisation processes in most countries are complex and contested. They are affected by power 
dynamics between levels of government, and capacity and/or resource limitations at all levels. To 
support the development of sustainable service systems, Australia must navigate the competing 
interests that exist within and between different parts of government, the private sector and civil 
society. Australia also needs to ensure coherence between its own governance programs that support 
decentralisation and sector programs that support service systems. 
This evaluation (conducted between December 2012 and April 2014) examined Australia’s support 
for service systems in decentralised contexts. It focused on three sectors: health, education and 
infrastructure (water and sanitation services and roads). Six countries – Indonesia, Papua New 
Guinea (PNG), the Philippines, Solomon Islands, Vietnam and Bangladesh – were selected, with the 
first three examined in more depth through fieldwork. The evaluation also drew on international 
literature, donor evaluations, staff consultation and organisational documents. This executive 
summary will focus on the overall assessment and findings related to the main evaluation question, 
summarised in Table 1.  This is followed by more specific findings and recommendations related to 
each of the sub-questions for this evaluation.    
How effective is Australian support for service delivery in decentralised contexts and 
how can it be improved? 
The Australian aid program has recognised, and begun to address, the challenges of working with 
partner governments to improve services in decentralised systems. In particular, efforts are being 
made to engage with a larger range of stakeholders and to work in low-capacity subnational settings. 
Australian aid has also started to focus on broader governance arrangements which are critical in 
service systems.  
The evaluation identified many examples where positive results have been achieved, such as a 
significant reduction of maternal deaths in target districts in Indonesia, increased rates of school 
building construction in PNG (including in remote areas) and stronger school-based management in 
the Philippines. The evaluation also identified how Australian investments could be more effective.   
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Table 1 Assessment of Australian support against six evaluation criteria  
Criteria Assessment Finding 
Analysis and 
learning 
Improving but 
currently 
insufficient 
Analysis and learning of decentralisation issues needs to be 
more systematic and detailed. Appropriate contextual analysis 
at subnational level is often missing  
Alignment and 
relevance 
Mostly 
appropriate 
Australian assistance is aligned and relevant to national-level 
priorities but alignment and relevance to subnational priorities 
is variable.  
Balance of 
engagement 
Varied, mostly not 
appropriate 
Staff recognised the need to engage concurrently at both 
national and subnational levels, but in practice this is often not 
achieved. A better balance of engagement across sectoral 
ministries, central ministries, elected leaders, local 
administrations, communities and civil society is needed. 
Sustainability Varied success Limited ownership at local levels of government mean it is 
likely that some gains made through aid support will be lost 
over time. Good practice examples of facilitating local 
ownership and effective capacity building could be built upon 
and replicated.  
Equity Sufficient 
regarding poverty. 
Insufficient 
regarding gender.  
Well targeted in terms of poverty. Insufficient attention is given 
to service needs of different groups including women and 
marginalised people  
Coherence Improving but 
currently 
insufficient 
Lack of coherence within country programs and at the 
subnational level. A stronger focus on governance aspects of 
sector support could improve coherence. Strategic 
coordination is needed across the aid program. 
 
Findings and recommendations to improve program effectiveness 
What key implementation lessons and good practice would improve sectoral 
programming in decentralised contexts?  
Programs need to choose strategic entry points for Australian aid across service systems. They also 
need to consider the resource implications of working across subnational locations and the potential 
to apply learning to other places. 
Strategies to improve engagement at the national level include: 
› using examples of approaches that have been shown to work at local levels to influence national 
governments in the design of larger-scale systems  
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› assisting different parts of partner governments to align  
› identifying governance as a cross cutting issue in country-level strategies 
Strategies to improve engagement at the subnational level include:  
› consulting with subnational authorities during design 
› using incentives to improve performance  
› capitalising on local leadership, at the same time as recognising the risk of changes in leadership 
› locating aid program staff at middle levels of government  
› building capacity for financial management at the subnational level where there is high fiduciary 
risk. 
Recommendation 1 
DFAT should continue to trial new programming strategies in decentralised contexts, using the 
practice notes developed in this evaluation, together with mandatory program management 
requirements (value for money, risk, monitoring).   
Are decentralisation processes and the role of subnational government appropriately 
taken into account in sectoral designs and evaluations?  
The evaluation found that design and evaluation documents from the six countries have variable 
coverage of key issues concerning decentralisation and subnational roles in service delivery, with 
evaluations showing greater coverage. Designs give limited justification for choices about:  
› engaging different parts of government 
› selected subnational locations 
› aid delivery modalities.  
Designs also have limited focus on the demand side of service delivery. Gender and equity concerns 
are usually touched upon, but there are inadequate capacity assessments and related activities 
designed for subnational authorities to address this area. 
Recommendation 2 
The design, monitoring and evaluation of sectoral programs in decentralised contexts needs to 
consistently address decentralisation, for example through the following 
i  a checklist of key issues for service systems in decentralised contexts 
ii personnel with governance and local expertise to review key program documents and provide 
input to design and evaluation teams  
iii management at post to ensure sufficient information on subnational perspectives is made 
available (through fieldwork or other sources) to program staff and evaluation teams of sectoral 
programs 
iv key program documents that outline, where appropriate, the relevant issues, components and 
levels of partner governments.  
Are decentralisation processes and the role of subnational government in service 
delivery appropriately taken into account in Australian aid policy and strategy?  
The evaluation found that strategy and policy guidance documents provide uneven analysis of 
decentralisation issues. Thematic strategy documents do not provide an adequate coverage of 
relevant issues and country strategies are variable in their coverage. Sector delivery strategies (now 
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sector investment plans) provide an appropriate level of relevant analysis. In relation to 
decentralisation these are critical documents where the analysis of various options, risks and choices 
related to decentralisation can be presented.  
Policy guidance documents that support the preparation of country and delivery strategies refer to 
‘partner governments’ in an oversimplified way that does not reflect the wider range of sector 
agencies and subnational levels that comprise government systems. Focus at the national level tends 
to be concentrated on public financial management and risk management to the exclusion of broader 
public sector capabilities. The guidance does not prompt an examination of the different parts and 
capacities of a partner government in a decentralised context. Such prompts are necessary given the 
complexity of the issues and the number of choices that need to be made for effective programming. 
Recommendation 3 
As DFAT updates key strategy and guidance documents, decentralisation and subnational roles 
should be considered and staff referred to relevant resources, including the practice notes developed 
in this evaluation. In particular, DFAT should expand the ‘working in partner systems’ guidance and 
assessment tools beyond public financial management and risk management concerns, to include 
broader public sector capabilities such as human resources, monitoring and evaluation and sector-
specific technical expertise. 
Does the organisation support sector staff sufficiently to take decentralisation into 
account in sectoral programming? 
A reasonable level of support is provided to staff by policy, strategies and through other learning 
opportunities. Program staff valued on-the-job learning from advisers and colleagues (especially local 
staff with an understanding of local norms, culture and politics) as important sources of knowledge. 
Program staff also valued formal training in governance and working in partner systems. 
What is the level of interaction between service delivery and governance sectors, and 
how could such interaction be optimised to best support service delivery outcomes in 
decentralised contexts? 
Where it exists, interaction between governance and other sectors offers valuable cross-fertilisation of 
ideas and sharing of resources. The integration of governance issues in service delivery programming 
is supported by governance advisers, governance programs and processes such as peer reviews, 
monitoring and annual reviews. It is likely that promoting cross-sector learning and improved 
knowledge management concerning decentralisation will be more effective if seen as the 
responsibility of senior level country program management rather than governance programs.  
Recommendation 4 
DFAT should foster specific governance capability in areas related to decentralisation and subnational 
levels, in particular:  
i incentives and mechanisms to support governance and service delivery sector areas to work 
more strongly with one another 
ii skills and knowledge of/resources available to governance staff to communicate with and support 
sector staff 
iii sector staff knowledge of governance and decentralisation  
V formal training opportunities and resources for on-the-job learning, that build governance and 
decentralisation knowledge of sector staff. 
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Management Response 
DFAT welcomes the findings of this evaluation on working in decentralised service systems. As the 
evaluation notes, in many of Australia’s partner countries, responsibilities for the delivery of basic 
services have been decentralised. The evaluation therefore emphasises the importance of addressing 
decentralisation and subnational levels of government in Australia’s development programming. The 
report also notes that decentralisation processes are often complex and contested, and there is no 
conclusive evidence about whether decentralisation has improved the various dimensions of service 
delivery. It is therefore critical for Australia’s aid program to work strategically and flexibly within these 
different decentralised contexts.  
DFAT agrees, or agrees in principle, with all four recommendations of the evaluation. However, since 
the release of this evaluation, DFAT’s new aid policy framework has given greater emphasis to an 
integrated approach to political, economic and social analysis within specific country contexts, and 
established a new requirement that such analysis underpin all our programming decisions. To that 
end, DFAT proposes to address decentralisation issues as part of the existing analytical and 
programming processes outlined in the new Aid Programming Guide, related aid thematic strategies 
and guidance notes.  
The evaluation’s recommendations and DFAT’s management response to them are listed in Table 2.  
Table 2 DFAT’s management response to recommendations to improve program 
effectiveness in decentralised contexts 
Recommendation Response Details 
Recommendation 1: DFAT should 
continue to trial new 
programming strategies in 
decentralised contexts, using the 
practice notes developed in this 
evaluation, together with 
mandatory program 
management requirements 
(value for money, risk, 
monitoring).   
Agree in 
principle 
DFAT will continue to trial new programming 
strategies in decentralised contexts. Specific 
programming decisions will be informed by analysis 
of context and operate in accordance with relevant 
mandatory program requirements set out in the Aid 
Programming Guide. 
However, rather than introducing additional 
practice notes, DFAT will consider incorporating the 
key analytical questions outlined in the evaluation’s 
draft practice notes into its existing guidance 
materials, such as the Analysis for AIPs: tools and 
techniques, Good Practice Note.  
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Recommendation Response Details 
Recommendation 2: Program 
managers should consistently 
address decentralisation in 
designing, monitoring and 
evaluating aid in decentralised 
contexts. Checklists, expert 
advice (e.g. on draft strategies, 
designs and evaluations), and 
improved access to country-
specific information and analysis, 
may help to improve how aid 
managers think about and 
respond to decentralisation. 
Agree  DFAT program managers will address 
decentralisation issues throughout the aid 
management cycle (as part of broader 
programming decisions, informed by country-
specific analysis).  
In terms of access to advice, DFAT has two Aid 
Advisory Services Standing Offers that can provide 
advice on decentralisation (9.3 Governance 
Reforms and Decentralisation and 13.1 Public 
Financial Management and Decentralisation). 
DFAT’s Development Policy Division (DPD) will 
continue to work with country teams to promote 
and share country-specific information and 
analysis, whether generated by DFAT or externally 
sourced. 
Recommendation 3: DFAT should 
carefully consider how 
decentralisation and subnational 
roles are addressed when 
updating key strategy and 
guidance documents, and 
referring staff to relevant 
resources (including the practice 
notes developed in this 
evaluation). In particular, DFAT 
should expand the ‘working in 
partner systems’ guidance and 
assessment tools beyond public 
financial management and risk 
management concerns, to 
include broader public sector 
capabilities such as human 
resources, monitoring and 
evaluation and sector-specific 
technical expertise 
Agree in 
principle 
DFAT will consider how decentralisation and 
subnational roles are addressed when updating key 
strategy and guidance documents. As resourcing 
permits the Governance, Growth and Fragility 
Branch, and the Public Financial Management 
Advisory Services Section and the Aid Management 
and Performance Branch will consider expanding 
the ‘working in partner systems’ guidance and 
assessment tools to include broader public sector 
capabilities, with monitoring and evaluation a 
priority area.  
DFAT (Principle Governance Specialist) is engaging 
with the ‘Indicators of the Strength of Public 
Management Systems (ISPMS) initiative’, a multi-
stakeholder effort coordinated by the World Bank to 
develop international consensus around a 
comprehensive set of cross-national performance 
indicators for governance and public management 
systems.  The ISPMS may help inform DFAT 
guidance around decentralisation and subnational 
roles. The Governance Performance Assessment 
Framework also provides guidance on a range of 
indicators and evaluative questions on how to 
monitor and measure a governance approach 
across all sectors. DFAT (DPD) will update the 
Governance Performance Assessment Framework 
in 2015 and will consider how to better address 
issues relating to decentralised service delivery as 
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Recommendation Response Details 
part of that process.  
Recommendation 4: DFAT should 
foster specific governance 
capability in areas related to 
decentralisation and subnational 
levels of government, including 
through: 
i. incentives and 
mechanisms to enable 
collaboration between 
governance and service 
delivery sector managers 
ii. skills, knowledge and 
resources for governance 
staff to support sector 
staff 
iii. opportunities for sector 
staff to improve their 
knowledge of 
governance and 
decentralisation, 
including formal training 
opportunities and 
resources for on-the-job 
learning. 
Agree  DFAT will endeavour to build and retain in-house 
expertise on governance, including in relation to 
decentralisation, and to support service delivery 
program managers in Canberra and at Posts.  
Promoting collaboration between governance and 
service delivery teams remains an important aspect 
of the work of the Development Policy Division. For 
example, a recent (October 2014) staff workshop 
was specifically designed to promote collaboration 
between DFAT governance and service delivery 
teams in the Asian geographic areas, with 
approximately half the participants drawn from 
governance and half from sector service delivery 
programs.  
The Governance, Growth and Fragility Branch will 
also continue to deliver core governance-related 
training to support DFAT staff. For example, political 
economy analysis training (referenced positively in 
the evaluation: pp75–76) is ongoing. This training 
includes a focus on understanding how systems of 
governance, including those relating to 
decentralisation and subnational levels of 
government, function within particular country 
contexts. In 2014, this training was delivered to 
DFAT staff in Canberra and at country posts, 
tailored specifically to address both country (e.g. 
Timor-Leste, Solomon Islands) and sector/service 
delivery (e.g. education, health) challenges and 
priorities. The Branch is also developing a new 
introductory ‘governance and fragility’ training 
package for DFAT staff, which will commence in 
2015.  
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Basic services and decentralisation 
Basic services are essential for meeting globally agreed social and economic development goals.1 A 
key priority of the Australian aid program is to support partner countries to provide such services. 
Decentralisation offers the potential to improve services. Decentralisation involves a ‘transfer of 
authority to plan, make decisions or manage public functions from the national level to any 
organisation or agency at the subnational level.’  For a more detailed definition and explanation, see 
Appendix 1.  
It is proposed that local governments are more likely to understand service needs and be held 
accountable for services.2 In line with this thinking, over the last two decades many donors have 
supported decentralisation as a means to improve governance and social development.3  
Decentralisation is usually motivated by the need to share political and economic power, not to 
improve service delivery.  
Swiss Development Cooperation agency, Decentralisation processes in developing and transition 
countries: evidence-based lessons learnt, Switzerland, 2011 
However, it is critical to understand that the main motivation for decentralisation reform is related to 
political power sharing rather than the effective administration of services.4 Predicted improvements 
in service delivery efficiency, effectiveness and equity have not necessarily been achieved as a result 
of decentralisation. In some cases, decentralisation has exacerbated inequalities between the rich 
and the poor because of differing abilities to access local resources or administer services in different 
subnational locations.5 There is no conclusive evidence about whether decentralisation has improved, 
or worsened, service delivery.1 
Basic services 
There is not always agreement on which services are defined as ‘basic services’,2 however, education 
and health are generally included, as well as certain forms of infrastructure.  
Health services: Health services are of three types: 
› clinical services (doctors and nurses) 
› population-oriented outreach services (e.g. immunisation, disease control and vitamin A 
supplementation) 
                                                        
1  For example, see Robinson, Introduction: Decentralising Service Delivery? Evidence and Policy Implications, IDS Bulletin 
vol. 38, no. 1, Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, UK. 2007. This article examines evidence in the health, 
education and water and sanitation sectors. It demonstrates only a few cases where outcomes in terms of equity and 
efficiency were improved, and only in locally supportive conditions were sustained improvements to service delivery 
observed. 
2  For example, there is debate about whether justice, law and various other such social and welfare services constitute 
‘basic services.’ 
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› information and social support (e.g. for breastfeeding or safe sex).6  
Service providers include public and private hospitals and health centres. The wider health system 
encompasses health policy, human resources, infrastructure, procurement systems for medicines, 
medical equipment and supplies, and information and financing systems. 
Education services: Education service delivery is usually focused on universal access to primary 
education. Service delivery requires school infrastructure (e.g. buildings, teaching materials) and its 
management and maintenance, teachers and their training and development, and wider systems of 
curriculum, testing, quality assurance and performance monitoring. 
Infrastructure services: Infrastructure services include a range of systems that provide communities 
with basic amenities. For example, safe water supply and sanitation for households and communities 
involve infrastructure in the form of pipes, facilities and treatment systems. Roads constitute another 
basic service that provides communities with access to markets and to other basic services. All 
infrastructure provision requires ongoing management and maintenance.  
For each type of service, a complex system of service delivery and accountability is necessary. This 
system includes:7 
› policy makers (elected and non-elected): who decide the level and quality of services offered 
› service providers: in the form of organisations (public, private and civil society) and frontline 
individual providers (e.g. teachers, nurses, engineers)  
› citizens: who are users of services and constituents of policy makers. 
 
Classroom in Milne Bay Province, Papua New Guinea. Photo: Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of 
Technology Sydney (ISF, UTS) 
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1.2 Supporting service systems in decentralised contexts 
Decentralisation arrangements are embedded in the legislation of most of Australia’s partner 
countries. Aid program managers therefore need to consider the opportunities and challenges when 
assisting decentralised partner governments with sector programs through policy and regulatory 
reform, system strengthening (advisory support and capacity building) and gap filling (direct service 
delivery). 
A number of key challenges to delivering services in such contexts are noted below. 
› There may be distributed responsibilities across different parts of national and subnational 
government and authorities. For example, while responsibility for service delivery may lie with 
subnational agencies, central agencies often retain authority for hiring, firing and promoting staff,8 
and line agencies often retain responsibility for sector policies. Priorities at national and 
subnational levels may also differ.9 Program managers must therefore make choices and trade-
offs in deciding on an appropriate degree of alignment and engagement at different levels. 
› Roles and responsibilities across tiers of government are often unclear or not well understood. 
These problems may be overlaid with political factors, complex financial flows and poor financial 
management, particularly at the subnational level. At times, subnational governments are given 
unfunded mandates and funding may flow directly to local members of parliament. These 
arrangements can further complicate the operation of a decentralised system of service delivery.  
› Decentralisation usually happens unevenly, in the context of stronger and weaker jurisdictions. 
This presents difficult choices to donors when deciding how to target assistance, as higher levels 
of poverty are more likely to be in poorly performing areas that present higher levels of risk (for 
both corruption and results) to donors. 
› Decentralisation may lead to greater local accountability for services. Often, however, this does not 
happen, and so there is a need to address the ‘demand side’—the voice and role of citizens in 
service systems. Donors must therefore consider not only government roles, but also how such 
accountability relations with citizens can be improved, and what balance of attention should be 
given to this area. 
› Limited capacity (government, civil society, private sector) at the subnational level has major 
implications for the sustainability of improved services achieved through development assistance. 
For example, support for a local private sector may require training and accreditation for 
companies, as well as increased capacity of subnational authorities for contracting and oversight. 
Donors may need to provide assistance over long timeframes, and select aid modalities that 
provide flexible support to meet needs as they change over time.  
› Different types of reform within a country may lead to contradictions. Decentralisation reform is 
often resisted by those who stand to lose power and authority at the national level. Some types of 
sector reform may recentralise certain functions, and can work against decentralisation.10 Sector-
wide approaches and sector budget support have been criticised in this respect.11 Donors must be 
alert to these tensions, and consider how best to contribute in a given sector. . 
The above challenges are not sector specific. Donors should consider the need for a strategic 
framework to provide support within and across sectors within a given decentralised country context, 
as has been recommended elsewhere.12 The specific considerations for different sectors are 
described in the chapters on health, education and infrastructure (Chapters 2, 3 and 4). 
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1.3 Policy context  
The international and Australian policy contexts are summarised below, with more detail presented in 
Appendix 1. 
International trends in development policy  
The broader context of international aid policy is an important backdrop to this evaluation. The Paris 
Declaration (2005), Accra Agenda for Action (2008), and Busan Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation (2011) all recognise the need for donors to strengthen developing 
countries’ ownership and design of their own development. Alignment to, and greater use of, country 
systems for aid delivery are core aspects of this agenda. The critical role of subnational authorities 
has been identified more recently:  
The importance of subnational governments as actors in the development process and 
as active partners in development assistance has increased [and] the original notion of 
ownership has broadened beyond traditional national actors to include other 
stakeholders in recipient countries, including subnational governments and citizens.13  
The international focus on ‘results’ is also critical. An important consideration for this evaluation was 
whether the drive for immediate, tangible service delivery outcomes may compromise other elements 
of aid effectiveness such as longer-term efforts towards capacity building, institutional reform and 
political engagement.  
Relevant trends in Australian policy context  
Traditionally, Australia’s aid program has mostly engaged with partner governments at the national 
level. Over the last decade, greater priority has being given to engaging at a local level and directing 
resources closer to where services are delivered. This evolution in the aid program’s approach reflects 
commitments to aid effectiveness.14 It is particularly important in countries where the lower levels of 
government are responsible for basic services, however, engaging these levels of government can be 
challenging.  
The Australian national policy context has been shaped by a series of major audits and reforms. The 
relevant issues from recent reforms are:  
Increased use and support of partner systems: The Australian aid white paper in 2006 recognised 
that aid programs that are driven by partner countries were likely to be more sustainable.15 Reviews 
by the OECD Development Assistance Committee and Australian National Audit office advocated 
policy development to guide the use of such systems,16 as well as use of partner government systems 
for design, management, expenditure, monitoring and reporting.17  
Increased investment in services: There has been increased support for service delivery in health, 
education and infrastructure.18 For example, in 2014–15, the main areas of support are in education, 
health and infrastructure: 23 per cent of Australian aid funding on education ($1105.8 million), 16 
per cent on health ($784.7 million) and 10 per cent on infrastructure ($530.3 million).19 Australia’s 
investment is accompanied by recognition of the importance of governance to help secure 
sustainable improvements in service systems.  
Increased aid program coherence: The need to improve coherence and exploit synergies in areas 
such as civil society, governance, and gender, was noted by the independent review of aid 
effectiveness. Since then, the aid architecture has been reviewed to clarify policy and strategy 
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definitions and structures to improve coherence, and there have been moves to integrate governance 
initiatives into sectoral program areas.20 
Increased staff knowledge of partner countries, and staff specialisation: The 2006 white paper 
stressed the need to strengthen the analysis of development issues through deeper knowledge of 
partner countries. The above three issues all have important human resource dimensions, including 
the roles of sector specialists and aid management/policy professionals. To date, competencies for 
specialisation in health and education are strongly sector specific and there is potential for increased 
focus on governance experience, knowledge and skills within requirements for specialist positions.  
1.4  About the evaluation 
This evaluation, which took place between December 2012 and April 2014, builds on a previous Office 
of Development Effectiveness (ODE) evaluation of Australian support for service delivery, published in 
2009.21 The previous evaluation highlighted the challenges present in decentralised contexts, including 
the need for greater recognition and focus on subnational government, and issues concerning local 
capacity to sustain services. The difficulties associated with division of responsibilities and priorities 
between central and subnational governments and the need for greater flexibility in working in such 
contexts, were also noted.22 This evaluation explores these and other issues further, and examines how 
Australian support is changing to meet the complex challenges associated with decentralised contexts. 
The aims of this evaluation are to: 
› assess the extent to which health, education and infrastructure programs have appropriately taken 
into account the role played by subnational authorities  
› provide a stronger evidence base for the design and management of such programs in contexts 
where subnational authorities have significant roles in service delivery. 
In many partner countries receiving Australian aid, subnational authorities, rather than national 
governments, play a key role in service systems, alongside private and civil society actors. This 
evaluation aims to inform effective investment within these contexts. 
Rationale for the evaluation 
The Australian Government invests significant aid resources in supporting partner governments to 
improve service systems, particularly in health, education and basic infrastructure. Priority has been 
given to sector programs that address basic service systems.3 In 2013–14, spending for the strategic 
goal of ‘saving lives’ was expected to comprise 19 per cent of total assistance. This included 
programs focused on increasing access to education, health services (particularly for women and 
children), safe water and sanitation. The strategic goal of ‘effective governance’ was expected to 
comprise 16 per cent of total assistance. This included programs for improving governance to deliver 
better services. Spending on ‘promoting opportunities for all’, including education services, was 
expected to account for 22 per cent of total Australian assistance.23 
                                                        
3  The Comprehensive aid policy framework states that by 2015–16, 25 per cent of the aid budget will be spent on 
education assistance and governance initiatives will be integrated into sectoral programs such as health and 
education.3 
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Evaluation approach and design 
This evaluation focuses on support to improve health, education and infrastructure services.4 
Governance programs are not a major focus; they are considered in terms of the way they operate 
alongside and in relation to other sectors. The evaluation approach incorporates a range of 
perspectives and involved aid program staff in key decisions concerning fieldwork and in review roles.  
The evaluation takes a ‘systems approach’ that seeks to capture the different parts of partner 
governments and other actors involved in service delivery chains in decentralised contexts (see Figure 
1). It examines both the supply and demand side of service delivery.  
The supply side of service delivery in decentralised contexts includes:  
› political decentralisation (of power and authority) 
› administrative decentralisation (of responsibilities for service delivery) 
› fiscal decentralisation (of resources) 
› divestment or market decentralisation (involving transfer of functions to the private sector or non-
government organisations). 
The demand side of service delivery includes:  
› mechanisms for citizen or community participation, voice and influence 
› citizen or community’s access to information to support accountability and transparency 
› the capacity of citizens or community to be active in the mechanisms available to them to 
participate, including social inclusion concerns about gender equity and marginalised groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
4  These three sectors were chosen as they represent the majority of Australian support for service delivery and represent 
key basic needs for the poor. 
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Figure 1. Supply and demand sides of service systems   
 
Evaluation criteria 
The overarching evaluation question is:  
› How effective is Australian support for service delivery in decentralised contexts and how can it be 
improved? 
A number of sub questions were developed to assist in answering this question: 
› What key implementation lessons and good practice (drawn from sectoral, including governance, 
programs) would improve sectoral programming in decentralised contexts?  
› Are decentralisation processes and the role of subnational government appropriately taken into 
account in sectoral designs and evaluations in health, education and infrastructure? 
› Are decentralisation processes and the role of subnational government in service delivery 
appropriately taken into account in Australian aid policy and strategy?  
› Are sectoral staff sufficiently supported organisationally to take decentralisation into account in 
sectoral programming? 
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› What is the level of interaction between sector support and governance support, and how could 
such interaction be optimised to best support service delivery outcomes in decentralised contexts? 
Six evaluation criteria5 are used to clarify the meaning of effective of aid support. Effective aid 
support would involve: 
› sufficient analysis and learning, including the use of sound evidence and knowledge of the 
decentralised context to inform strategy and programming 
› appropriate alignment and relevance with the priorities and policies of partner governments at the 
national and subnational levels 
› an appropriate balance between:6  
» national and subnational levels24,including strengthening subnational institutions25 
» line ministries and central ministries and cross-cutting reforms (e.g. around civil service 
management, human resource management, public financial management and local 
government),26 as ties between these parts of government are often weak27 
» local government (and elected leaders) and local line agencies 
» the demand and supply sides of service delivery (see above)  
› appropriate consideration of sustainability: ownership and strengthened capacity of partner 
government (particularly at the subnational level) 
› equitable targeting of the poorest and of groups such as women, children, minorities and people 
living with disability 
› sufficient coherence of organisation and programming across: 
» the aid investment plan (and whole of program governance issues) 
» within sector portfolios 
» within and across subnational locations  
» within organisational guidance materials 
» Canberra and Post.  
Evaluation methods 
The evaluation focuses on the six countries to which Australia has provided most development aid in 
health, education and infrastructure. These six countries all have some level of decentralisation of 
service delivery responsibilities to subnational authorities in these sectors. A mixed methods 
approach was taken, comprising in-depth inquiry in Indonesia, Papua New Guinea (PNG) and the 
Philippines and a desk-based document review. A short summary of methods is outlined below with 
detailed information presented in Appendix 2. 
In-depth inquiry: We selected Indonesia and PNG for fieldwork because of substantial Australian 
investments in sector programs in these countries. Both countries have decentralised frameworks 
where subnational government has responsibility for health, education and some infrastructure.28 The 
Philippines was included to provide lessons from a country program that has operated over a long 
                                                        
5  Note, these criteria were defined specifically in relation to this evaluation topic and should not be confused with an 
assessment of ‘program effectiveness’ in terms of results, efficiency of specific initiatives.  
6  This criterion does not imply that the Australian aid program should be working at all levels, across all parts of 
government, or across supply and demand in every initiative or sector. Rather, it means that a balance of engagement 
would be expected, based on sound analysis (which might include what other donors or other program areas are doing) 
and realistic expectations of achievable outcomes. 
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period in a decentralised context. Across the three countries, 440 interviews were conducted with a 
wide range of stakeholders from national and subnational levels. Interview transcripts were analysed 
against the key evaluation questions and criteria, with the assistance of qualitative software. 
Interview quotes have been used in this report to illustrate points in the text, and are not necessarily 
representative of a broader perspective unless otherwise indicated. Six sector initiatives from the 
fieldwork were chosen for deeper analysis and profiling.  
Document review: A framework to consider key aspects of service delivery in decentralised contexts 
was applied to a selection of strategy and program documents.7 The document review covered the six 
countries, the fieldwork countries and three others, which have received most Australian support for 
health, education and infrastructure. All six countries all have some level of decentralisation of service 
delivery responsibilities to subnational authorities in these sectors. Literature, including past donor 
evaluations and documentation on decentralisation and service delivery, was reviewed to ensure this 
evaluation built on existing knowledge. 
About this document  
This evaluation is intended to be of use to aid program staff who develop and review strategies and 
programs in decentralised contexts, including sectoral areas. This evaluation is relevant for decision-
making on new investments and mechanisms to support whole-of-aid-program coherence. It presents 
useful findings for technical and policy staff as well as country programs. Representatives from these 
areas were involved in the evaluation through an advisory and learning group. This group gave input 
at key points to ensure the issues of our key audience were addressed. Finally, this evaluation will 
also be of interest to partner governments and development partners in multilateral donor 
arrangements and facilities who are engaging with the same challenges. 
                                                        
7  Country strategies from six countries, four thematic strategies, two delivery strategies, policy guidance and a sample of 
14 sector designs and 11 sector evaluations. A selection of governance program evaluations and thematic performance 
frameworks were also reviewed. 
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2 Lessons from the health sector  
Evaluation question 
› What key implementation lessons and good practice would improve sectoral programming in 
decentralised contexts?  
Key findings 
› Some Australian health support has shifted to increase subnational engagement, but it can be 
challenging to achieve effective and sustainable outcomes in subnational contexts.  
› Developing sound service systems at local levels requires well-resourced and well-thought-out 
support. Building local-level government capacity often requires working from a low base, and 
hence longer timeframes are required to build and consolidate capacity. Equally, sustained 
ownership by local authorities cannot be assumed and programs are vulnerable to changes in 
locally elected leadership which may then affect ownership and results. 
› There are critical aid choices about which subnational level at which to engage (provincial, district 
or service provider) to achieve sustained change. Working at the district level provides the 
opportunity to engage directly with actual service delivery. It also provides opportunities to work 
meaningfully with citizens and civil society organisations, to achieve positive results in service 
provider accountability.  
› Maintaining national-level engagement is important to complement engagement at the 
subnational level. Failure to do so may miss opportunities to engage in policy dialogue, influence 
decisions and replicate good practice and to capitalise on knowledge generated through 
subnational engagement.  
› Improved coherence across governance and health sector programs was demonstrated, 
especially in Papua New Guinea. Communication was evident (including at design phase) to 
ensure there were benefits for both programs and coordination at the subnational level. 
› The resource implications for subnational programming and program coherence is primarily 
related to staff time for communication and cross-program coordination, maintaining a local 
presence and local engagement. 
 
The chapter has four sections: health services and decentralisation (Section 2.1); Australian health 
sector support (Section 2.2); and two profiles based on in-country fieldwork—a maternal and neonatal 
health program in Indonesia (Section 2.3) and support to provincial health authorities in Papua New 
Guinea (PNG; Section 2.4). 
2.1 Health services and decentralisation  
In the health sector in decentralised contexts, central government usually remains responsible for: 
› setting parameters for priority national programs such as family planning and immunisation 
› sector financing arrangements (e.g. taxation-based or insurance-based systems) 
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› how funds are transferred to subnational level to ensure equity 
› standard setting, for example around functions such as the licensing of health professionals, 
registration and quality control of drugs and the design of clinical care protocols.29 The 
subnational level is often responsible for service delivery mechanisms, setting user charges or 
other cost-recovery mechanisms, and planning expenditure allocations.30 
The challenges mentioned in Section 1.2 concerning service delivery in decentralised contexts are 
generally relevant to the health sector. Some specific additional points are as follows.  
› Control of large-scale national health programs usually remain at the central level, and can work 
against decentralisation. For example, in Indonesia the national health ministry and national AIDS 
commission are the main recipients of global grants.31 Since such programs can undermine local 
priorities and planning, they have been considered to have unsustainable outcomes.32  
› A key issue in the health sector is severe shortage of personnel, particularly in subnational 
locations.33  
› Health services may not be prioritised by government at the local level. This means that services 
are reduced where funding transfers from the central to the local level take the form of untied 
grants. For example, decentralisation led to the cessation of family planning services in some local 
government areas in the Philippines.34 In India and China spending on health care under 
decentralisation declined due in part to a lack of prioritisation and also inadequate transfer of 
funds from the central level.35  
› A range of issues related to financing are important. The financing of local-level health care is 
challenging. Taxation-based funding tends to be insufficient, private health insurance excludes the 
poorest, and user fees can reduce access unless they are tightly controlled.36 Health sector 
procurement at the local level offers opportunities for corruption and leakage of funds,37 as can 
other areas of the health service chain. Expenditure at the local level may be directed towards 
high-profile, vote-winning curative health care centres and hospitals rather than more cost-
effective preventive programs and services needed by local populations.38  
An effective role for the private sector in health systems relies on the capacity for stewardship at both 
national and subnational levels. For example, in PNG there are deficiencies in the regulatory and 
governance environment for private health sector, as well as low capacity for provincial and district 
health offices to engage in partnerships that contribute to the current limited private sector role.39  
2.2 Australian health sector support 
The health thematic strategy recognises good health as a fundamental human right which can help to 
achieve other development goals including economic growth. Australian assistance has prioritised 
health systems and services and their responsiveness to poor and vulnerable citizens.40 The health 
strategy contained some coverage and guidance with respect to decentralisation (see Section 6.1). 
The Australian aid budget estimate for 2013–14 for health sector support is $763 million. Of this, 
$380.3 million was allocated to bilateral programs; $301.4 million to global programs; $64.9 million 
to regional programs and $16.7 million to other government departments. Some of the headline 
results arising from existing investments during 2012–13 were 2 768 628 children vaccinated 
against childhood diseases and 304 934 women giving birth attended by a skilled birth attendant. 
This evaluation did not comprehensively evaluate the whole health sector portfolio. We focused on 
service delivery-focused programs, which were generally bilateral programs. Across the top six 
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spending countries in the health sector, the majority of such bilateral programs were implemented by 
managing contractors.  
This evaluation found some evidence that decentralisation and a focus on governance and local-level 
engagement were considered. For example, in PNG staff reported that ‘we work with the governance 
strategy—as health requires both the supply and demand side [and] … better governance is needed 
for the system to function.’ This was verified by a provincial representative: 
Health talk to us about almost everything. Other sectors are yet to come in [but we need] 
to get the sectors to have a think about what they would find useful and task us. The 
[other] sectors don’t think about us as part of their team.’  
Health staff in Indonesia also reported that they were ‘looking into demand side more now … and how 
do you make local government more accountable’ and that they would be focusing further on this 
area. 
The profiles in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 show changes towards greater consideration of decentralisation 
and local-level governance.  
2.3 Maternal and neonatal health program, Indonesia 
We appreciate AIPMNH—it is a neat and tidy work scheme with good ethics of partnership. 
District planning agency, staff interview. 
Background on decentralisation in the Indonesian health sector 
Indonesia’s rapid decentralisation resulted in shared responsibilities for health service delivery across 
national, provincial and district levels. Policy, planning and responsibilities between the three levels of 
government are not always linked or clear. Financial mechanisms are complex, an administrative 
burden at the local level41 and have low rates of expenditure.42 Service delivery varies from province 
to province. For example, eastern Indonesia is reported to be worse than elsewhere, with issues of 
shortages and low capacity in the health workforce, dysfunctional referral systems, and weak 
management and governance.43 
The Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Maternal and Neonatal Health 
The goal of the Australia–Indonesia Partnership for Maternal and Neonatal Health (AIPMNH) is to 
improve maternal and neonatal health and contribute to reaching the relevant Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs).44 A long-term outlook was taken, with the 10-year objective defined as 
‘selected provincial and district governments can effectively manage national, local and donor 
resources to progressively achieve MDG targets for maternal and child health.’45 The initiative 
involved an investment of $68.6 million up to the end of 2013.46 It aims to support a ‘progressive 
move to increasing use of Indonesian Government systems’47 and works in partnership with a range 
of government agencies in 14 districts in Nusa Tengarra Timur province in east Indonesia. Since 
2008, the program has achieved significant outcomes. Maternal deaths in target districts dropped 
from 186 in 2009 to 125 in 2012, and the percentage of births that took place in a facility increased 
from 42 per cent in 2009 to 72 per cent in 2012. Local governments have allocated proportionally 
more funding to health, with 11 of the 14 target districts increasing their budget allocations to 11 to 
20 per cent of the total district budget, exceeding of the national target of 10 per cent.48 
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Before [this program] we just worked 
and did not seek to excel, now we 
feel we have improved and 
complaints are like an indicator that 
we have to work better. 
Local health service, east Indonesia, 
staff interview. 
 
Implementation is led by a managing contractor, with some staff placed in local government health 
offices. The initiative works across villages, health centres and hospitals.49 Within the wider context of 
the aid program’s health portfolio, the more recent Australia–Indonesia Partnership for Health System 
Strengthening has been able to take advantage of key relationships and activities supported through 
AIPMNH.50  
The evidence base underpinning the design of the initiative was strong, particularly for the 
subnational level. This demonstrates one of the potential benefits choosing a single subnational 
location. The initiative provides detailed analysis of the subnational context of the chosen province, 
including discussion of the links between current decentralisation reforms and health sector 
reforms. 51 In addition, a solid assessment was made of the demand side of health services, including 
‘community reluctance to use services and lack of accountability to service users.’52 The design 
documents do not contain much reference to international literature, however the independent 
progress review draws on such literature and provides a positive assessment of the approaches laid 
out in the design.53  
Alignment and relevance to national and subnational levels 
AIPMNH has strong alignment with both national and subnational agendas and to national priorities, 
particularly MDGs 4 and 5, as well as the Indonesian Government’s medium-term development plan 
and the National Making Pregnancy Safer Strategy (2001–10). 54 Nusa Tengarra Timur province is 
behind on achieving the minimum health standards compared to the rest of Indonesia and has lower 
government revenues, higher rates of poverty, and poorer health indicators. This means that 
Australian support is highly relevant to the chosen subnational context. A particular strength is 
AIPMNH’s use of existing district government recruitment, budgeting and planning processes.55 
Engagement across different parts of government and with community 
AIPMNH has not always achieved a good balance in its engagement with different parts of 
government. Participants reported a lack of engagement at the national level. This engagement was 
intended in the design, but was not implemented due to inadequate resourcing. The missed 
opportunity for policy-level dialogue at national level is noted in two reviews (2010 and 2012). The 
2010 review notes ‘inconsistent involvement of the most senior Government of Indonesia officials’ 
and need for ‘a more robust policy dialogue’56 and that ‘currently, there is little or no policy dialogue 
by AusAID, making it extremely difficult for there to be any systematic improvement to government 
systems.’57 The 2012 review repeats this message.58  
The balance of engagement across different local agencies has been put forward as a strength of the 
program, and was reportedly also facilitated by the local planning agency.59 Engagement with both 
political leaders and local authorities was also reported to be constructive. For example, a local 
stakeholder mentioned how issues were resolved with support ‘from local government and from the 
legislators.’ However, existing gaps in communication between authorities and the leadership have 
been difficult to overcome. This is reflected in one district leader commenting that ‘[the Australian aid 
program] doesn’t give me enough information about their 
health program.’  
AIPMNH had good engagement with the local community 
in terms of demand-side engagement with service users, 
more than is visible in other profiles. Local health staff 
reported becoming more accountable to communities and 
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To achieve the goals requires a long 
term—at least five more years 
required. 
District health, east Indonesia,         
staff interview 
 
mentioned the use of a community survey: ‘There is a satisfaction index survey conducted by the 
public that is helpful.’ AIPMNH also established a board made up of community members to act as an 
intermediary between the community and health centres. In one health centre, AIPMNH actively 
supported local accountability: ‘The demand side is to increase citizen participation. Before, services 
were driven by central government so people didn’t need to think about how to engage, [whereas 
current reform] seeks to bring the community in to improve quality.’  
 
Midwife at Tuabatan village, Timor Tengah Utara, Nusa Tenggara Timur, Indonesia. Photo: DFAT 
Sustainability through ownership and capacity building 
Sustainability is described in the design document as ‘built in’ through a partnership approach, 
however, there are mixed results. On the positive side, there is evidence of local commitment 
(e.g. new regulations about births at health centres), local parliaments agreeing to provide financial 
resources (e.g. an incentive payment to medical personnel and budgets for transport) and strong trust 
and engagement between local government and the program.60  
At the same time, concerns have also been raised in 
reviews about lack of an exit strategy61 and that ‘current 
gains might not be sustained.’62 Sustainability of capacity-
building outcomes is seen as important but does not appear 
to have been well monitored.63 The low capacity at the 
subnational level is a challenge to sustainability and 
requires long timeframes: ‘The strategy is over-reliant on government processes and systems that are 
poorly developed and in need of strengthening over the longer term.’64 The challenges of high staff 
turnover exacerbate the problem: ‘The largest threat to sustainability is staff turnover of health 
workers at [the health centre] and hospital level.’65 A local government representative interviewee 
also noted that ‘we are worried about what will happen if AIPMNH ends in June.’ One final concern on 
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sustainability relates to a lack of engagement at the provincial level. A program staff member noted 
that ‘[we] need to be realistic about what the province is actually going to do. We have become a de 
facto health office in NTT [Nusa Tenggara Timur province] which wasn’t our intention but districts 
want our help.’ A recent report also reflects on this: ‘The program design did not budget for capacity 
building of the provincial health office in any meaningful or strategic way, so any gains on this front 
have been haphazard at best, which impacts on sustainability.’66 
Equity and gender  
The subnational location was chosen on the basis of equity concerns: ‘Using assessment criteria 
including distribution of wealth quintiles, total fertility rate, human development index, infant 
mortality rate, contraceptive prevalence and prevalence for stunting, NTT continues to rank among 
the 10 worst provinces.’67 Staff reported that AIPMNH also meets the needs of marginalised groups 
such as unmarried women and the very poor, and some health centres have ramps for people with a 
disability.  
AIPMNH has resulted in significant outcomes concerning women’s maternal mortality: ‘When you look 
at the AIPMNH program overall in 14 districts, the decrease has been 38 per cent.’68 However, while 
the program is focused on women’s health—particularly pregnant women—consideration of broader 
gender concerns has been limited, and gender outcomes have not been monitored.69 A recent review 
noted that current approaches (which align with current male-dominated culture) potentially take 
away women’s agency and that ‘there are pressing gender issues that affect maternal health, notably 
a woman’s right to act in her own best interest and to be able to decide independently to seek 
care.’70 
Our fieldwork also revealed a lack of attention to women’s reproductive rights, in line with a recent 
report: ‘Most women living in rural NTT villages are severely constrained in making and implementing 
informed decisions regarding their reproductive health.’71 A commitment to include this, and other 
gender issues such as maternal and neonatal health and nutrition, in future phases of the initiative 
has been made.72  
Complementing other initiatives 
Coordination was envisaged between east Indonesian programs, however, this has not succeeded in 
practice. The evaluation found informal relationships between AIPMNH and other programs rather than 
strategic and intentional arrangements. A review noted that ‘it would be beneficial for an ongoing 
process that promotes identification of the strategic inter-sectoral opportunities between the programs 
in a more structured way.’73 Aid program health staff in Jakarta noted a lack of coordination and 
sharing of lessons: ‘[We] haven’t reflected on common threads present in our programs, reports, 
personnel, because we are operating in silos’ and ‘More joining the better. [We are] currently doing this 
randomly.’  
During this evaluation, complications in the relationship between AIPMNH and the Australia–
Indonesia Partnership for Decentralisation (AIPD) were noted. A progress review of AIPMNH 
recommended that AIPD undertake governance activities, which AIPMNH had started. The review 
argued that the public financial management issues AIPMNH was attempting to address ‘cannot be 
[solved] without widespread public financial management reform’ and should not be the focus of a 
sector program such as AIPMNH. However, program staff reported that AIPD did not have a mandate 
to work on various areas that were arising as concerns (e.g. procurement) for AIPMNH. 
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2.4 Support to provincial health authorities in PNG 
We have a better chance of ownership if we get to decide what we do. 
Provincial Health Authority,PNG, interview. 
Background on decentralisation in the PNG health sector 
Health services in PNG are delivered by government and church institutions74 with responsibilities 
shared across national, provincial and local levels.8 Significant responsibility for health delivery lies at 
the provincial level. Provinces manage the primary health care system including hospitals and some 
3300 rural health centres.75 The national Department of Health funds national and provincial 
hospitals, is responsible for drug procurement and distribution, sets and maintains minimum medical 
standards76 and looks after tertiary training and salary systems. The responsibility for providing new 
rural health infrastructure is unclear, though increasingly this is seen as the domain of members of 
parliament using their constituency funds. PNG’s local-level governments have minimal formal 
responsibilities for health. 
Service delivery is undermined by poor-quality intergovernmental coordination, short-term and 
politicised leadership, and pervasive corruption in public administration.77 Several interviewees 
highlighted these challenges, noting:  
› the tendency for central departments to maintain control (e.g. over human resources, finances, 
appointment of provincial treasurers) 
› inadequate funds reaching district and provincial levels 
› political interference, particularly at the provincial level where funds are provided to members of 
parliament rather than to the administrative authorities; and inadequate capacity at the district 
level. 
The current National Health Plan 2011–20 includes new provincial health authorities (PHAs)9 to help 
overcome the lack of coordination between the national Department of Health, provinces, districts 
and non-state actors. PHAs will have responsibility for all health services within the province. It is not 
yet clear whether the initiative will move beyond the current three provinces (Milne Bay, Eastern 
Highlands and Western Highlands).  
Background on Australian support to provincial health authorities 
Australia uses nine health and governance programs10 to support the three pilot PHAs.11 The goal is 
to support the PHAs as a vehicle to reform public health service delivery by developing capacity to 
                                                        
8  PNG comprises 21 provinces (and 1 autonomous region), 89 districts, and 313 local-level governments. 
Decentralisation in PNG is defined in the 1995 Organic law on provincial and local level government. 
9  Based on the 2007 Provincial Health Authorities Act which allows establishment of a separate authority. 
10  (i) Health Sector improvement Program—direct financing; (ii) Health and HIV Implementing Services Provider—technical 
assistance, grants and research support; (iii) Economic and Public Sector Program—engagement with central agencies 
on financing, human resources; (iv) Sub-National Program—capacity development in provincial Administration; (v) Health 
Procurement Program—direct procurement or distribution; (vi) Health Awards Scholarships—health worker training; (vii) 
Churches Partnership Program—mobilise communities in health-seeking behaviour; (viii) Strongim Pipol Strongim 
Nesen—grants to communities and civil society organisations for activities and involvement in local-level health 
planning; (ix) Incentive Fund Program—innovative projects to well-performing organisations. Sources: Milne Bay: Health 
& HIV Development Agreement Final Draft 2012; Eastern Highland Province, Health service Agreement, 2012; Western 
Highlands Province, Health & HIV Service Agreement, 2012; Western Province, Health & HIV Service Agreement, 2012. 
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manage, deliver and monitor a minimum package of health services.78 Funding to support PHAs is 
estimated to be about $220 million. One of the key programs—the Health Capacity Development 
Program (HCDP)—has funding of $60 million, targeted at the subnational level.79  
Australia’s partnership agreements for each PHA were based on independent capacity diagnostics, 
which identified entry points to strengthen service delivery.80 The aid program supports:81  
› planning and budget preparation at the national and subnational levels 
› joint annual assessment of institutional, organisational and health service delivery 
› longer-term in-province advisory assistance to strengthen provincial and district capacity to plan, 
budget, spend, monitor and report on total health funding 
› advisers based at the national Department of Health with expertise in mentoring, change 
management, leadership, health financing, accounting, and human resources management 
› financing and procurement of goods and services.  
Significant analysis of the subnational level and decentralised context was provided in the HCDP 
design. The design responds to evidence from previous reviews that pointed to a need to shift the 
focus of technical assistance to the subnational level with a strengthened focus on service delivery.82 
A more recent review of the PHAs raises questions as to whether adequate analysis was undertaken 
of the national-level agencies and their role. This review describes significant deficiencies in 
preparation and support from the national level for the three pilot PHAs.83 
 
In Mul Baiyer District, Western Highlands Province, Papua New Guinea. Photo: ISF, UTS 
National and subnational alignment and relevance  
Australian support is PHAs strongly aligned and relevant to national and subnational priorities, though 
shifting subnational priorities is challenging. At the national level, Australia’s support contributes to 
PNG’s National Health Plan 2011–20 and the HCDP approach aims to ‘reinforce GoPNG [PNG 
                                                                                                                                                                            
11  The PHAs were first set up in PNG in late 2011; partnership agreements between Australia and priority PHAs were 
signed in 2012 with support starting from 2013. 
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[The Australian aid program is] not 
seen as a donor program but seems 
to be integrated into government 
departments. 
National Department of Health, PNG, 
staff interview 
 
I see AusAID support over the years 
and I value this … having the policies 
is great but these policies need to be 
stronger at subnational levels and 
AusAID could come in with more 
technical advice. 
National Department of Health, PNG, 
staff interview 
 
Government] holistic strategies rather than develop ad hoc activities. It will minimise the use of 
parallel systems limiting them to agreed areas where there are genuine capacity gaps and/or high 
fiduciary and development risks of using GoPNG 
systems.’84 The PHAs themselves are a national 
initiative. National counterparts were appreciative of the 
aid program’s approach: ‘[Australia] is a very good 
partner, it has flexibility to align with the GoPNG whereas 
other donors are more fixed. [The Australian aid 
program] is very supportive, incorporates local 
knowledge.’ 
At the subnational level, PHAs are under way in the three pilot provinces and Australian support is 
targeted to them.85 Yet, local commitment to establish effective subnational working arrangements 
for PHAs is variable. Lack of leadership from governors and provincial and district administrators was 
revealed in the recent review of PHAs.86 The two new provincial governors were seen to pose a threat 
to the continuation with the PHA and the risk of reverting back to previous arrangements.87 In 
addition, during fieldwork interviews, officials at both the provincial and district levels were seen to 
prioritise roads ahead of health. Australian support has been set up to ensure a fixed percentage of 
funds is spent on health and also to allow flexible use of funding for health and to allocate grants in a 
responsive way, and to increase allocations to provinces that are performing well. This is one way to 
support alignment and relevance. 
Engagement across different parts of partner government and with community 
The balance of engagement between national and 
subnational levels has changed significantly towards a 
much stronger focus on the subnational level. In taking 
up a focus on PHAs, staff reported that the subnational 
level now receives about 80–85 per cent of health 
program funding. This is a major shift, and likely will help 
address PNG Government perceptions that the aid 
program focuses too strongly at the national level. 
In terms of balance between sector and central agencies, a recent review noted that there was 
insufficient engagement with central agencies: ‘More work is required to effectively engage with 
central agencies in 2012.’88 The Milne Bay agreement also notes the challenge of ensuring 
engagement of central agencies towards resolving PHA policy conflicts, financing and staffing and 
improving accountability. It proposes that the Economic and Public Sector Program address this area 
(see Appendix 2). 
Australian support aims to find a good balance between engaging with political leaders and 
administrators at the subnational level. One of the health service agreements’ guiding principles is 
that ‘leadership will come from both politicians and senior public servants using their powers and 
authority to guide, direct and manage.’ An interviewee in one subnational location indicated that the 
aid program has now made funds available where members of parliament have demonstrated a 
commitment to the health sector and that PHA has attracted significant attention from members of 
parliament in that province. 
Within the PHA service agreements (e.g. for Milne Bay) there is some mention of local engagement in 
the form of ‘community mobilisation’ strategies, however the agreements contain no discussion of 
how citizens hold service providers to account. The approach to achieve balance across the demand 
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and supply sides of service delivery appears to be to address the demand side through other 
governance programs (e.g. Strongim Pipol Strongim Nesen and Churches Partnership Program). This 
is discussed further below. 
Sustainability through ownership and capacity building 
The documented strategy for sustainability appears sound, but remains to be tested. It gives attention 
to ownership (through working in partnership), alignment with PNG Government planning and 
reporting processes, and coordination in the form of a single-capacity development plan. It provides 
for reduced reliance on long-term advisers, greater emphasis on national in-line positions,12 
strategies for procurement functions, emphasis on peer learning and mutual accountability for 
results.89 Decision-making about activities lies with subnational partners. For example, one provincial 
officer reported:  
This PHA agreement is quite significant as it has monitoring frameworks attached to it 
and this is the first year we have identified and chosen projects ourselves. We have a 
better chance of ownership if we get to decide what we do.90  
Also, HCDP ‘integrate[s] their support within PNG-led programs to strengthen capacity 
development.’91  
These measures will be critical considering the challenging environment in which the support to PHAs 
takes place. As mentioned earlier, a recent review identified many issues related to a lack of 
leadership at all levels, a lack of political support worsened by changes in elected leaders, insufficient 
planning, insufficient support to provinces from the national level, and inadequate advocacy for and 
awareness of PHAs.92 Staff may need to rethink the proposed strategies for implementation and 
sustainability and consider how to address these systemic issues which could undermine PHAs. 
Australia’s support for PHAs is justified, given their critical role. However, the challenges in addressing 
the problems surrounding their establishment does pose potential risks for achieving effective 
outcomes and points to the need for rigorous monitoring. 
Equity and gender  
The three pilot PHA provinces were self-selected as pilots, on the basis of interest and commitment 
rather than poverty. However, these provinces include seven of the 20 ‘high poverty’ districts in 
PNG.93 During our fieldwork, there was frequent mention of a lack of accurate data on which to base 
funding decisions concerning target locations.  
The HCDP has clear strategies that focus on gender equality. One promotes maternal health through 
provincial support for maternal care and family planning. A second increases women’s role in the 
health workforce through recruitment and representation of women on decision-making bodies such 
as the PHA boards.13 Finally, sex-disaggregated data is used to inform efforts to increase accessibility 
of health services and ensure gender responsive budgeting.94 The design does not detail how these 
strategies would be implemented and reviewed. 
                                                        
12  Supported with salary supplements as incentives for high-quality personnel. 
13  There is a requirement within the Provincial Health Authority Act 2007 for one of nine PHA board members to be a 
woman.  
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Complementing other initiatives 
Program documentation considers integration of Australian support, particularly between health 
sector and governance programs. Aid program staff envisaged this being facilitated within the 
subnational strategy. However, it is less clear how such activities delivered through different programs 
would be ‘joined up.’ For example, it is not clear how efforts on the supply side (concerning PHAs) and 
demand side reinforce one another, or how efforts with central agencies and work with sector 
agencies and provincial administrations are to be coordinated. Fieldwork for this evaluation indicated 
that the aid program needs to consider more carefully how to support coordination at subnational 
level. Government stakeholders at both national and subnational levels reported coordination of aid 
programs at provincial level to be a ‘major issue’ and that there was ‘no coordination at the frontline.’  
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3 Lessons from the education sector  
Evaluation question 
› What key implementation lessons and good practice would improve sectoral programming in 
decentralised contexts? 
 
Key findings 
› Australian education support does not always consider decentralisation and subnational roles. A 
positive example is the emergence of a stronger focus on these aspects in the Philippines, 
however, programs in Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Indonesia had more limited engagement with 
subnational government.  
› In some cases, systems are developed and used to deliver support in parallel to existing systems 
(e.g. through a private contractor). Reasons for choosing to use parallel systems relate to the 
assessment of fiduciary risks (PNG) and to avoid the complexity of layers and actors (Indonesia). 
› The use of parallel systems does not help to build local capacity in subnational partner systems, 
and thus can affect sustainability. The risks of limited subnational engagement include the 
deterioration of aid funded school infrastructure due to lack of maintenance by local government, 
and continued lack of capacity to plan and budget for this area. 
› There have been missed opportunities for innovation and capacity building within existing 
programs.  
› Effective support at the subnational level is possible, including with ongoing national engagement 
to enable replication of good practice, as demonstrated in the Philippines. 
› Education and governance programs have complementary aims in both PNG and the Philippines, 
though the former could be more strategic.  
 
The chapter has four sections: education service delivery and decentralisation (Section 3.1); 
Australian education sector support (Section 3.2); and two profiles based on in-country fieldwork—a 
service provision facility in PNG (Section 3.3) and an education program in Philippines (Section 3.4). 
3.1 Education service delivery and decentralisation  
In the education sector, central governments typically retain responsibility for policy, standard setting, 
regulation, supervision, and decisions related to the national curriculum content, instruction time, 
teachers’ salaries and resource allocation. Subnational levels are often involved in school 
management and governance, as well as performance monitoring.95 
The challenges mentioned in Section 1.2 concerning service delivery in decentralised contexts apply 
to education service delivery. There are additional challenges particular to the education sector:  
› Motivated, qualified teachers are the most critical component of quality education, and teachers’ 
salaries form the largest part of the education budget.96 This raises important questions in a 
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decentralised context about how resources for salaries are allocated. Human resource 
management therefore becomes a central consideration and in many contexts requires 
engagement with central agencies.  
› A large share of funds must be spent at the local and school levels, involving a very large number 
of locations. This underlines the importance of donors using existing financing systems rather than 
parallel systems which are neither practical nor sustainable.97  
› School funding, which often supports fee-free schooling, is a recurrent cost, and requires planning 
and budgeting at the subnational level. However, due to central government fears that local 
authorities may not prioritise school funding, in some contexts such funding remains centrally 
managed. This becomes a vicious cycle where subnational level authorities are side-lined and do 
not have incentives for taking over this responsibility.98  
› School infrastructure requires ongoing management and maintenance, and is usually a shared 
responsibility between schools and local government. However, if local government ownership is 
low, there are often inadequate plans and budgets for this work.99  
› A focus on school-based management as a mechanism to increase accountability between schools 
and the communities they serve is seen as an approach that responds to decentralisation. In some 
locations, it has assisted with resource allocation, hiring of additional teachers outside the civil 
service, better teacher attendance rates and improved learning environment and learning 
outcomes.100  
3.2 Australian education sector support 
Education forms a significant part of the Australian aid program. In 2014-2015, 23 per cent of aid 
program funding will be on education ($1105.8 million).101 The education thematic strategy 
recognises the international commitment to universal primary education. It focuses on improving 
access to basic education and learning outcomes. It also commits to driving development through 
better governance, recognising the role of partner governments to support quality education. This 
strategy only gave partial consideration to decentralisation and its implications for education service 
delivery. It was the weakest among the sector strategies in this regard (see Section 6.1).This 
evaluation found that education sector staff appreciated the need to engage with decentralisation, 
subnational levels and governance. For example, in the Philippines a staff member said that ‘you 
can’t move unless we change governance … everything is a process towards readiness for 
decentralisation in education.’ In Indonesia, education staff also spoke of the importance of aligning 
with partner government priorities: ‘[The] bulk of [Australian aid program] funds goes on budget 
[support] … so flow of funds cannot contradict national government decentralisation goals. We are 
supposed to be supporting better governance. We have to understand the systems and the context, 
this is fundamental.’  
In the Philippines, significant progress has been made, as is clear from the profile (Section 3.4). In 
Indonesia, however, implementation was found to be difficult. In relation to partner government 
assessments and because of the number of local authorities, staff reported that it was ‘easier and 
safer to do it at the national government level.’ The term ‘safer’ reflects the high fiduciary risk that 
may exist at the subnational level. PNG education program staff also spoke of the difficulty of working 
at the subnational level. Previously, the PNG Government was focused on the national system and so 
was reluctant to have different approaches in individual provinces. Hence, the aid program chose to 
align with the national government. Another problem was the lack of data at the subnational level for 
choosing where to work and the costs involved in data collection to fill this gap.  
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The two profiles below were chosen as examples of how Australian support has addressed 
decentralisation and engagement at the subnational level.  
3.3 School infrastructure, PNG 
To deliver school infrastructure providing support for the design, contracting and construction of 
basic and secondary education facilities. 
Australian Agency for International Development, Australian support for basic and secondary 
education 2010–15, Delivery Strategy, AusAID, Canberra, 2010. 
Background on decentralisation in the PNG education sector 
In the PNG education sector, provincial and local governments assumed formal responsibility for 
elementary, primary and many aspects of secondary education in 1996.14 The national government is 
responsible for policy, regulatory and curriculum development across the sector, and for national 
textbook procurement. It is responsible for the system of school operating grants and management of 
national high schools and tertiary institutions. Teachers sit outside the provincial government 
workforce structures, (though provinces undertake some critical human resource functions for 
teachers). The national level has key teacher human resource and payroll responsibilities. The 
national level also has school inspectors in all provinces (though there is a concurrent provincial 
responsibility to also undertake school inspections). Provincial-level governments manage and 
maintain provincial high schools, and manage primary and elementary schools. The provincial 
education function grant is expected to supplement the national subsidy through either direct 
payment or in-kind support for schools. Local government’s role is to maintain primary and 
elementary school buildings, though in practice this function now seems to rest with the schools 
themselves using national and provincial subsidies.102 Accordingly, education in PNG’s provinces 
does not fit within a ‘neat’ decentralised model. This may in part influence Australia’s decision to limit 
direct and flexible support to provinces.  
There is a system of intergovernmental accountability, including a mechanism that obliges provinces 
to expend education function grants on a set of priority areas.103 However, in practice, the roles of 
each level are not well understood, leading to inefficiencies and communication gaps.104 During our 
fieldwork, a provincial administrator noted that ‘[a] lot of provinces are dissatisfied with the way 
things are done in Port Moresby. There is total indifference to us there … they say one thing, do 
another, and nobody is listening.’ Similarly, a district education official said that ‘people at the 
provincial level can preach that they are assisting, but they are not. I’ve been here for 14 years and 
never seen provincial government assisting us.’  
The financing arrangements are complex and fragmented, with delays and low levels of expenditure. 
The risk of corruption is present across all levels of government. In 2010, fee-free education was 
introduced, increasing demand for infrastructure and teachers. During our fieldwork, it was apparent 
that the national Department of Education has been unwilling to take the lead in responding to this 
demand. The responsibility nominally lies with provincial and local government, but there is 
insufficient ownership at those levels. PNG has no systematic mechanism that provides or earmarks 
funds for provincial education infrastructure. In recent years, it appears that school infrastructure is 
expected to be met through the ever-increasing system of constituency funding for local members of 
                                                        
14  In line with the Organic law on provincial and local level government; AusAID, Australian support for basic and 
secondary education 2010–2015. 
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parliament. This further complicates responsibilities at subnational level because this often operates 
outside provincial government systems. 
Background on support to school infrastructure and policy context 
Providing school infrastructure is one aspect of Australian support for the education sector. It is of 
interest to this evaluation since infrastructure is clearly defined as a subnational responsibility. The 
PNG Education Delivery Strategy 2010–15 notes three main modalities:  
› direct financial support 
› specialised services provision, now called service provision facility (SPF) 
› capacity development.  
Infrastructure provision lies within the SPF modality. SPF operates at the provincial level, with 
coordination at the national level, while the two other modalities had a national engagement and 
focus only. 
The delivery strategy indicated that an external procurement specialist would provide support where 
the PNG Government lacks capacity to deliver new infrastructure.105 The goal was ‘to deliver school 
infrastructure providing support for the design, contracting and construction of basic and secondary 
education facilities (classrooms, teacher houses, dormitories and other facilities).’106 In line with this, 
a private contractor directly provides and installs ‘kit’ schools. The indicative budget for school 
infrastructure rose from $13 million in 2010–11 to almost $25 million per year in 2013–14 and 
2014–15.15 In 2010, school infrastructure expenditure comprised 28.9 per cent of education sector 
support.107 Staff reported during fieldwork that 20 schools in 20 provinces (400 in total) are under 
construction. 
The education delivery strategy appears to provide the main framework and basis for support to 
school infrastructure. There is no separate design document, which means our ability to review the 
evidence on this component was limited. The strategy does speak about the political, administrative, 
capacity, financing, public financial and management constraints related to the process of 
decentralisation.108 
The aid program’s decision to use external contractors rather than go through PNG Government 
systems was based on the following reasoning:  
While there are strong arguments to move aggressively to the use of government 
systems, with the requisite safeguards, there are still areas where the fiduciary risk is 
too great at present. This is due to low capacity in key areas such as large-scale 
procurement and the administration of human resources.109  
A previous review of Australia’s school infrastructure support recommended that provincial roles in 
infrastructure provision be clarified.110 This, and other lessons from the report, does not appear to be 
part of the current support.  
                                                        
15  Estimated from: AusAID, Australian support for basic and secondary education 2010–15, 2010, assuming that the 
proportion of service provision funds that is spent on infrastructure stays at the level it was in 2010, which is about 
60 per cent.  
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Double classroom provided by DFAT as part of an infrastructure kit for primary schools, Milne Bay Province, 
PNG. Photo: DFAT 
  
Old building housing two primary school classrooms, Milne Bay Province, Papua New Guinea. Photo: DFAT 
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[Working at subnational level is] built 
in to the strategy but the absence of 
an implementation plan for school 
development, at subnational level or 
otherwise made the Australian aid 
program’s work quite hard. 
Australian aid program,  
staff interview 
 
National and subnational alignment and relevance  
Support to school infrastructure aligns with national government priorities and plans.16 Although the 
need for schools in all provinces is evident, this was not always a high priority for provincial 
government. Our fieldwork indicated that provinces tended to prioritise roads and other areas ahead 
of education. In the current support, 20 school kits were provided to each province, based on the 
valid argument that there is a need across the country. This approach, however, does not necessarily 
ensure the aid program is aligned and relevant in chosen subnational locations. For example, some 
provinces were interested and became involved (e.g. Milne Bay) while others were reported to have 
never responded to letters offering free schools.  
Engagement across different parts of partner government and with community 
The engagement between the national and subnational levels appeared uneven. During fieldwork, 
participants reported that the aid program had facilitated discussions at the national level on school 
infrastructure needs, and internal documentation notes the development of an infrastructure 
selection process.  
Meeting the aspirations of the delivery strategy to engage at subnational level has proved difficult. 
The delivery strategy recognised the role of subnational government:  
In education and other sectors, a key lesson learned is the need to work more 
proactively with subnational administrations, and to specifically target capacity-building 
activities to subnational roles and responsibilities.’111  
It also noted that ‘there is a requirement that the [SPF] support … would … strengthen GoPNG 
government and church delivery systems as part of its services.112  
However, subnational engagement and targeted capacity building around planning and undertaking 
new works has not been part of the support. One program staff member commented that it has been 
difficult to work at the subnational level in this sector. In general, the role of provincial government in 
the current approach to supplying school infrastructure is limited to ‘consultation’ around selection of 
schools. Local provincial education officials mentioned to us that they had set up a selection 
committee to select schools. Interviews with program staff noted that ‘provincial departments supply 
names of schools that need support and each province 
has 20 sets of facilities.’ In this same province, school 
staff noted the importance of the aid program provincial-
level staff member who had resolved issues, including 
complaints about the contractor. This latter example 
demonstrates the beneficial role played by aid program 
provincial representatives at the site of service delivery, 
and gives some indication of the need for more formal 
subnational engagement with relevant authorities. 
There is limited community engagement in the current approach. An earlier review of school 
infrastructure notes the risks of providing kit buildings: ‘There is a danger that the provision of kit sets 
will undermine the message of the original BEDP [Basic Education Development Project] approach, 
namely that communities should take their share of responsibility for school buildings.’113 Further, 
the review emphasised that ‘the original question of how communities and provincial authorities will 
                                                        
16  For example: the National Education Plan 2005–14, the PNG Universal Basic Education Plan 2010–19 and the PNG 
Development Strategic Plan 2010–30. 
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[Australian support to] education 
seems remote to us. We can see the 
benefit, but we want to be involved. I 
feel like a spectator … I don’t want to 
be negative [but] we need some 
feeling of involvement and 
ownership. 
Provincial administrator, PNG, 
interview 
 
work together to build and maintain schools is still an essential one … and one to which [Australia] 
and the DoE [Department of Education] will need to return.’114 This evaluation suggests that more 
work is needed to ensure appropriate demand-side engagement. Governance programs17 were 
reported to have some focus on the demand side of education but it was unclear how these linked to 
school infrastructure provision. 
Sustainability through ownership and capacity building 
This evaluation found potential for a lack of ownership of school infrastructure at the school, district 
and provincial levels, which is likely to lead to a deterioration of the facilities. The technical design 
reportedly took account of this issue. Program staff indicated that even with no maintenance, the 
buildings were designed to last 30 years.18 Overall, however, it did not seem that heed had been 
taken of the broader sustainability risks pointed out in the delivery strategy:  
Lessons from past Australian support to education, indicates that direct provision of 
services through project support has a poor track record in managing sustainability 
risks, demonstrated for example through lack of national funding for some key recurrent 
costs (teaching, materials).115  
DoE does not provide funds or resources to ensure the maintenance and upkeep of the 
existing and the new school facilities and buildings funded by [the Australian aid 
program]. This leads to gradual breakdown and decay of buildings, reduced 
opportunities for students to attend and deterioration of basic education learning 
facilities.116  
Rather, staff reported making an explicit decision to provide school infrastructure directly through an 
external provider, having weighed up the risks of this and other approaches. 
In one province we visited, there were arrangements in 
place for maintenance and interviews revealed they had 
recently developed a policy for asset maintenance. 
Australia had assisted this through a governance 
program,19 demonstrating that linkage between aid 
programs is evident in some locations and is providing 
benefits.  
Lack of ownership at the provincial level was reported 
during fieldwork by the same provincial administrator who 
noted the difference between Australia’s approaches in education and health:  
In health, we have tried but in education we haven’t tried to get our provincial people 
involved. They [Australian education program] work outside our system. [The Australian 
aid program] get contractors from outside of the province who don’t understand the 
place so you feel distance from what you’re doing. 
Members of one of the provincial assemblies also asked for greater government ownership and 
empowerment: ‘We should make some empowerment for local-level governments.’ These officials 
                                                        
17  Community Development Scheme, Democratic Transition Program, and the Strongim Pipol Strongim Nesen Program. 
18  Other local stakeholders indicated they did not believe it would last that long, and it is also unrealistic that additions 
such as water supply and ablution blocks will remain functional without maintenance. 
19  Provincial Performance Improvement Initiative. 
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voiced a desire for stronger engagement at district and local level: ‘We need to think about delivering 
the needs of the people and this is best understood through the local-level government.’ 
Equity and gender  
Support for school infrastructure was provided equally across the provinces. This was justified by aid 
program staff at the national level in terms of the high need across the country, and the lack of 
available data to allow a more informed decision: ‘[The] level of need in infrastructure across the 
country is so high that equally across provinces is as good [an approach] as any.’ It is not clear 
whether subsequent provincial decisions in selecting school locations included an emphasis on 
poverty or equity.  
The evaluation fieldwork indicated that the construction of ablution blocks had contributed to girls’ 
attendance at school. In relation to people with a disability, the delivery strategy commits to taking 
their needs into account in the design of school infrastructure: ‘Care will be taken to address the 
physical and educational needs of male and female students with disabilities, including in the design 
of classrooms and improving access to basic services.’117  
Complementing other initiatives 
The education delivery strategy goes some way towards supporting complementarity between 
different initiatives within the education sector, but does not make clear the links between the three 
main support modalities. The strategy mentions links with governance programs, but without clarity 
about the practicalities of linking or specific subnational locations where this is envisaged. 
It appeared that engagement of subnational aid program staff has already proved beneficial for the 
education programs in the manner described in the delivery strategy:  
Officers co-located in the provincial administrations of five provinces have frequent 
interactions with the education divisions in the provinces and will be increasingly relied 
upon to provide regular feedback on the education issues, challenges and developments 
in the education sector.118  
Our fieldwork confirmed this by revealing that one of the recipient schools appreciated the role of the 
aid program officer. 
Indonesia education program.  
During our fieldwork, we engaged with Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia, particularly 
with the component related to school infrastructure and school systems quality. This program is 
somewhat similar to the one described for PNG. It involves strong national engagement with the 
education line ministry, and the extensive use of private contractors who engage at school level. The 
chosen approach is influenced by national line ministry policy on directly funding schools and 
bypassing subnational government. This represents a typical contradiction found in decentralised 
contexts between national agencies and those at local level. The program uses parallel systems for 
monitoring quality that is outside of government systems, and implemented by the school systems 
quality program. The program appeared to have limited leadership roles and engagement at the 
subnational level, which seems inappropriate given their responsibility for school infrastructure and 
its maintenance. For instance, at the subnational level one interviewee noted that: ‘All [is] determined 
in Jakarta and local governments don’t know what’s going on—schools get built and local 
governments don’t know about it.’  
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This approach appears inconsistent with the thrust of the Indonesia country strategy which includes 
consideration of decentralisation. It is also inconsistent with evidence in the education design 
document, which highlights learning from past programs in Indonesia including issues of poor district 
capacity in school construction and maintenance: ‘in a decentralised system, capacity-building 
activities need[s] to work at the central and subnational levels.’119 However, it is also the result of 
inherent tensions in the decentralised context which donors must navigate.  
 
Teachers, Lombok Tengah, Lombok, Indonesia. Photo: ISF, UTS 
3.4 Basic education in the Visayas, Philippines 
STRIVE has built systems ownership through active stakeholders’ participation in systems 
development, and integration of changes with local management structures. 
Australian Agency for International Development, STRIVE in support of BESRA:                              
independent completion report, AusAID, Canberra, 2011, p.6. 
 
Background on decentralisation in the Philippines education sector 
In the Philippines, the Basic Education Sector Reform Agenda (BESRA) and subsequent Department 
of Education (DepEd) orders have shifted education towards a decentralised operating structure.120 
Service delivery, including facilitation of community participation, is undertaken primarily under the 
auspices of school-based management.121 The education sector is ‘deconcentrated’ through regions 
and the divisions of the DepEd, not through actual decentralisation of responsibilities to local 
government. In other words, subnational education staff belongs to a national department rather than 
to a decentralised tier of government. However, local governments do have a place on school boards. 
In 2010, the DepEd was ‘ill-prepared to shift to decentralised education management as their 
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Working at subnational level … has 
demonstrated that achievement of 
our objectives is far more certain. In 
part, this is a matter of scale but it is 
also a question of the degree to which 
regions are more prepared than is 
national office to change structures 
and processes, be innovative and 
respond quickly to new ideas. 
AusAID, Philippines Strategy Program: 
performance report, 2011, p.19 
 
organisation structure and functions were not appropriate and information management was 
unreliable.’122 Aid program staff reported that the challenge is the large bureaucracy (across 17 
regions) and an inadequate capacity to communicate with authorities at the subnational level. They 
also reported that there is a strong vision and change agenda active at the national level, which is 
making a difference.  
An important distinction to note is that in the Philippines decentralisation of the education sector is 
through deconcentration only, and hence many of the power dynamics present in other countries 
(such as Indonesia and PNG described above) are not at play. Instead, the national department is 
more easily able to exert influence on its departments at subnational level. 
Background on the initiative and policy context 
BESRA was supported by a national initiative: Strengthening the Implementation of Basic Education in 
Selected Provinces in the Visayas (STRIVE). The goal of STRIVE was to improve the quality of and 
access to basic education and it focused on education management and learning support systems.123 
The strong subnational engagement within STRIVE was intended to influence national systems that 
had proven hard to change.124  
STRIVE’s first phase focused on leadership and management, and out-of-school children. STRIVE’s 
second phase focused on school-based management, human resource development (specifically for 
in-service education and training), and learning resource materials.125 The initiative also focused on 
change management and systems for reform, including ‘quality assurance, monitoring and evaluation 
and improving access and equity.’126  
The evidence for the design rested on previous Australian education programs in the Philippines as 
well as efforts by multilateral banks.127 The school-based management reforms align with approaches 
outlined in international literature.128 The design for STRIVE 1 included some analysis of 
deconcentration within the education sector, and the design for STRIVE 2 follows up with a response 
to sector reforms, but does not specifically examine issues and priorities at the subnational level or 
the demand side of service delivery. Subsequent studies were undertaken to fill knowledge gaps, 
including an examination of DepEd capacity to implement school-based management.129  
Alignment and relevance to national and subnational levels 
As mentioned earlier, the education sector is deconcentrated in the Philippines, rather than fully 
decentralised. Hence, questions about alignment and relevance to multiple levels of government are 
less important than for other profiles presented in this report. The key stakeholder for the Australian 
aid program was the national department. STRIVE used 
partner systems and was characterised as a DepEd 
project supported by the aid program and the managing 
contractor: ‘STRIVE has worked from the inside to use 
and develop DepEd systems.’130  
The program demonstrated alignment and relevance to 
the national level agenda. A review confirmed that STRIVE 
was ‘consistent with GoP [Philippines Government] 
policies at design and has remained relevant despite a 
range of planning, policy and legislative changes during 
implementation.’131 After a change in national leadership, 
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it appears that STRIVE was successfully realigned to adjust its focus towards restructuring of regional 
offices and a stronger governance focus.132  
While STRIVE was influenced strongly by the national government agenda, the program has also been 
relevant and aligned to needs at the subnational administrative levels (regional and divisional levels). 
Engagement across different parts of partner government and community 
STRIVE worked with the DepEd central office, three regional offices20 and four school divisions.21 At 
the national level, management guidance and support by DepEd central units was provided through a 
national committee.133 Engagement at the subnational level was reported to have empowered 
government staff in regions and divisions.134 A review confirms this: ‘The systems are there; they are 
ours; we are using them; we cannot lose that. Also, our relationships have changed because of the 
restructuring. We do not belong to different divisions now; we work as a team.’135  
STRIVE did not have a strong focus on the demand side of service delivery. 
Sustainability through ownership and capacity building 
STRIVE was perceived to have developed strong ownership within the structures of the DepEd at 
central, regional and divisional levels.22 The approach to ownership was described by an aid program 
interviewee: ‘We let them take the lead in the reform agenda. They allow us to provide input into 
policy, processes, structures.’ 
The main sustainability objective of the program was ‘to provide the environment that will enable the 
STRIVE sites to continue utilising and replicating the outputs of STRIVE in the Visayas, and for central 
office to take on the recommendations from the development work as inputs to BESRA work.’136 A 
range of strategies was used to achieve this. Participation, partnership and training were integral 
components, with attention to matching training with needs. Efforts to improve organisational 
functioning used existing structures. For example, programs were monitored by regional and divisional 
supervisors as part of their normal roles.137  
The program lobbied for counterpart contributions to ensure tangible evidence of ownership and 
commitment. For example: ‘Approximately 218 personnel across the pilot schools, divisions, district, 
regions and central office were given dedicated part-time or full-time release for commitment to the 
project.’ 138 In addition, pilot regions allocated funds to ensure ongoing impact: ‘The pilot regions have 
budgeted in their [plans] for the cascading work required to ensure that all divisions, districts and 
schools receive the necessary training to implement the systems developed with STRIVE support.’139  
At one stage, there was concern about uptake at the national level. Two reports raised questions 
about the role of the central office: ‘There are serious concerns, however, as to the degree to which 
organisational learning is taking place at central level’140 and ‘DepEd central office does not have the 
capacity to manage the rollout after STRIVE technical assistance ends in April.’ 141 However, aid 
program staff during this evaluation reported that these issues were addressed by the current 
administration and that almost all STRIVE outcomes have been nationally implemented.  
In addition, concerns have been raised about capacity at the district level:  
                                                        
20  Namely, Region 6 (Western Visayas), Region 7 (Central Visayas), Region 8 (Eastern Visayas). 
21   Namely, Negros OccidentalBohol, Tagbilaran, and Northern Samar; AusAID, STRIVE quality at implementation report, 
2010. 
22  Quality at implementation reports scored sustainability as 4/6 (2007), 5/6 (2008), 5/6 (2009), 4/6 (2010). 
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The DepEd is reported as having an 
‘inconsistent’ record in 
mainstreaming gender. This appears 
to result from limited understanding 
among the current DepEd senior 
management of gender 
mainstreaming and of the nature of a 
gender-aware organisation. 
AusAID, STRIVE in support of BESRA: 
independent completion report,  
2011, p.iii  
Despite positive developments in STRIVE, the ICR [independent completion report] team 
observed that the leadership and support for SBM [school-based management] and 
school improvement plans is weakest at the district supervisor level. Staff working at this 
level requires motivation, commitment and resources if they are to perform this function 
effectively. Greater attention needs to be given to this level in follow-on activities in 
support of SBM.142  
Equity and gender  
Within design documentation, analysis of poverty and equity at program locations is minimal. The 
design does provide a general statement that locations were chosen based on indicators of poverty 
and low levels of basic education.143 However, further analyses used to identify appropriate 
subnational locations are not mentioned. Later documentation such as the independent completion 
report does not make any specific reference to poverty. There is also no mention of specific 
disadvantaged groups or of addressing the needs of children with a disability. 
Consideration of gender within project implementation is 
limited, and the initiative scored 3 out of 6 (inadequate) for 
gender equality in the independent completion report. 
Some efforts were made, 144 however, the capacity of the 
DepEd to prioritise gender was described as a barrier to 
promote gender equality considerations. There was a 
reported ‘lack of a definitive and well-institutionalised GAD 
[gender and development] policy and a lack of direction in 
gender budget initiatives for the department.’145 This 
review also notes that sex-disaggregated data was 
collected, but that ‘there is little evidence that this data has 
been analysed and used to design interventions that could improve gender equality and learning 
outcomes.’146 There was evidence of small-scale actions to support gender equality, for example 
empowerment of women within one element of school-based management in some pilot schools,147 
and since women occupy many roles within DepEd, 71 per cent of participants in project activities were 
women. 148 However, overall the report described the result against gender as ‘disappointing’149 and 
noted limited awareness among teachers of gender issues.150  
Complementing other initiatives 
Australian support for the education sector is increasingly viewed as a ‘program’ by DepEd and other 
stakeholders.151 Other initiatives seen as part of this program include the Support to Philippine 
Education Reform Trust Fund, the Education Performance Incentive Fund and specific project funding 
in Basic Education Assistance to Mindanao.152 The STRIVE completion report notes that the initiative 
is part of a ‘move towards strategic system-wide engagement in policy development and 
implementation and scale-up.’153 
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4 Lessons from the infrastructure sector  
Evaluation question 
› What key implementation lessons and good practice would improve sectoral programming in 
decentralised contexts? 
 
Key findings 
› Australian support to infrastructure provides examples of working in innovative ways at the 
subnational level, including demand-led approaches and the use of incentives to improve the 
effectiveness of decentralised governance structures. 
› The Philippines infrastructure profile demonstrates the potential for more effective governance 
within infrastructure programming. 
› The Indonesian water and sanitation profile demonstrates the potential for building on existing 
partner government mechanisms to support effective service delivery at the local level. The 
demand-driven approach means that the local governments involved were inherently motivated. 
Poverty is targeted by the requirement that funds must support access to services for low-income 
and poor households.  
› In the Philippines road program, there were challenges concerning weak subnational financial 
management and questions of who should carry risks. The contractor avoided risk by bypassing 
both provincial and national engagement in the work, which undermined the capacity building 
and use of performance incentives. A program review highlighted where implementation had 
diverged from the design, and Australia was able to take back responsibility for the initiative and 
consider how to better share risks with a future contractor.  
› Both profiles show that sustainability through ownership and leadership at both the national and 
subnational levels is challenging. The limited subnational government capacity to sustain new 
services is as an area that needs further attention. 
 
The chapter has four sections: infrastructure service delivery and decentralisation (Section 4.1); 
Australian infrastructure sector support (Section 4.2); and two profiles based on in-country fieldwork—
a maternal and neonatal health program in Indonesia (Section 4.3) and support to provincial health 
authorities in PNG (Section 4.4). 
4.1 Infrastructure service delivery and decentralisation 
In decentralised contexts, responsibility for water and sanitation services usually lies with local 
government, sometimes with functions contracted out to private sector or non-government 
organisations (NGOs). In many countries, community management structures are formally recognised 
as service providers.154 Beyond the challenges common to service delivery described in Section 1.2, 
three other points below are important regarding water supply, sanitation and roads respectively.  
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› Water supply infrastructure concerns in relation to decentralisation have been predominantly 
around clarifying responsibility within levels of government for building new water systems. Less 
attention has been given to responsibility and capacity for support to maintenance and 
management of existing systems, severely affecting sustainability of service outcomes.155  
› Sanitation services have been overlooked due to a focus on safe water supply, and responsibility 
for sanitation is frequently fragmented across different agencies such as health, public works and 
environment. In many countries, there is a lack of policy, regulation and governance, and local 
governments rarely prioritise this sector. In rural areas, it is increasingly considered that sanitation 
services are a private investment and that the role of subnational government is to facilitate 
behaviour change, support product markets and monitor progress. 
› Responsibility within the transport sector is often shared between national and subnational levels 
of government. A key issue for this sector in decentralised contexts is that the bulk of the required 
expenditure on transport is for maintenance.156 Ongoing dependence at the subnational level on 
national funds often results in insufficient funds for road maintenance. Further, limited 
institutional capacity at the subnational level often undermines planning and budgeting and leads 
to the common approach of ‘contracting out’ road maintenance. Lastly, decentralisation laws may 
not provide adequate detail regarding where responsibility lies for transport infrastructure 
services.  
One last matter concerning various types of infrastructure and decentralisation is that in some 
Melanesian countries, such as PNG, there is increasing expectation that infrastructure be facilitated 
through use of constituency funds from members of parliament. This presents issues around 
politicisation of these funds, lack of coordination with subnational authorities and potential for low-
quality implementation due to low public works skills and capacity.  
4.2 Australian infrastructure sector support 
Australian assistance in the infrastructure sector is guided by two thematic strategies. The aid 
program’s water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) strategy, demonstrates relatively good coverage of 
issues in relation to supporting service delivery in decentralised contexts. It focuses on access to safe 
water and basic sanitation, improved hygiene behaviour and creating sustainable services through 
better governance.157 Australia’s support for roads is viewed as a catalyst for economic development, 
and the key focus is on maintenance and preservation of existing infrastructure.158 This strategy has 
had a mixed influence on how projects address decentralisation and the role of subnational 
governments (see Section 6.1). 
In 2014–15, the Australian aid program will spend 10 per cent of its funding on infrastructure 
($530.3 million).159 Investments in water and sanitation infrastructure are implemented through 
multilateral organisations, the private sector, civil society organisations, bilateral programs (e.g. in 
Indonesia, East Timor and Vietnam) and regional programs. Australia’s global engagement helps it to 
influence global policy on WASH, and to build knowledge to improve the effectiveness and delivery of 
WASH services. Results in 2012–13 included 2 257 000 people with increased access to safe water, 
and 1 910 000 with access to sanitation. Investment in infrastructure has increased over recent 
years, and in 2013–14 is expected to total 7 per cent of overseas development assistance. In 2012–
13, 4400 kilometres of national roads were rehabilitated, maintained or constructed as a result of 
Australian aid.160 
As with the health and education sectors, infrastructure support has evolved in recent years. Some 
key large-scale initiatives (such as the Indonesia infrastructure facility which covers both water and 
 42 
sanitation infrastructure as well as roads) have a strong governance focus. Moreover, during fieldwork 
in Indonesia, it was clear that staff were aware of the issues associated with decentralised contexts, 
such as poor asset management, lack of local ownership, and tensions between national and 
subnational authorities.  
The Transport Sector Support Program in PNG was also discussed during our fieldwork, and aid 
program staff considered options for future subnational engagement. While this program focused on 
national roads, interviewees were keen to ‘look at what can be done for provincial roads’ and 
suggested that an ‘outputs-based model and incentive scheme’ would be needed. They pointed out 
the lack of capacity and associated risks: ‘[Provincial-level organisations] don’t have the people or 
systems etc. to manage funds whereas the works department at a national level do, and they do 
know what they are doing’ and ‘it would be extremely high risk plying money into the provincial 
government.’ These are issues addressed in the profiles presented below.  
The two profiles were chosen to provide insight into the support Australia provides for subnational 
governments and local service systems.  
4.3 Water and sanitation Hibah, Indonesia 
Decentralisation has been an opportunity, to develop new systems that incentivise ownership and 
service delivery through different types of funding arrangements. 
Program contractor, Indonesia, staff interview 
Background on decentralisation in the Indonesian WASH sector 
In Indonesia, district governments are responsible for water supply and sanitation.23 Ambitious goals 
have been set by the Ministry of Public Works (MoPW),24 but the investment and operational 
performance of water utilities is poor.161 Legislation excludes central government from implementing 
projects in water and sanitation, but district governments have been reluctant to invest.162 The result 
has been a reported loss in service delivery: ‘For water, there has been a notable decline in service 
delivery’ and ‘only 11 cities have sewerage.’  
The sector is complex; roles are distributed across MoPW (technical agency), Ministry of Health (water 
quality), the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA); administration, utility organisation structures, tariff 
guidelines, Bappenas (planning) and the Ministry of Finance (MoF); financing.163 
Service provision is uneven and higher capacity, more responsive districts perform better. In addition, 
tensions between the different levels of government are evident. During our fieldwork, sector 
stakeholders reported ‘central government still acts as a gate-keeper. Local government feel that 
central government take away any choices they have.’ As one stakeholder put it: ‘There is still an 
institutional reluctance to decentralise.’ 
                                                        
23  First in 1999 (Law 22 of 1999 on regional autonomy and law 25 of 1999 on fiscal balance.) and later in 2004 (Law 33 
of 2004 and Law 33 of 2004 revising laws 22 and 25 respectively). 
24  MoPW reported goals to reach the Millennium Development Goal target of 67.87 per cent access to water supply. 
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Participation is voluntary and competitive, and there is keen interest on the part of local 
governments and [utilities] despite stringent eligibility conditions. 
Water and Sanitation Initiative design summary and implementation document, AusAID, Canberra, 
2009 
Background on the initiative and policy context 
The Water and Sanitation Hibah (the ‘Hibah’25) focuses on water supply and sanitation connections 
for poor urban households. The initiative aims to:164  
› expand and improve service delivery 
› increase local government investment 
› improve sustainability through sector reform and improved local-level governance.  
An initial phase in 2009–11 ($20 million) reached 77 000 households with water and 5000 with 
sewerage, working with 35 different local governments. A second phase in 2011–14 ($95 million) 
aims to reach a further 250 000 households with water and 9000 with sewerage, working with 95 
local governments. The initiative uses an innovative output-based approach to incentivise local 
governments to invest in their utilities.165 Installations are paid for by the district and then 
reimbursed. The aid program provides support to the Hibah via MoPW and MoF by a managing 
contractor, the Indonesia Infrastructure Initiative (IndII).166 The initiative partially uses partner 
systems ‘until MoPW has the necessary financial and human resource to adequately supervise the 
Hibah program an external program of assistance through the IndII Facility will be required.167  
In general, the initiative is based on sound evidence concerning decentralisation. Key areas covered 
well in the two relevant design documents were:  
› recognition of roles defined by decentralisation legislation 
› analysis of decentralisation reform and its implications 
› newly emerging mechanisms for fiscal transfer to local governments 
› the need for incentives for local governments to invest in service delivery.  
We found weaknesses in the evidence base in two areas: subnational capacity and the demand side. 
There was little examination of local government-owned water company (PDAM) or local government 
capacity to manage services in the long term, aside from the information on the financial status of 
PDAMs. Issues of accountability, participation and capacity at the subnational level were not 
addressed.168 
National and subnational alignment and relevance  
The Hibah is aligned and relevant at both the national and subnational levels. National government 
departments are strongly involved, including MoPW, MoF and BAPPENAS.169 The Hibah is aligned with 
national priorities to meet the MDGs and addresses key decentralisation challenges.26 During our 
fieldwork MoPW explained that ‘we see [the Hibah] as a good process for decentralisation. All 
proposals come from the local government not from national.’ 
  
                                                        
25  ‘Hibah’ means ‘grant.’ 
26  Quality at implementation scores for 2011, 2012 and 2013 for ‘relevance’ were 5/6, 6/6 and 6/6 respectively, 
supporting this recognition. 
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WASH used to be the lowest priority—it 
was cut off from the political process. 
So if we make it political, work with 
champions and mayors, this helped to 
speed up achievements. They share 
their stories and then get re-elected 
due to the success—so it has political 
value. 
Program contractor, Indonesia,         
staff interview 
Fragmentation at the local 
government level is [caused by] 
multiple sources of funding. This 
causes a lack of consolidated 
programming. To what extent can we 
consider strong cross-sectoral 
linkages at the central level? The 
program has strong linkages with MoF 
and MoPW, but it would be good to 
involve MoHA which would have a 
good flow-on effect to the LGs [local 
governments]. 
Concept peer review minutes for next 
phase design, AusAID, Canberra, 
2011, p.5 
Involvement of subnational government is demand driven.170 This approach ensures relevance and 
alignment at the subnational level.27 Interviewees at the national level reported there was initial 
scepticism by local governments: ‘Most sceptical were the local governments—they weren’t sure 
they’d get approval from parliament or mayors. Usually they see money first rather than use their 
own.’ There were challenges in letting local governments know of the program, but despite this the 
program has been over-subscribed.  
Engagement across different parts of partner government and with community 
The balance of engagement across national and subnational levels was assessed by this evaluation 
to be appropriate, with the caveat that it is not clear whether the initiative is meeting capacity needs 
at the subnational level. The main support that is provided at the subnational level concerns the grant 
mechanism itself rather than broader capacity building. 171 In addition, with the shift to the new phase 
of the Hibah in 2012, there has been national level resistance to multiyear budgets because they 
would require the national government to relinquish some control. As one stakeholder put it: ‘Central 
government doesn’t want their budgets affected.’ Multiyear budgets are a key feature to enable local 
governments to plan in advance for better implementation.172  
The balance of engagement with other central agencies 
may not be appropriate, as engagement with MoHA 
appeared limited. MoHA are responsible for local 
government, and they ‘have the formal authority with 
respect to change of the nontechnical systems of 
PDAMs.’ 173 MoHA are responsible for laws concerning 
tariff setting. Under current tariffs, few utilities recover 
their costs.174 The need for engagement with MoHA was 
raised in an internal peer review175 with a response that 
the initiative would look ‘to increase the participation of 
MoHA in activities.’176 Our evaluation was unable to verify 
if this was followed through however an aid program staff 
placed in MoHA for another program may facilitate this 
engagement.28 One program staff member noted that 
‘[having] lots of players has slowed down the process due to negotiations.’ 
The Hibah had significant success in striking a balanced engagement with political leaders and local 
administration. Local leaders are important to 
development of services, as mentioned by a local agency 
in east Indonesia: ‘My responsibility is limited to … 
forward [inputs] to Bupati who are the decision-making. 
Water utility tariffs, Bupati set these too.’ At the national 
level, a managing contractor staff member reported: ‘The 
Hibah program … aligns incentives for everything. Local 
government sees there are votes in this’ and ‘We also 
work with the media, with MoHA—explicitly recognise 
                                                        
27  There were 39 local governments in Phase 1 and 95 in Phase 2. 
28  Aid program staff confirmed appointment of an adviser within MoHA who is not dedicated to the hibah, but concerned 
with a new sanitation grant program. The adviser is expected to contribute to institutional and regulatory initiatives for 
sanitation services delivered by local governments (personal communication). 
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The water Hibah design required local 
government to invest equity into the 
PDAM equal to or greater than the 
grant. While most local government 
invested funds to equal the grant, 
some invested in excess. 
Concept peer review minutes, AusAID, 
Canberra, September 2011 
these achievements and the political value behind it.’  
Engagement was weighted towards the supply side with more limited focus to the demand side. 
During implementation, baseline assessments were undertaken to understand which members of the 
population were interested to connect and to verify connections.29 The following issues are not 
addressed in design or implementation: the availability of service agreements, customer complaint 
mechanisms, expected service levels, participation in tariff setting and potential mechanisms to raise 
demand for better service delivery through citizen voice and pressure on local government.30 In 
addition, limited demand-side knowledge of sanitation contributed to challenges. Demand for 
connections was found to be lower than expected and this led to reallocation of funds to water. 
Sustainability through ownership and capacity building 
Ownership of the Hibah initiative at the national level is strong. For example, there are examples of 
government investments: ‘DGSH [Director General of Human Settlements] has established a full 
staffed CPMU [Central Project Management Unit] to manage the water hibah and is using its own 
resources and funding to administer the program.’ Ownership at the subnational level is also strong. 
The self-selection of local governments ensures ownership. IndII staff explained: ‘Hibah […] give[s] 
local government a sense of ownership. Local government decide how it works.’ Local governments 
invest in the initiative: ‘The water hibah grant is sized to provide approximately 40 per cent of the full 
cost of development of new connections. It represents about 65 per cent of the marginal cost of 
extending the network for new connections.’177 However, 
some investment may have come from PDAMs rather 
than local governments: ‘The first phase of the Hibah 
was so successful because PDAMs were strong—they 
had budgets and could move before the local 
governments could provide money. More than half was 
pre-invested by the PDAMs.’178 To receive the grant, local 
governments are required to enact a local regulation that 
sets out the equity investment to PDAM, and this is an 
important step forward.  
Sustainability of the Hibah has been positively assessed.31 However, questions have been raised 
about whether the Hibah has provided sufficient capacity-building support at the local level to ensure 
sustained services.179 In phase 2: ‘Weaker local governments and PDAMs will be a challenge. The 
main design feature that will allow us to [work successfully with weaker local governments] is the 
three year program.’180 The challenges to sustaining services raised in interviews were:  
› lack of commitment of local leaders: ‘Commitment of local leaders influences success. If local 
leaders commit, they will have a good [utility]. This is a challenge as some provinces have less 
commitment.’ 
› lack of local investment in services (reliance on central government investment): ‘There is reliance 
on the centre to bring investment down’ and ‘things are built by central government but local 
                                                        
29  This examines whether households stay connected and pay for their connection for three months. 
30  Other smaller Australian aid initiatives in Nusa Tenggara Barat and Nusa Tengarra Timur provinces do address these 
areas. 
31  Through three quality at implementation reports (scoring 4/6, 4/6 and 5/6 for 2011, 2012 and 2013) and through the 
independent evaluation (judged as ‘good’; AusAID, Independent evaluation of the Hibah Program Indonesia, 2011. 
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government must operate them—but no ownership for maintenance—they still look to central 
government.’  
› inadequate asset management, and funds for operation and maintenance: ‘Maintenance and 
operations are the responsibility of PDAMs. It’s a local responsibility to charge tariffs etc. In [some 
locations], tariffs might be too low to develop the system. In addition to national funds, the district 
should contribute’ and ‘asset management is a problem—no sense of ownership.’ 
Actions to address sustainability were expected to be rolled out in 2013, and the issue to be given 
prominence: ‘Sustainability aspects are not so strong. This can be addressed in the design. 
Operations and maintenance has not really been addressed at all. We need to think of things such 
as: are we addressing this at the LG [local government] or PDAM level? Do they have a skilled 
workforce?’181 It is not clear if or how these aspects have been taken up in phase 2. 
Equity and gender 
The Hibah was targeted at low-income and poor households. 32 MoPW made this clear and pointed to 
the value of this focus: ‘The problem is in making connections for the poor who cannot afford it … 
local governments don’t have a budget to look after the poor.’ Aid program staff also noted that ‘pre-
program, local governments were less willing to invest in the lowest tariff tier [based on a] belief that 
poor people won’t pay their bills. But now they are seeing the benefits.’ Governments in poorer areas 
may have difficulty in implementing the initiative. Staff commented that local governments in the 
eastern islands, where poverty is higher, are weaker. A government staff member from that location 
also noted that ‘we did not meet the requirements for this. They might approve it for [us] in the future 
though—the mayor has agreed to propose this.’ 
In terms of gender equality, there were no specific indicators, however the initiative expected to 
benefit women and girls, and had collected but not analysed data about households headed by 
females.182 Quality at implementation reports noted the need for a gender action plan (2011, score 
5/6), analysis of female-headed households (2012, score 4/6) and the need for aid program staff to 
devote attention to this area with the contractor (2013, score 4/6). Overall, attention to gender 
equality could be improved,183 and there is a need to work ‘with local governments to ensure their 
decision-making about community infrastructure (such as public toilets) have considered the 
interests of the whole community, especially women, elderly and people with disabilities.’184  
Complementing other initiatives 
The Hibah was linked to some other IndII activities (e.g. the ‘20 PDAMs’ initiative which sought to 
build capacity within PDAMs) but was not well linked to other initiatives. This issue was raised during 
peer review for the next phase, including the need for linkage to governance programs.185 In addition, 
another WASH sector program, PAMSIMAS, has quite a different approach to the Hibah, and during 
fieldwork this was raised as an issue: ‘PAMSIMAS is … a centralised program, it is putting funds into a 
centralised fund for services that are the responsibility of local government. PAMSIMAS sidesteps 
local government. That’s the issue.’ and ‘PAMSIMAS uses new systems; Hibah uses existing systems. 
[The Hibah is] staying out of PAMSIMAS locations. Twenty years down the track, which system will 
survive? At what point will central government pull out of local government? Central government can’t 
                                                        
32  The concept note for Phase 2 gives the clearest definition: ‘The utilities must ensure that the expansion results in 
connections to low income households, 50% of which are classified as poor. Low income household in the hibah 
program have been defined as households with an electricity connection <1.3KVA whilst poor households are those 
with an electricity connection <0.9 KVA’; AusAID, Concept peer review for Australia-Indonesia Infrastructure grants for 
sanitation, water hibah and sanitation hibah, 2011, pp.23–24. 
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keep funding local government.’ The difference in program approaches demonstrates the challenges 
in achieving coherence when working in decentralised contexts. 
4.4 Provincial roads management, the Philippines 
PRMF is not a typical roads program. It encourages provincial governments to invest in and change 
the way they do road maintenance and make local government more accountable in providing basic 
services. PRMF uses a substantial suite of incentives to encourage reform. 
Australian Agency for International Development, 2007–11 Philippines strategy program 
performance report, AusAID, Canberra, 2011, p.10 
Decentralisation in the Philippines roads sector 
Responsibility for health, local roads, social welfare services, provincial infrastructure and a number 
of other services was devolved in the Philippines in 1991.186 The two largest sectoral areas of 
expenditure by provincial governments are typically health and roads. Over 85 per cent of the road 
network falls under the jurisdiction of provinces and cities, municipalities and barangays. The national 
government is involved in policy setting but such policies ‘are often not well implemented at the local 
government level … In many provinces the guidelines are poorly understood or followed and a gap 
remains between the objective and the reality.’187 There has been a progressive deterioration of 
provincial roads due to the low priority given to them and limited budget at the national and provincial 
levels to rehabilitate and maintain roads: ‘On average, a road is “maintained” once every 8 years.’188 
Performance is variable across provinces and unpredictable funding from national government 
affects capacity for planning and budgeting. 
Three main constraints exist at the subnational level. These are: 
› lack of authority for revenue raising through taxes, and a lack of political will to support local 
revenue raising 
› weak accountability and civil society engagement 
› lack of capacity in technical aspects of road maintenance, planning and budgeting, monitoring, 
financial management and human resources.  
Background on the initiative and policy context 
The Philippines Provincial Road Management Facility (PRMF) was designed in 2008 as a five-year 
program, with provision for extension for a further five years since ‘the institutional reform process 
required is likely to require at least 10 years to achieve the targeted changes.’189 Funding for the 
initiative was approximately $94.5 million. 190 The program was designed within the aid program’s 
governance sector, which is a point of difference with other case studies. The program intended to 
use roads as an entry point for provincial governance reform since ‘road sector planning reflects the 
wider challenges for improving public administration and governance across all development sectors 
at the provincial level.’ 191  
The PRMF’s goal is ‘increased economic growth and improved public access to infrastructure and 
services in the southern Philippines.’ There are two objectives:  
› improve the sustainable Philippines Government provision, management and maintenance of a 
core network of provincial roads in targeted provinces 
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Management of funds will only be 
given to provinces that have 
acceptable project development and 
financial management procedures 
and capacities. 
PRMF Design; p.9 
› strengthen provincial institutional capacity and governance systems related to the provision and 
maintenance of provincial roads.  
The initiative worked initially across seven provinces with 
three more provinces included later. Annual incentive 
grants were offered based on provincial performance 
criteria.192 The financing approach was through an Imprest 
Account managed through the managing contractor.193 For 
a number of reasons, however, the envisaged design was 
not implemented.33 The initiative has been directly 
managed by the aid program until another contractor 
commences.  
The design of the PRMF was based on mostly sound evidence concerning decentralisation.34 There 
was strong analysis of issues at the subnational level, including corruption as a risk factor with 
respect to provincial governors, municipal/city mayors or barangay captains.194 As a result, the design 
proposed that only provinces with proven systems and capacities would manage funds.195 The design 
required fiduciary risk assessment to be undertaken within target provinces,196 but aid program staff 
noted this was not undertaken for some time. There was also limited assessment of demand-side 
issues, particularly with regard to particular social groups or women. There was some discussion of 
gender and social inclusion and the need for participatory planning processes, but no detailed 
evidence to support demand-side strategies.  
National and subnational alignment and relevance  
The program has strong alignment and relevance to national priorities. The program objectives are 
matched to the goal of inclusive growth described in the Philippine Development Plan197 which 
includes a focus on rewarding local governments for improved services to the poor, and is also 
aligned to the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) governance reform agenda 
(Seal of Good Housekeeping, Performance Challenge Fund, Local Governance Performance 
Management Systems).198  
Alignment with agendas at the subnational level is less clear since these are not described in program 
documentation. Also, the design features aimed at strengthening alignment (allocation of funds to 
better performing provinces) did not function as expected.  
Engagement across different parts of partner government and with community 
The design involved balanced engagement across both national and subnational levels. However, 
neither engagement played out as planned. At the national level, the original plan was to have an 
advisory board chaired by the Australian aid program and the National Economic Development 
Agency.199 DILG also had a role to ‘disseminate lessons learned and reforms … to the national 
government.’200 Independent appraisal of the design questioned why there was not stronger 
engagement at the national level: ‘A committed counterpart at the national government is not 
                                                        
33  Originally, the PRMF was managed by a Facility Managing Contractor that reported to a Project Steering committee 
comprised of AusAID and DILG. However, due to implementation issues identified in the 2012 independent review, the 
original contract was suspended in late 2012, and the program came under direct AusAID management on 1 October 
2012 while a new facility manager was procured. On 1 October 2013, AusAID formally ended its direct management 
and handed over day-to-day responsibilities to a new Support Contractor. 
34  It scored well in the quality at implementation report for ‘analysis and lessons’ (5/6); Australian Agency for International 
Development, Quality at implementation report PRMF, AusAID, Canberra, 2008. 
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[We need to] move beyond doing things for and on 
behalf of provinces, to encouraging provinces to 
lead. This will not happen automatically, all the 
key stakeholders will have to deliberately change 
their assistance in ways that will support this 
transfer. 
PRMF Technical Monitoring Group fourth 
monitoring mission, fourth monitoring report, 
AusAID, Canberra, 2011, p.1 
identified but needs to be brought in to make the concept sustainable. This will be a critical issue; it 
begs the questions of whether a program of this size and nature should be initiated without national 
government engagement in place.’201 Within the lifetime of the program, such engagement became 
even more important due to the strong reform agenda of the new government. This issue has now 
been taken up and a stronger role for DILG is envisaged,202 including a package of support.203 DILG 
also agreed to be the procuring entity for PRMF rehabilitation and maintenance contracts. 
The engagement process with provincial government did not go ahead as planned. The managing 
contractor retained control of procurement and contracting processes rather than using provincial 
government systems, and the incentive program did not achieve the expected results: ‘There is a 
pervasive divergence between the PRMF espoused theories and those in actual use.’204 The incentive 
program, which was intended to improve institutional and governance issues, instead encouraged a 
compliance response:205 ‘The incentive mechanism does not take account of the complexities of the 
differentiated political economic environments found in the individual provinces.’206 Overall, it 
appears that there was excessive risk placed on the managing contractor. During our fieldwork, a key 
lesson mentioned by aid program staff was that ‘[the Australian aid program] should not devolve [risk 
to the managing contractor] but should carry the risk’ and should be in a position to ‘withdraw if 
provinces can’t meet their end of the bargain.’ In future, the aid program will share this risk. 
The country strategy includes a focus on the demand side, engagement of the poor and ‘facilitating 
partnerships between government and civil society to create stronger demand and accountability for 
change.’207 Yet this this was not a strong feature of PRMF. The independent progress review raises 
concerns about the lack of engagement with local NGOs, and the lack of involvement of local 
knowledge or perspectives or development of provincial staff capacity to undertake participatory 
planning processes. For example, the review notes that the community engagement model is ‘still 
primarily limited to information and consultation and paid employment, missing opportunities for 
more collaboration leading to local recognition of responsibility and ownership.’208 The review also 
notes that ‘local knowledge of road use, local needs and available access to needed services remain 
essentially untapped.’209 The review saw PRMF as needing a stronger role in improving provincial 
capacity for participatory planning because it is ‘important that the capacity development program 
incorporates activities for provincial staff to increase their knowledge and skills in facilitating 
participatory community engagement processes.’210 
Sustainability through ownership and capacity building 
The strategies in the PRMF design to ensure sustainability were not implemented. Strong criticism in 
a mid-term review prompted a revision to arrangements and suspension of the contract. The rating for 
sustainability dropped from 5/6 (2009) to an ‘inadequate’ 3/6 (2010 and 2011). Leadership had not 
been established at the national level, and only recently have arrangements changed to ensure 
stronger leadership from DILG. The independent review also noted ‘there has yet to be any move to 
leverage national government resources.’  
Lack of ownership, capacity and leadership 
by the provinces was also reported and has 
been responded to.211 However, recent 
planning documents point out the 
challenges in shifting implementation 
responsibility to provinces: ‘Public financial 
management and procurement 
assessments involving five provinces are 
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yielding mixed results … additional safeguard measures would be required for a transition to full 
management by and use of a provinces budget and procurement systems.’212 
The aid program’s direct management of PRMF has led to several changes to address the 
sustainability challenges noted above. Notably, the recent plans confirm that ‘PRMF now works 
closely with DILG and provides targeted, demand-driven support.’ 213 There are a range of supports 
provided to DILG, including an approach to working with provinces that ‘could be replicated in a 
national program.’214 The path ahead remains challenging and achieving ownership at both the 
national and subnational levels is an ambitious, yet important, goal. Interviews with program staff 
noted that building the case for replication at the national level is difficult, particularly given that the 
design had little focus on DILG. Interviews with DILG representatives at the national level noted an 
inability to sustain changes, and concerns about this for the future: ‘During the project we have the 
resources and the experts but these leave at the end of the project.’ 
Equity and gender  
The PRMF design document does not describe a poverty focus in the choice of subnational locations. 
However, two of the target regions (Visayas and Mindanao) are noted to have poverty rates higher 
than the national average. 215 The collection of sex-disaggregated data is a strength, yet there is no 
analysis and use of this data and the gender strategy has not been implemented. Recent planning 
documents note that ‘PRMF has not been proactive in promoting gender equality in the physical 
works program.’ Construction is male-dominated in spite of the potential to involve women: ‘Despite 
strong interest from women who possess the requisite skills, contractors do not see, or they overlook 
the relevance of female participation in construction work.’216 A range of missed opportunities and 
negative gender outcomes were noted in the independent review. Despite women’s desire to be more 
involved in road management, their involvement was limited to cleaning drains. Contractors did not 
prioritise empowering women (or local people in general), and no provincial women’s or disability 
groups were consulted at the local level. Moreover, some roads are inaccessible for women and 
children.217 
Complementarity with other initiatives 
Collaboration with other programs (both the Australian aid program and World Bank) was noted in the 
design, but is not mentioned in subsequent reports. PRMF builds on and expands Australian aid 
program’s ‘existing geographical focus in Mindanao and the Visayas islands.’218 The current plan 
notes the close operational partnerships with other governance programs. These include the aid 
program’s Coalitions for Change program which ‘is active in several PRMF partner provinces and the 
work is directly relevant to budgeting and programming.’ 219 The plan also notes a partnership with 
the Human Resources and Organisational Facility, which strengthens human resource development 
planning and processes, delivers trainings and leadership development, and undertakes competency 
profiling. Finally, the Public Finance Management Program ‘helped design and is supporting Public 
Financial Management and Procurement Assessments for some PRMF partner provinces’ 220 These 
examples demonstrate a commitment and follow-through on supporting cross-program engagement 
and coordination. 
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5 Design and evaluation of sector programs  
Evaluation question 
› Are decentralisation processes and the role of subnational government appropriately taken into 
account in sectoral designs and evaluations in health, education and infrastructure?  
Key findings 
› Design and evaluation documents had variable coverage of key issues concerning 
decentralisation and subnational roles in service delivery. Evaluation documents demonstrated 
greater coverage than design documents. 
› Most design and evaluations touched on, or had significant content concerning, supply-side 
considerations of subnational capacity and key gaps and challenges. Evaluations examined 
demand-side issues more strongly than did the design documents, which had limited reference to 
this area. 
› Designs gave limited justification of choices regarding which parts of government were chosen for 
engagement; choice of subnational location; or choice of modality. It is possible that these areas 
were considered, however, this is not reflected in the documentation. 
› Almost half the recommendations in evaluations related to some aspect of decentralisation or 
supply or demand side of service delivery, demonstrating these aspects are being given attention.  
› There was some mention of gender and equity concerns in designs and evaluations, though there 
was a lack of consideration of these concerns in relation to the capacity of subnational authorities 
to address them. 
› Most of the evaluations did engage at the subnational level, but more could be done to ensure 
that evaluations include a stronger subnational perspective (e.g. using monitoring data or field 
visit records).  
› The designs and evaluations from the three sectors did not demonstrate significant differences, 
though within the small sample, infrastructure designs tended to pay more attention to 
decentralisation considerations. There were variations across countries, with the Philippines 
consistently demonstrating deeper consideration of these issues. 
› Sector performance assessment frameworks contained some, but few, indicators and prompts 
that would support monitoring the factors that affect service delivery in decentralised contexts. 
The frameworks could be strengthened by incorporating specific indicators that are important in 
decentralised contexts.  
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Recommendation 1 
DFAT should continue to trial new programming strategies in decentralised contexts, using the 
practice notes developed in this evaluation, together with mandatory program management 
requirements (value for money, risk, monitoring).   
Recommendation 2 
The design, monitoring and evaluation of sectoral programs in decentralised contexts needs to 
consistently address decentralisation, for example through the following 
i  a checklist of key issues for service systems in decentralised contexts 
ii personnel with governance and local expertise to review key program documents and provide 
input to design and evaluation teams  
iii management at post to ensure sufficient information on subnational perspectives is made 
available (through fieldwork or other sources) to program staff and evaluation teams of sectoral 
programs 
iv key program documents that outline, where appropriate, the relevant issues, components and 
levels of partner governments.  
 
Design and evaluation are both key points in the aid program cycle when there is opportunity to bring 
in knowledge and learning about decentralisation to underpin effective Australian support. This 
chapter examines the evidence of analysis of decentralisation in sector designs (Section 5.1), 
evaluations (Section 5.2), and performance assessment frameworks (Section 5.3). The purpose was 
to assess whether there was sufficient analysis and learning regarding decentralisation and service 
delivery to enable informed aid choices. An additional aim was to find out whether issues of equity 
and coherence relating to decentralisation were sufficiently covered.  
5.1 Evidence of analysis of decentralisation in sector designs  
Design documentation was reviewed to examine the presence or absence of content related to the 
decentralisation context and service system implications on supply and demand sides.  
The sample frame for this review included 14 design documents sourced from the six countries that 
are the highest recipients of Australian aid in health, education, infrastructure and governance. The 
sample included high-value service delivery programs (>$10 million) implemented within the last five 
years across the sectors, countries and aid modalities. See Appendix 3 for details of initiatives.  
Design documents gave a mixed result in terms of the sufficiency of evidence and analysis of 
decentralisation processes and subnational roles (Table 3). There were also differences between 
countries. The Philippine designs mention aspects of decentralisation and subnational government 
roles more than designs of the other countries, followed by Indonesia, PNG and Vietnam. The 
Solomon Islands and Bangladesh designs demonstrated limited coverage of these areas. Of the 
sectors, infrastructure initiatives had more detailed content on decentralisation and its implications. 
However, the sample size is small and hence no firm conclusions can be drawn on this point. 
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Table 3 Evidence of analysis and learning, equity and coherence in designs 
Evaluation 
criteria 
 No content 
(n = 14) 
Some 
content 
(n = 14) 
Significant 
content 
(n = 14) 
Analysis and learning 
Decentralisation 
context 
Implications of decentralisation laws and policy for 
service delivery 
6 5 3 
Unevenness in the decentralisation process 
(across different subnational locations)  
7 6 1 
Supply side/ 
subnational role 
Subnational capacity to undertake their roles 4 8 2 
Key gaps or challenges at subnational level faced 
in service delivery 
4 7 3 
Availability of financial resources at subnational 
level relative to those needed for service delivery 
4 8 2 
Adequacy of management of financial resources at 
subnational level 
6 5 3 
Demand side Mechanisms for citizens to participate in planning, 
management or monitoring services  
7 4 3 
Quality of citizen participation in planning, 
management or monitoring service delivery  
6 5 3 
Efforts to increase accountability or transparency 
of government to citizens  
9 2 3 
Evidence to 
support aid 
choices 
Rationale for working from national or from 
subnational level or both, given the status of 
decentralisation 
5 6 3 
Rationale for choice of subnational location?  
(Note: 3 designs are national scale so N/A) 
5 5 1 
Justification for the choice of aid modality in 
relation to the decentralisation context 
6 5 3 
Equity 
Participation of marginalised and vulnerable groups in planning, 
management or monitoring delivery of services  
9 4 1 
Identification of specific equity outcomes  3 7 4 
How the role of subnational authorities might affect equity 
outcomes 
12 2 0 
Coherence 
How Australian aid program governance programming supports or 
intersects with sectorally focused efforts 
8 5 1 
What is the extent of alignment to current decentralisation reform  
(Note: this criterion uses a different scale: not aligned/some 
alignment/strong alignment) 
1 13 0 
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The decentralisation context 
Less than half the design documents mentioned the implications of decentralisation laws and policy 
for service delivery. Among examples of designs that did include such content was the Vietnam health 
resources design: ‘Although much of the responsibility for human resource management, including 
recruitment and distribution of staff, has been decentralised to the province level, the provinces 
require strong support from the national level to address ‘big picture’ human resource issues, such 
as regulation, production, salaries and allowances, registration and licensing.’221 Similarly, the 
transport sector program in PNG acknowledged subnational roles and related challenges: ‘Issues 
pertaining to the division of roles, responsibilities and funding between national and subnational 
levels of government (particularly the provinces) also remain to be resolved.’222  
The unevenness of decentralisation processes across different subnational locations reflects that it 
may not be an important issue for all designs, hence it is reasonable that about half the design 
documents included this content. Some design documents discussed this issue and its implications 
for service delivery. For example, the Indonesian education design notes that ‘uneven subnational 
governance standards have created an incentive for [the education ministry] to bypass the district in 
implementing major programs by delivering funds directly to schools.’223 Other design documents 
described variations in administrative capacity between subnational locations and the implications of 
this for the design. For example, the Indonesian health design mentions ‘the current situation in 
regards to achievement against target levels varies considerably among the provinces of focus. The 
program will determine the timeframe for the achievement of the targets for each province (and 
district), wherever possible, within the target timeframe of the national strategy.’224  
Supply side of service delivery at the subnational level 
The majority of designs contained some consideration of supply-side aspects of service delivery at the 
subnational level. However, only a few designs had significant content and analysis of this area. Some 
design documents discussed capacity constraints and how the initiative would respond to them. For 
example, the Philippines education program for Muslim and indigenous people noted that ‘the plan to 
decentralise the delivery of basic services in the Philippines means that heavy financial burdens and 
decision-making now rest with the local government units.’225 It also noted that ‘a variety of capacity 
development initiatives could be supported, including skills training, information sharing and 
planning workshops, and/or systems review and development initiatives.’226 Similarly, the Vietnam 
health human resources program discussed the lack of capacity at the local level: ‘There are 
insufficient medical specialists, nurses, college-trained pharmacists, public health workers, and 
specialist managers, particularly for hospitals and in the poor and remote areas with the greatest 
needs.’227  
Most designs that discuss subnational financial resources noted the lack of resources for services. 
For example, the Philippines provincial roads program described ‘the amount of Government of 
Philippines budget at the national and provincial level to rehabilitate and maintain these roads is 
extremely limited.’228 The Indonesian education program design found that the ‘decentralisation 
framework and [finance management] system for the education sector needs better alignment of 
authority, capacity and resources.’229 and discussed challenges at the district level: ‘80 per cent of 
funds … [are] allocated to salaries [resulting in] limited funds for operational funding.’230 Designs also 
mentioned different forms of financing: ‘Hospital financing is currently supply-driven, based primarily 
on staff levels and numbers of beds, which encourages overuse and inefficiency. The use of per-case 
payment methods (supported by ‘care pathways’) offers a promising alternative to current payment 
methods.’231 
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Those designs that mentioned financial management at the subnational level mostly reported 
problems in this area. For example, the education program in Mindanao in the Philippines noted that 
‘last year, an assessment of the [Department of Education’s] financial system indicated inefficiencies 
and ineffectiveness in the department’s budget allocation and spending as a consequence of poor 
budget planning, preparation and execution.’232 The Solomon Islands health program discussed the 
need for analysis of financial management at both central and provincial levels: ‘As part of efforts to 
improve budget preparation and execution, the Ministry of Health has requested a functional analysis 
of the finance team—both in headquarters and in the provinces. This analysis is needed to improve 
the efficiency of the team.’233  
 
Village facilitators describe the community complaints mechanism concerning maternal and neonatal 
health developed through a DFAT program between communities and the hospital, Timor Tengah Utara, 
Nusa Tenggara Timur, Indonesia. Photo: DFAT 
Demand side of service delivery 
Analysis of the demand side of service delivery was generally not a feature of design documents. In 
around half of the designs it was not mentioned at all. Those designs with strongest mention of civil 
society involved some use of an NGO implementing partner. Where mechanisms for participation 
were mentioned, it was in relation to involvement in planning (e.g. in the Philippines’ road program), 
management (e.g. in community-run schools through an NGO program in Bangladesh) and monitoring 
(e.g. in an Indonesian rural water supply program and an Indonesian education program). For 
example, the Bangladesh NGO education design mentions that ‘it [tripartite cooperation between 
government, NGO and community] also works to improve the abilities and effectiveness of school 
management committees and to increase community participation in primary education.’234  
Quality of participation relates to the ability of civil society to self-organise and have a voice. The 
education program in Mindanao in the Philippines reported that ‘the community members will be the 
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strongest ally of the implementing NGOs in ensuring continuity of activities despite the conflict 
situations. The acceptability of the local NGO and the learning facilitator with the community are vital 
to the project’s success and will be an important consideration.’235  
Efforts to increase accountability or transparency of service providers or government were rarely 
mentioned. Where they were, it was usually in relation to community monitoring of construction or 
implementation. For example, the Indonesian water supply project mentioned innovative methods to 
assist community monitoring: ‘An open mobile telephone text line and the project website have 
encouraged self-monitoring by the community implementation groups and other project 
stakeholders.’236 The education design from Indonesia also discussed the use of forums to assist 
communities to monitor school construction: ‘Holding forums so village representatives are able to 
understand the construction procedure and monitor any non-compliant practices.’237  
Aid choices concerning partner engagement and location 
Design documents were mixed in terms of mentioning a rationale for working from national or 
subnational levels or both. Almost half of the designs gave some, but limited, explanation of their 
rationale and a few provided a detailed rationale. The health resources program in Vietnam gave a 
limited explanation of its rationale. For example, it mentions that ‘the project loan supports a set of 
linked and coordinated actions that are closely aligned with the policy actions and are designed to 
support their implementation at national and subnational levels’ and ‘it will also support the 
establishment and operation of the health professional registration system at the provincial and 
national level.’238  
Where initiatives were targeted to particular subnational locations, design documents did not 
necessarily present a robust analysis or reasons for their choice of subnational location. For example, 
the Solomon Islands education program design mentions two subnational locations but gives no 
details or rationale for their choice.239 There may be cases where subnational location is determined 
and described in other program documentation. 
Some designs did provide explanations, with reasons such as poverty targeting or complementarity (or 
in some cases alignment) with other Australian aid (or other donor) programs. For example, the 
Philippines Mindanao education program explains that ‘there is an urgency to address poverty which 
is most chronic in autonomous region Mindanao because it impacts on economic growth, social 
stability and peace in the region … [the Australian aid program education resource facility] study on 
conflict and fragile states recommended long-term reforms to improve the relevance and quality of 
education and targeting the most vulnerable.’240  
Most program designs did not provide a justification for their aid modality. In some cases, there was 
some justification. These included quantum of funding (Vietnam health resources design), the cost-
effectiveness of the chosen approach (the Philippines education program in Mindanao), and use of 
direct budget support (Vietnam health delivery program in Vietnam, but through use of a project 
management unit). Some initiatives at the subnational level justified the use of a managing contractor 
as implementing partner because this approach allows use of government systems. For example, the 
health program in Indonesia notes that ‘the program mode of delivery uses government systems, and 
has the potential to achieve sustainable improvements in those systems. This approach is also 
consistent with the decentralisation of GoI [Indonesian Government] and with AusAID policy and the 
Paris Declaration on harmonisation among donors.’241  
An example of a design that gave detailed justification of its ‘facility’ modality was the Philippines 
provincial roads program. This design notes that ‘the design team designates the PRMF as a facility 
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that requires the development of both project and program management skills at the provincial 
level.’242 The design also provides a detailed explanation for why a facility modality will address the 
required needs at the subnational level. The health design in Bangladesh also discusses their chosen 
approach in relation to decentralisation dynamics: ‘Furthermore, active pursuit of decentralisation by 
the current government aims at a more efficient and appropriate use of resources. Connecting the 
lines between commitment, decentralisation and systems development, [Australia] is considering 
pooling funds with other development partners for the [program].’243  
Equity in service delivery 
The majority of design documents included some mention of the participation of marginalised and 
vulnerable groups in planning, management or monitoring service delivery. Often, design documents 
included broad-brush statements about adhering to gender policy directions or about access of 
certain groups to different services, but without consideration of their influence on service delivery. 
Some designs did consider this issue, though the examples relate mostly to women as a vulnerable 
group rather than other vulnerable groups (e.g. people with a disability). For example, the Philippines 
roads program mentions that ‘the involvement of the community in the priority setting planning 
process is apt to result in different results if there is a conscious effort to include women in planning 
the activity.’244  
A few designs provided detailed strategies to ensure the involvement of all groups and address 
gender equity concerns in service provision. For example, an education program for Muslim and 
indigenous people in the Philippines notes that ‘the Program design has a specific focus on ensuring 
equity. Gender and disability awareness must go well beyond simply detailing data. Specific program 
activities will be designed to meet and remove obstacles to a universally inclusive education.’245 
Further, this design provides concrete strategies for involving minority groups.35 
The majority of designs at least touched on specific equity outcomes. For example, the Vietnamese 
health program notes that ‘women and adolescent girls in poor, remote, and ethnic minority 
communities are particularly affected by the limited access to quality health services. Design 
measures are included to promote improved access and equity, and targets are set for training of 
female health workers and provision of scholarships in all training programs.’246  
The area for which there was least consideration was how the subnational role of government might 
influence equity outcomes. Most designs made no mention of this area. The provincial roads program 
in the Philippines does mention this issue, and describes the importance of good governance to 
achieve equitable outcomes: ‘Good governance is also part of [the initiative]. It embodies the 
principles of participation, transparency, and accountability which must be applied by executive 
planners and decision-makers throughout each stage of the project cycle if there is to be equitable 
and sustainable development.’247 The water and sanitation design in Indonesia mentioned efforts to 
ensure government officers are gender aware: ‘Efforts will be made to ensure that equal opportunity 
is given to both women and men and the disabled to participate in capacity-building activities ... 
ensuring that government officers are gender aware in their interface with the community and that 
women and men in the community, including those from minority and disadvantaged groups, are 
given equal opportunity to engage in activities.’248  
                                                        
35  ‘Gender issues remain to be embedded in the initiatives of the TWG which are: (1) gender equality at the 
implementation level; (2) gender concerns in the reform process and monitoring; (3) the effectiveness in promoting 
gendered equitable access and quality basic education to Muslims and IPs in remote areas; (4) who is the responsible 
person identified to facilitate and monitor process of gender mainstreaming; (5) the efficacy in budgeting for access 
and quality with focus on pro-poor budgeting whereby gender concerns are taken into consideration.’; (p15). 
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Coherence within aid programming and with decentralisation processes  
The majority of designs demonstrated broad alignment with the direction of decentralisation in the 
relevant country and sector, and no initiatives were working in a contrary direction. In general, designs 
did not make mention of their relationship to any governance initiatives with which the initiative might 
usefully intersect. Exceptions included the PNG transport program, which strongly mentioned the 
subnational strategy and sought to ensure alignment to this broader effort at governance reform, 
though it later narrowed its focus to national roads and hence this was not followed through. An 
Indonesian education program also presents a table with related governance efforts, though it does 
not discuss how links might be made. 
5.2 Evidence of analysis of decentralisation in sector evaluations 
Ten evaluation documents were sourced from the six countries based on the same criteria mentioned 
earlier for designs. See Appendix 3 for details of initiatives. These were reviewed to examine content 
related to the decentralisation context and service delivery implications for both the supply and 
demand sides.  
Evaluation documents had variable amounts of evidence and analysis of decentralisation processes 
and the role of subnational government. In general, the evaluations were judged to be slightly better 
than designs in relation to their content and analysis concerning the supply side of service delivery 
and subnational roles (Table 4). In general, evaluation methodologies allowed for some subnational 
engagement, but more could be done to ensure that evaluations include a stronger subnational 
perspective (through secondary data from monitoring or field engagement).  
The kinds of differences across the six countries did not follow the same pattern as the designs. 
Evaluations from Indonesia and the Philippines had the greatest content concerning decentralisation 
and service delivery. Following these were evaluations from the Solomon Islands, and those from 
Vietnam and Bangladesh had much less such content. The three sectors did not show any major 
differences. 
Analysis and learning concerning decentralised context 
Evaluations made little mention of the implications of decentralisation laws and policy for service 
delivery or of unevenness in the decentralisation process (across different subnational locations). 
The analysis of supply-side service delivery issues at the subnational level were better covered in 
evaluations than in designs. Close to half the evaluations contained significant content on 
subnational capacity and on challenges faced at subnational level. Several evaluations included 
detailed discussions of institutional capacity at local, provincial (or regional) and national levels and 
particular strengths and weaknesses that needed to be addressed. For example, the evaluation of an 
education program in east Indonesia notes that ‘field visits support the conclusion that: Any 
interventions that involve development at a school level should also include interaction and provision 
of capacity building to key personnel at the district level. Districts occupy a pivotal position between 
national policy makers, the provinces and service deliverers.’249 Similarly, evaluation of a large-scale 
water and sanitation service delivery program in Indonesia critiques the initiative for ‘lack of sufficient 
support in building capacity of subnational agencies responsible for service delivery and sector 
monitoring.’250  
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Table 4 Evidence of analysis and learning, equity and coherence in evaluations 
Evaluation 
criteria 
 Absent 
(n = 14) 
Some 
reference 
(n = 14) 
Significant 
content 
(n = 14) 
Analysis and learning 
Decentralisation 
context 
Implications of decentralisation laws and policy 
for service delivery 
7 3 1 
Unevenness in the decentralisation process 
(across different subnational locations)  
6 4 1 
Supply side/ 
subnational role 
Subnational capacity to undertake their roles 2 3 6 
Key gaps or challenges at subnational level 
faced in service delivery 
1 5 5 
Availability of financial resources at subnational 
level relative to those needed for service delivery 
2 6 3 
Adequacy of management of financial resources 
at subnational level 
4 4 3 
Demand side Mechanisms for citizens to participate in 
planning, management or monitoring services  
2 5 4 
Quality of citizen participation in planning, 
management or monitoring service delivery  
2 6 3 
Efforts to increase accountability or transparency 
of government to citizens  
2 7 2 
Equity 
Participation of marginalised and vulnerable groups in planning, 
management or monitoring delivery of services  
2 7 2 
Identification of specific equity outcomes  1 6 4 
How the role of subnational authorities might affect equity 
outcomes 
8 2 1 
Coherence 
How Australian aid program governance programming supports or 
intersects with sectorally focused efforts 
7 3 1 
The extent of alignment to current decentralisation reform  
[Note: this criterion uses a different scale: not aligned/some 
alignment/strong alignment] 
1 6 4 
 
The demand side was also covered in more detail in evaluations than in designs, with almost all 
evaluations discussing this aspect of service delivery. It was sometimes commented that the demand 
side had not been sufficiently addressed. For example, the Philippines provincial road evaluations 
said that ‘none of the civil society organisations who met with the team was able to identify instances 
where their knowledge and expertise were drawn upon specifically for their province.’251 A positive 
example of progress on the demand side was evident in the education program evaluation in Eastern 
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Indonesia, which reported ‘growing community ownership of the governance of their schools; highly 
skilled local school-based management training teams in three districts, totalling approximately 80 
trainers; steady improvement in the number of women on school committees, and in their effective 
participation in the committees’ decision-making.’252  
Equity in service delivery 
Evaluations mostly mentioned marginalised groups and women as beneficiaries of programs rather 
than discussing their role in planning, management or monitoring service delivery. Most evaluations 
discussed gender dimensions of the program, however, references to specific other groups were more 
unusual. One example occurs in the evaluation of the water infrastructure program in Vietnam: ‘[The] 
project included a number of targeting mechanisms to increase the participation and benefits going 
to poor urban residents and vulnerable groups.’253 Lastly, links between subnational authority 
attitudes and equity were rarely mentioned. Such a link was mentioned in the Philippines education 
evaluation: ‘The DepEd is reported as having an ‘inconsistent’ record in mainstreaming gender. This 
appears to result from limited understanding among the current DepEd senior management of 
gender mainstreaming and of the nature of a gender-aware organisation, the lack of a definitive and 
well-institutionalised gender and development policy and a lack of direction in gender budget 
initiatives for the department.’254 
Coherence within aid programming and in decentralisation processes  
Most evaluations mentioned alignment to decentralisation processes, with most demonstrating some 
alignment and several describing strong alignment to decentralisation processes.  
Evaluations generally did not address questions of how sector programs were intersecting with 
governance initiatives. When this issue was mentioned, it was either to provide evidence of some 
level of engagement, or to recommend engagement as a means of improving complementarity. For 
example, an education evaluation in east Indonesia noted that ‘there was some coordination with 
other AusAID activities (e.g. IAPBE, Australia-Nusa Tenggara Assistance for Regional Autonomy 
[ANTARA])’255 and … [also] discussions with ANTARA to determine the most effective way for this 
facility to support dissemination of the benefits achieved in the partnership.’256 
In contrast, Indonesian water and sanitation infrastructure program evaluation noted:  
‘AusAID’s decentralisation program includes an office in Kupang, however there is no 
systematic interaction (that we heard of) between this program and programs … which are 
working with subnational government and communities on service delivery (including in 
eastern Indonesia). There is therefore opportunity to explore how the decentralisation 
program might inform or support WASH programming focused at subnational level. Equally, 
AusAID’s experiences in the WASH sector might usefully serve to inform areas being 
addressed in the decentralisation program.’257  
The Philippines roads evaluation pointed to their strong emphasis on this area: ‘This lesson strongly 
supports a cross-sectoral model for AusAID programming that links governance interventions to those 
of a sectoral nature, such as the approach piloted [here].’258  
Evaluation design  
The design and methods in the majority of sector evaluations allowed for some engagement at 
subnational levels, however the time allocated to empirical work in evaluations is generally small. It 
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was not always possible to ascertain the diversity of stakeholders consulted in the evaluations. Given 
the limited time and resources allocated to most initiative evaluations it is unlikely that a full range of 
stakeholders at the national and subnational levels (e.g. central agencies, elected representatives 
etc.) were consulted. 
The orientation of evaluations is often dependent on the skill set of the evaluation team (e.g. they may 
have a background in sectoral work, governance or evaluation) and on the direction laid out in 
evaluation terms of reference. It is useful to examine evaluation recommendations to see what 
importance is given to working to support partner systems and to governance-related service delivery 
issues. Among the recommendations, close to 40 per cent (ranging from 7–71 per cent) related to an 
action to address some aspect of decentralisation or governance in relation to supply or demand side 
of service systems. Examples include recommendations to: 
› have a focal point at the provincial level (Vietnam health evaluation) 
› increase support to local government through: bottom-up planning, links to political economy and 
prioritisation of water and sanitation, and analysis of ongoing operation, maintenance and 
replacement costs of infrastructure (large-scale rural water and sanitation program in Indonesia) 
› encourage provincial actors to develop infrastructure policies that define provincial responsibilities 
for oversight of new school infrastructure (PNG education program)  
› better address systemic issues facing the education sector (Bangladesh education program) 
› continue mixed-budget financing for infrastructure with construction works funded from provincial 
budgets and technical assistance from Australian assistance. 
5.3 Performance assessment frameworks 
Sector performance assessment frameworks support sector planning and design. They each include a 
generic ‘theory of change’ concerning the relevant sector with related outputs, outcomes and impacts. 
Five frameworks were reviewed to assess the presence or absence of indicators and advice that 
would support monitoring services in decentralised contexts. The coverage of these issues was fairly 
limited.  
All of the frameworks could be strengthened by incorporating specific indicators that are important in 
decentralised contexts, for example the balance of engagement at national and subnational levels.  
Health: The health framework proposes a theory of change to ‘build and sustain fully-financed, 
equitable, accessible health systems.’ It does not make reference to different levels of government 
that may have responsibility for health. Several of the indicators (e.g. government expenditure on 
health as a percentage of total expenditure) could feasibly be employed at the subnational level, but 
there are no prompts to do so. The framework mentions civil society in its theory of change and 
includes the outcome that ‘poor and vulnerable people are empowered to improve their health.’ Its 
focus is on reducing barriers to access health services, but it does not deal with the demand side of 
service delivery or with citizens’ roles in planning or monitoring services and holding governments to 
account.  
Education: The education framework documentation makes passing reference to decentralised 
contexts as presenting challenges in quality service provision, and notes that the indicators can also 
be used at the subnational level. One indicator focuses on pro-poor priorities through exerting an 
influence on ‘political institutions.’ This influence might include encouragement to implement 
decentralisation reform. The related guidance proposes effective management of schools as part of 
decentralised service delivery and argues that accountability for their performance can be achieved 
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through ‘effective school committees or mechanisms for public scrutiny.’ This is reflected in one of 
the indicators, though the indicator is not well defined.  
WASH: The theory of change in the WASH framework refers broadly to sustainability in service delivery 
and strengthening governance arrangements and capacity, but without explicit reference to 
decentralisation. It includes a number of indicators that support effective service delivery in 
decentralised contexts, such as an indicator of financial sustainability and equitable conduct of service 
providers. On the demand side, there are indicators concerning ‘complaint and response mechanisms’ 
and the proportions of women on committees. Indicators for monitoring the sustainability of services 
are also included.  
Infrastructure: The theory of change for infrastructure support is strongly focused on the capacity of 
institutional actors to plan, implement, maintain and govern infrastructure works. It does not refer to 
decentralisation. However, the indicators, as for others, can be used at the subnational level. For 
example, there is mention of a national recurrent budget for road maintenance, which in 
decentralised contexts should also be considered at the subnational level. There are also indicators of 
additional numbers of local contractors executing public works and additional person-days generated 
for labour-based maintenance, which demonstrates a focus on local service provision. There is no 
representation of demand-side issues in the framework. 
Governance: The governance framework includes a wide range of supply-side and demand-side 
outcomes that are important for service delivery in decentralised contexts. The governance framework 
mentions that its indicators can be used at the subnational level. There is also some explicit mention 
of areas of decentralisation that directly affect service delivery, for example in the area of better 
public sector and financial management there is an output of ‘greater transparency of national to 
subnational fiscal relations and more timely and reliable transfer of financial resources.’ 
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6 Strategy for service delivery  
Evaluation question 
› Are decentralisation processes and the role of subnational government in service delivery 
appropriately taken into account in Australian aid policy and strategy? 
 
Key findings 
› Health, education, infrastructure and governance thematic strategies had limited content related 
to decentralisation issues as they relate to service systems.  
› Country strategies (now known as aid investment plans) for Indonesia, Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
and the Philippines provided sufficient analysis of the decentralised context. Country strategies 
for Solomon Islands, Vietnam and Bangladesh included limited and at times inadequate 
discussion of subnational roles or decentralisation, particularly the case of Vietnam.  
› Policy guidance for preparing strategy documents does not contain adequate detail or prompts to 
consider decentralisation. The phrase ‘partner government’ does not usually mean (implicitly or 
explicitly) the full range of sector agencies and subnational levels that comprise a government 
system. There were no prompts to consider different levels of partner government systems. 
› Delivery strategies (now known as sector investment plans) had an appropriate level of analysis of 
decentralisation, although only a limited number were reviewed. Delivery strategies have the 
potential to play a stronger role in guiding programming. Delivery strategies are the appropriate 
level to analyse decentralisation and the role of subnational government and identify strategic 
and complementary entry points for aid and the best type of aid. 
 
Recommendation 3 
As DFAT updates key strategy and guidance documents, decentralisation and subnational roles 
should be considered and staff referred to relevant resources, including the practice notes developed 
in this evaluation. In particular, DFAT should expand the ‘working in partner systems’ guidance and 
assessment tools beyond public financial management and risk management concerns, to include 
broader public sector capabilities such as human resources, monitoring and evaluation and sector-
specific technical expertise. 
 
This chapter reviews key strategy documents that support service delivery in decentralised contexts, 
using the criteria of analysis and learning, equity and coherence. This chapter also considers staff 
perspectives on how these documents are used in practice. Documents included: 
› thematic strategies (health, education, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), infrastructure and 
governance; Section 6.1)  
› country program strategies (Indonesia, PNG, Philippines, Solomon Islands, Vietnam and 
Bangladesh; Section 6.2) 
› sector delivery strategies (PNG health and education; Section 6.3). 
Policy and guidelines on strategy development were also reviewed.  
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6.1 Review of thematic strategies  
Thematic strategies do not consistently address issues related to service delivery in decentralised 
contexts and subnational roles (Table 5). While such strategies are high-level documents and detailed 
coverage of these issues was not expected, some reference to important dimensions of 
decentralisation for service systems is appropriate.  
Analysis and learning in health, education and infrastructure strategies 
This section presents findings against five main areas with respect to analysis and learning related to 
the context, the supply and demand sides of service delivery, guidance on working in decentralised 
contexts, and strength of the evidence.  
Decentralisation context: The education, WASH and infrastructure strategies all made some reference 
to the implications of decentralisation for service delivery. An example in the WASH strategy is the 
explicit reference to how support should be tailored as a result of decentralisation: ‘There will be a 
focus on building capacity, cost recovery and water safety planning at local government levels, 
recognising the trend of national governments to decentralise service delivery.’259 The third pillar of 
the WASH strategy is specifically aimed at ‘creating sustainable services.’ Such measures are 
described as ‘support policies and strategies that keep services operating after they are built. This 
includes better governance through public sector reform and improving service delivery though 
partnerships with civil society and the private sector.’260 
Supply side: The infrastructure strategy was strongest in discussing supply-side issues of service 
delivery in decentralised contexts. This strategy referred to subnational capacity and financial 
resources, for example, ‘many developing countries do not have the institutional capacity, experience 
and expertise at all levels of government to develop infrastructure policies and mobilise the funds 
required to build and maintain their infrastructure assets.’261  
The other strategies paid less attention to supply-side issues, although they are mentioned in 
education and WASH. For example, the education strategy notes that ‘decentralised responsibilities 
for schools can make it difficult to scale up effective models of school management.’262 The WASH 
strategy describes issues concerning financial management and suggests ways to address these: ‘In 
many cases the resources allocated for WASH infrastructure need to be used more efficiently and 
align with investments by partner governments, private sector and other donors to deliver real 
results. This can be done incrementally by better understanding how to promote policy reform and 
address governance issues around public financial management and procurement.’263 
Demand side: All strategies provided guidance on the demand-side elements of service delivery. 
Mechanisms for participation of citizens and marginalised groups in planning, management or 
monitoring of services were often mentioned. For example, the health strategy notes that ‘Australia 
will provide targeted funding to civil society and advocacy groups to enable them to demand quality 
health services on behalf of the communities they represent, be active partners in their health and 
hold authorities accountable for the quality and accessibility of services.’264 However, as evidenced in 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6, we did not find that this commitment flowed through consistently in sectoral 
design and implementation.  
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Table 5 Review of thematic strategies 
  Health  Education WASH Infrastructure Governance 
Analysis and learning 
Contexts Implications of decentralisation laws 
and policy for service delivery 
     
Supply side/  
Subnational 
role 
Subnational role or capacity      
Key gaps or challenges at subnational 
level faced in service delivery 
     
Availability of financial resources at 
subnational level relative to those 
needed for service delivery 
     
Adequacy of management of financial 
resources at subnational level 
     
Demand 
side 
Mechanisms for citizens to participate 
in planning, management or 
monitoring delivery of services 
     
Efforts to increase accountability or 
transparency of government to citizens 
     
Guidance  Specific objectives or outcomes 
specified that focus on subnational 
institutional capacity development 
     
Description of how the aid program will 
work with subnational governments 
     
Evidence base 
Evidence and literature on subnational roles in service 
delivery – use of previous program experience 
     
Evidence and literature on subnational roles in service 
delivery - use of grey/academic literature 
     
Equity 
Participation of marginalised and vulnerable groups in 
planning, management and/or monitoring service 
delivery  
     
Coherence 
Articulation of how governance features within efforts 
in this sector 
     
      
No content      
Some content      
Significant content      
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Guidance on ways of working: In relation to working at subnational levels and capacity development, 
the WASH strategy referred to these areas in terms of approaches to support local-level government, 
private sector and community management systems. The strategy also provided some guidance on 
ways of working at the local level, for example, ‘using results-based payments which are effective in 
mobilising local capacity is one way of improving aid effectiveness.’265 The infrastructure strategy 
comments on the use of result-based approaches: ‘This includes strengthening the organisations 
responsible for delivering services, and building in ways to increase community participation, deal 
with customer problems, ensure user charges are appropriate and sustainable (for example, using 
results-based aid approaches) and make sure poor people have access.’266 The education and health 
strategies did not include similar guidance. 
Evidence: Most thematic strategies drew on previous program experience and literature (published 
and unpublished) concerning subnational roles in service delivery, often in the form of examples.  
Equity in health, education and infrastructure strategies  
Equity issues were addressed in all strategies (and done well in WASH),in terms of targeting, rather 
than in terms of how marginalised groups participate in planning, management or monitoring. For 
example, the education strategy observes that ‘communities that live in the outer islands and 
mountainous areas have lower participation rates’267 and refers to ‘targeting the participation of 
girls.’268 The WASH strategy mentioned participation of marginalised groups in the service delivery: 
‘Civil society, including women’s groups and groups of people with a disability, plays a key role in 
ensuring transparency and accountability of government service delivery and can catalyse change in 
government policy so it includes and responds to development ... We will also enable the participation 
and meaningful consultation of children and young people (including children with disabilities).’269 
Coherence in health, education and infrastructure strategies 
All four strategies have a governance focus. The education strategy has a pillar devoted to better 
governance and the health strategy states that ‘Australia will also support improved governance, 
including in public financial management, to ensure adequate budgetary allocations for health.’270 
The WASH strategy notes that governance is a cross-cutting issue: ‘The Australian Government is 
committed to ensuring the cross-cutting themes of gender equality and improved governance 
continue to underpin its investment in WASH.’271 However, no strategies provide guidance on how to 
achieve coherence and complementarity between governance and other sector programs. 
Review of governance thematic strategy 
We reviewed the extent to which this strategy provides guidance to other sectoral areas in terms of 
their response to decentralised contexts. We found that although one of the three pillars in the 
governance strategy focuses on enhancing service delivery,36 the document contained limited 
guidance concerning decentralised contexts.  
In the governance strategy, the discussion on the supply side of service delivery is limited to generic 
guidance for ‘sound analysis of the political and institutional context’272and seeking ‘strong public 
sector and sound public financial management.’273 It makes limited mention of subnational roles, 
and no mention of key gaps and challenges in service delivery or subnational financial resources. It 
also does not mention how the aid program would work with subnational levels of government. The 
                                                        
36  Pillar 1a: Delivering better services through improved government efficiency and effectiveness and Pillar 1b: Delivering 
services through more accountable, open and responsive governments; Australian Agency for International 
Development, Effective governance thematic strategy, AusAID, Canberra, 2011. 
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governance strategy could be expected to provide more detailed guidance around the challenges that 
are typically faced in decentralised contexts (see Section 1.2). By contrast, it provides a much more 
detailed coverage of the demand side of service delivery at the local level, and of ways to address 
this, including equity considerations. For example, it mentions ‘social accountability and improving 
relationships between the state and society, as well as governing in a socially inclusive way, to 
respond to the needs of all members of society.’274 
With respect to coherence, the strategy refers to coordination and to governance as ‘cross-cutting’ but 
does not discuss how governance and sector programs might be expected to engage with one 
another on service delivery. The strategy proposes a focus on analysis and learning, including the use 
of political, social and political economy analysis. Links between governance and service delivery are 
expected to inform sector strategy and programming. There is no clear guidance, however, on 
mechanisms to ensure such learning is transferred and translated into other sector areas. 
Guidance for preparation of thematic strategies 
There appears to be no specific guidance to underpin preparation of thematic strategies. Such 
guidance could include general governance considerations related to decentralisation and 
subnational roles in supporting sustainable service delivery, as well as prompts regarding specific 
sectoral considerations. Such guidance could also cover thematic performance assessment 
frameworks. This would help to ensure consistent terminology and approaches, as well as appropriate 
cross-referencing between documents. 
6.2 Review of country program strategies  
We found an uneven coverage of decentralisation processes in the six country program strategies 
(summarised in Table 6, see Appendix 3 for detailed analysis). We reviewed the strategies in light of 
the status of the decentralisation process in each country, which in some cases explains the absence 
or limited discussion of decentralisation issues. Strategy documents for the three countries where 
decentralisation is well progressed (Indonesia, PNG and the Philippines) all describe the role of 
subnational authorities and decentralisation processes as key considerations.37 The documents for 
the three other countries contained limited consideration of these areas. This may be justifiable for 
Solomon Islands and Bangladesh given their status of decentralisation, but it is questionable for 
Vietnam, where decentralisation is further progressed.  
The ‘working in partner systems’ guidelines were ‘written to complement the new country strategy 
architecture’ and are mostly focused on public financial management. They define ‘partner systems’ 
in terms of financial and budgetary systems. So, while these guidelines do mention subnational 
government, they are primarily concerned with fiduciary risk. They do not prompt consideration of how 
to address the variety of aid choices that are available in decentralised contexts (e.g. balance of 
engagement with different parts of partner governments at different levels, choice of subnational 
location, modalities that support responsiveness). 
Internal guidelines on political economy analysis recognise the political nature of governance with 
both formal and informal systems and processes influencing government. This guidance promotes an 
‘understanding of local political economy’, ‘macro level analysis’ and ‘sector and issue specific 
analysis’ and is useful in prompting consideration of issues important in decentralised contexts.  
 
                                                        
37  However, the nature of PNG documents (Partnership agreement and accompanying schedules) limits analysis. 
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Table 6 Service delivery roles and review of country strategies  
Country Subnational roles in service 
delivery  
Evidence of decentralisation and subnational roles in 
country strategy documents 
Indonesia Provincial and local governments 
responsible for service delivery 
(Devolution) 
› Good coverage of decentralisation—provides analysis of 
decentralised context, challenges faced at subnational level.  
› Commits to work with select provincial and local governments 
to enhance capacity and public financial management, and to 
dedicate resources to increase knowledge of the context. 
PNG Provincial and local governments 
primarily responsible for delivery of 
most public services, including 
provincial health authorities in some 
provinces (Devolution)  
› Partnership agreement and accompanying schedules have 
limited reference to subnational roles in service delivery.38 
› Health schedule commits to support subnational capacity, 
education schedule does not, but describes role of different 
levels of government.  
Philippines Services in healthcare, social services, 
public works, education, and housing 
devolved to local level (Devolution) 
› Detailed coverage of decentralisation and role of subnational 
government in service delivery. Notes specific problems with 
current decentralised service delivery. 
› Commits support to address two of these major problems, 
funding at local level and accountability for performance. 
Vietnam Education, health and social welfare 
provided by provincial and local 
governments. Devolving authority and 
resources resisted (Deconcentration) 
› Limited mention of decentralisation or subnational roles. 
› Governance is a  cross-cutting theme for sector areas, but 
there is no analysis or discussion of capacity, authority or 
financial management at subnational levels. 
Solomon 
Islands 
Most service delivery responsibility of 
central government due to lack of 
provincial capacity  
(Political decentralisation without 
devolution of authority and function) 
› No mention of subnational contexts, nor the role of provincial 
governments in development programs (Partnership 
agreement rather than a country strategy) 
› Subsequent schedules for priority outcomes not yet prepared. 
Bangladesh Local government currently plays a 
limited role in service delivery, 
particularly in health and education  
(Deconcentration) 
› Limited mention or analysis of decentralisation or the role of 
subnational authorities. 
› Commits to support service delivery through civil society 
partners without description of how this relates to role of local 
authorities.  
Use of country strategies 
Program staff in all three fieldwork countries referred to their country strategy documents.39 In the 
Philippines program, staff reported that the country strategy was influenced by a ‘huge body of 
research’ and was supported by baselines and performance frameworks. The strategy is to be 
integrated into all programs and staff reported ‘everyone has bought into it.’ Program staff saw their 
work as consistent with or supporting the country strategy. In relation to the Philippines education 
program, program staff said both country and delivery strategies were ‘keeping people on track.’ The 
Philippines staff clearly demonstrated the valuable role that country strategies can play in setting 
directions and coordinating activities. At the same time, one interviewee acknowledged that the 
                                                        
38  The previous country program strategy 2006–10 contained clear recognition of the decentralised system of government 
with a pillar devoted to improved service delivery and stability, including strengthening decentralised service delivery. 
39  In PNG, this was a little unclear, and this is probably due to the status of the country strategy and partnership 
agreement. 
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country strategy also needed to retrofit existing programs.40 While there may be some limitations 
regarding accommodation of existing programs, as well as political uncertainty, it is critical that a 
current analysis of the decentralised context informs the country strategy. 
6.3 Review of sector delivery strategies  
Delivery strategies have been used to define and organise the aid investments necessary to 
implement higher levels plans.275 The evaluation found there is a significant opportunity to articulate 
decentralisation processes and implications in sector investments plans, which have superseded 
delivery strategies.41 This is because such plans are at the appropriate level to provide more detail 
about choosing entry points and complementary programming across initiatives.  The Sector 
investment plans: working in decentralised systems practice note draws on the findings of this 
evaluation to provide practical assistance on how to take decentralisation into account. 
Coverage of decentralisation issues and subnational roles 
We reviewed two current delivery strategies from PNG: the Australia–PNG Health Delivery Strategy 
and the Australian Support for Basic and Secondary Education. Both include some analysis of 
decentralisation and the role of subnational government. The education delivery strategy contains a 
more detailed analysis than the health strategy.42  
Neither strategy provides a detailed assessment of supply-side subnational capacity to undertake 
their prescribed roles in service delivery. The education strategy discusses the need to make better 
use of government systems and work more closely with provincial administrations. The education 
strategy analyses sources and the adequacy of funds compared to service delivery needs, but the 
health strategy does not. However, the health strategy commits to channelling funds to the 
subnational level based on the assessment that the transfer of funds from the national level is 
insufficient. Coverage of the demand side of service delivery was very limited. In terms of coherence, 
both delivery strategies mentioned governance programs and the health delivery strategy mentions 
use of program staff at the subnational level but did not include mechanisms to improve coordination 
and coherence.  
Policy guidance for preparation of delivery strategies 
The guidance for preparing delivery strategies does not include explicit prompts to consider 
subnational government or decentralisation. The guideline does imply that partner government 
extends beyond the national government with reference to ‘various parts of government.’276 However, 
the guidance does not address the competing interests and agendas of different parts of government.  
                                                        
40  An internal review of the aid architecture found that sequencing can be a challenge and there ‘has been a tendency for 
some strategies to justify existing investments rather than guiding future decisions.’ It is argued that strategies can 
‘acknowledge the programming that is already fixed, while outlining where new spending will be targeted.’ Further, they 
argue that programs need to implement the architecture ASAP and have strategies in place before making new 
investment decisions; Australian Agency for International Development, Rapid assessment of AusAID’s strategic 
programming architecture (unpublished), AusAID, Canberra, 2013. 
 
42  However, the health strategy did discuss issues within health service delivery that are primarily the result of the 
decentralisation. 
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Use of delivery strategies  
The development of delivery strategies was under way in all three countries. They were referred to 
more routinely in the Philippines where they were talked about in connection to the country strategy 
and in relation to new program designs. For example, the preparation of the Philippines education 
delivery strategy was informed by the education thematic strategy and the education thematic group. 
We found that the delivery strategies were seen to help with the recruitment of the right mix of staff, 
selection of partners, analysis, resources and program decisions.  
In PNG, program staff saw developing the governance delivery strategy as an important process for 
setting a more strategic direction and as a means of responding to partner government changes and 
reviews of the governance program. Program staff expected this document to flow on to the next 
country strategy and to other programs ‘to provide guidance for governance and [Australian aid 
program] strategy going forward.’ There were no explicit delivery strategy examples for Indonesia. 
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7 Organisational support  
Evaluation question 
› Are sectoral staff sufficiently supported organisationally to take decentralisation into account in 
sectoral programming? 
› What is the level of interaction between sectoral service delivery support and governance support 
and how could such interaction be optimised to best support service delivery outcomes in 
decentralised contexts? 
 
Key findings 
› Establishing and maintaining a degree of coherence across the Australian aid program, as well as 
alignment with national and local-level government, depends on a variety of factors, including the 
capacity for:  
 - sequencing strategy and design documents  
 - balancing higher-level strategy alignment and flexibility at both national and subnational levels  
 - balancing the interests and perspectives of different parts of partner government, who may also 
have poor relationships  
 - optimising resources in policy and guidance using in-country knowledge and expertise.  
› Aid program staff can access a reasonable level of support through key strategy, policy and 
guidance documents and other learning opportunities. More could be done, however, to support 
staff to take into account decentralisation and governance at subnational levels.  
› There has been some progress in integrating governance issues. The approach to integration of 
governance capabilities into sector programs should be reviewed in each country context so that 
needs are understood and relevant options are explored.  
› There are significant opportunities for cross-sector learning and improved knowledge 
management within the aid program concerning decentralisation issues. More could be done to 
build stronger strategies around interactions and coordination between programs. 
› Practical support and steps for program staff include good practice examples; greater interaction 
between governance and other program staff; links to broader public sector reform governance 
programs; design of sector programs with clear governance objectives; corresponding resources. 
› Greater coherence is needed across country programs, particularly at the subnational level.  
› Responsibility for coherence across country programs should not be assumed to be the 
responsibility of the governance program team. Not all country programs will have governance 
staff and may sit more easily within a corporate area such as program effectiveness or in quality 
teams who work across all program areas.  
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Recommendation 4 
DFAT should foster specific governance capability in areas related to decentralisation and subnational 
levels, in particular:  
i incentives and mechanisms to support governance and service delivery sector areas to work 
more strongly with one another 
ii skills and knowledge of/resources available to governance staff to communicate with and support 
sector staff 
iii sector staff knowledge of governance and decentralisation  
V formal training opportunities and resources for on-the-job learning, that build governance and 
decentralisation knowledge of sector staff. 
 
This chapter reviews the adequacy of support provided to staff to work effectively in decentralised 
contexts (Section 7.1) and whether analysis and learning concerning governance and decentralisation 
are underpinning sector programming (Section 7.2). The level of interaction between governance and 
other sector programs as a component of this support is also reviewed (Section 7.3). This chapter 
draws on the perspectives of staff, implementing partners and partner governments captured during 
the evaluation interviews. 
7.1 Support for program staff to work in decentralised contexts 
Donors have been asked to ‘develop consistent support and integrate decentralisation and local 
governance into their own sector policies and strategies.’277 There are various ways that the 
Australian aid program supports staff to do this. DFAT staff across the three countries where fieldwork 
was carried out  identified a range of information sources in addition to strategy documents that they 
used to inform their practice, including: 
› on-the-job learning: colleagues (especially those with local knowledge), advisers (sectoral/program 
and Post/Canberra), field trips, meetings, brown-bag lunches, working groups 
› formal guidance (working in partner systems) and training (governance/decentralisation, working 
in partner systems) 
› formal evidence: evaluations, research, reports, reading, management information systems (also 
geographical) 
› external: donors (e.g. World Bank) think tanks (e.g. Asia Foundation), government counterparts, 
managing contractors, NGOs 
› personal networks. 
Internal sources of information, such as on the job learning, formal guidance and training, were cited 
more consistently than external sources and the extent of sector staff knowledge of decentralisation 
is addressed below (see section 7.3). 
7.2 Integrating governance in sector programs 
This section shows that analysis and learning concerning governance and decentralisation have been 
addressed in some sector programs. At the same time, the need for ongoing learning, internal 
coordination and greater knowledge of governance and decentralisation was consistently expressed 
across all three countries.  
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Changes to service delivery sector support 
This evaluation agrees with a recent study of working in partner government systems in the education 
sector that noted ‘using (partner government systems) puts a premium on country teams being able 
to build an in-depth understanding of something complex, varied and continuously evolving.’278  
The need to do things differently was evident in all three countries—to engage more strongly in 
governance issues in sector programs. This is consistent with a recent review of PNG governance 
programs that found ‘sector programs have a better appreciation of the workings of subnational 
government and are making efforts to engage more directly with provincial administrations.’279 This 
review also found that new designs in health, education, transport and infrastructure reflected the 
use of data from provincial expenditure reviews that gave insight into the ability of line agencies to 
support service delivery.43 
Staff responsible for sector programs demonstrated an understanding of the complexity and 
challenges of working at different levels of the system. Specific issues raised were the need for more 
informed approaches to local contexts, relationships, financial flows, capacity, resource needs, 
incentives and accountability mechanisms at the subnational level. For example, education staff in 
the Philippines explained that for 20 years the focus was on classrooms and materials development 
whereas now there is recognition of governance issues, such as business processes, structures, the 
capacities of people, and accountability mechanisms. In Indonesia, staff reported that the key 
infrastructure initiative (Indonesia Infrastructure Initiative) addressed core issues of poor asset 
management and lack of ownership and badly managed funding from the national level.  
Influence of governance programs and advisers on sector programming 
An important point to note is that ‘governance’ is a ‘sector’ with country-specific plans, programs and 
initiatives. These may, or may not, be aligned to the other sectors. Also, it is a cross-cutting element of 
the aid program and is considered to be similar to other cross-cutting areas such as gender.  
This evaluation raises key questions about how the governance strategy can be implemented with 
regard to this area. What are the practical ways to implement ‘strengthening knowledge and training, 
as well as coordination and cross-agency collaboration’? To what extent are governance staff 
members expected to support better inclusion of governance considerations in sector programs? 
Should sector staff undertake governance training or is other support needed? 
Program staff from the three countries reported different experiences of support from in-house and 
Canberra-based governance advisers.44  
The Philippines demonstrated engagement between staff and programs in governance and other 
sector areas. In addition, their roads program was led by governance, not infrastructure, staff. The 
learning from this initiative had clearly been shared across all programs. For example, staff described 
‘brown-bag lunches’ that facilitated engagement and exchange. Governance staff in the Philippines 
cautioned that there were limits to the support they could provide in responding to issues raised in 
sector programs. For example, it was reported that the national-level governance program 
(Philippines–Australia public financial management program) could not be expected to also cover 
subnational agencies: ‘If you want to back stop subnational public financial management you need to 
provide resources. We don’t have the skills and capacity to decentralise public financial 
management—six relationships with national departments are already stretching capacity.’  
                                                        
43  Undertaken by the PNG National Economic Fiscal Commission. 
44  In Indonesia (adviser and AIPD), Philippines (advisers), and PNG (provincial representatives and initiative staff). 
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In PNG, the influence of governance programs on sector programs was visible and yet also had limits. 
The subnational governance programs (see Appendix 2) were strategic and practical attempts to 
address the range of issues operating in a decentralised context. These programs had four areas of 
focus, namely:  
› capacity building of subnational authorities 
› policy and reforms to the operation of PNG’s decentralised system 
› whole-of-aid program coherence 
› provincial representatives.  
The program was seen to influence the redesign of Australia’s main mechanism to support rural 
health (Health Services Improvement Project). Policy dialogue and legislative changes influenced the 
health program direction.45 During fieldwork, senior staff reported that ‘as a result of the subnational 
[governance] program, people understand the system better than five years ago.’ Another governance 
program was reported to have been partially successful in working with health and education areas. 
Staff suggested more was needed though, in that ‘sectoral programs need to have a vision … to 
understand how the system operates, to be able to move forward.’ It is also worth noting that at the 
time of the evaluation, the priority for the governance program in PNG was improved coordination of 
PNG governance initiatives rather than coordination between governance and other sector 
programs.46 It is also possible that the absence of a senior manager responsible for coordination 
across governance and sector teams contributes to limited interaction and influence of governance 
staff on sector teams.280  
In Indonesia, governance staff reported that while they have been asked to provide input into designs, 
there were some sector programs that ‘may overlook the decentralisation context and how sectoral 
programs work at the local level.’ They argued that health, education and infrastructure needed a 
common framework for decentralisation in Indonesia. From a sector perspective, education staff 
reported that ‘we don’t tap into the Australia–Indonesia Partnership for Decentralisation (AIPD) team 
enough. AIPD only works in a few districts, whereas we work nationally. We need to look at ways to 
tap into their knowledge.’ This was similar in sentiment to the WASH staff, who, in response to 
questions regarding sharing knowledge, said that they ‘don’t think we do! We have discussed this a 
lot about connecting with other silos … we have just started doing that.’ AIPD, on the other hand, 
reported that ‘other [Australian aid] programs that come here ask our advice. Knowledge 
management is an important role.’ 
The interviews show that not all governance programs are seen as having a role in supporting other 
sector programs. Other sectors do not necessarily draw upon governance programs for support, 
indicating that current practice is ad hoc rather than systematic.  
Sector staff knowledge of decentralisation 
While DFAT clearly provides some support to staff (see section 7.1), across all three countries, there is 
evidence that staff capacity to work in decentralised contexts requires further attention. Staff 
recognised limitations in their knowledge of decentralisation in PNG. For example, one staff member 
responded: ‘I’m not 100 per cent confident [about sufficiency of our knowledge of decentralisation]’ 
                                                        
45  For example, it was reported that the research, policy dialogue and legislative changes generated through our 
Governance Program’s support to PNG’s National Economic and Fiscal Commission (PNG’s intergovernmental financing 
agency) has heavily influenced the direction of health program over recent years. 
46  Recent reviews highlighted the need for greater coherence and improved delivery approaches in PNG governance 
programs, (e.g. T Land & F Dobunaba, 2013). 
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and ‘in-house there’s only a few people who would have a bit of an idea how it works.’ Furthermore, 
staff members observed that decentralisation is part of a broader process of political change: ‘It’s 
complex out here and we are learning every day.’ Recent reviews have offered a variety of 
recommendations relating to staff capacity, including the need to recruit governance specialists281 
and for officers to regularly travel to provinces to increase their knowledge and understanding.282 
Implementing partners in both PNG and Indonesia reported limitations in program staff knowledge. In 
Indonesia: ‘The decentralisation unit within [the Australian aid program is] not across all the issues’ 
and in PNG: ‘[The Australian aid program] need to have technical assistance around how to give us 
guidance on what they need out of our programs … local staff lack analytical capacity and expatriate 
staff lack the “how it works” knowledge.’  
An important source of knowledge on context was local staff. In all three countries, local engaged 
officers were appreciated for their local knowledge related to political economy, policy, relationships 
and ways of working. Staff members who had been specifically recruited for technical or local 
expertise were valued and examples of good recruitment practice were related to a specific strategy 
document. For example, staff in Indonesia reported:  
[The] recruitment strategy ensures a mix between aid and Indonesia knowledge. [It] 
brings [together] policy awareness and Australian aid knowledge. The strategy has been 
smart to combine these and it goes a long way to reflect the nuanced understanding of 
what decentralisation means in Indonesia. 
Political economy analysis training had recently been delivered in all three countries by the 
governance group from Canberra. A number of people commented that they were now more able to 
talk about governance issues. One officer from the Philippines reported that recent governance 
training was a ‘validation’ of an existing focus on participation and that they now felt more confident 
to focus on these aspects of governance. In Indonesia, staff members reported that the local 
university delivered decentralisation training to aid program staff. 
Implications for different programs and country contexts  
We conclude that while there has been some positive change, sector programs do require additional 
capacity to effectively work with partner government systems in decentralised contexts and that 
‘different strategies are needed depending on whether … [Australia] is a large or small donor.’283 This 
evaluation also found that while provinces and districts were seen as for a critical component of the 
service system, subnational government and decentralisation issues were not given the same level of 
importance across different programs.284  
Each country program will need to consider its particular context, in terms of political economy (at all 
levels of the system) and public sector reform (across service delivery sectors). This analysis, together 
with assessments of internal/external capacity for governance and policy dialogue specific to the 
relevant sectors in a county portfolio, would help to identify the need for governance support. A cross-
program assessment of staff capacity in governance and decentralisation would help identify needs in 
this area and could lead to recruitment strategies, professional development and other means. 
Depending on the program, sectoral staff may need knowledge of the service delivery chain at all 
levels of partner government and across line and central agencies. All three posts had some 
combination of in-house governance advisers and program staff with some capacity to provide advice 
and support. Staff demonstrated an ability to access a range of external expertise, as well as 
individual and informal networks.  
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Clearly, staff who work on governance are able to influence and support some aspects of sector 
programs. A more comprehensive assessment is needed of in-house governance technical expertise 
and how it is resourced and used to support service delivery sectors. The current and potential 
coordination and collaboration between governance and other sector programs is considered further 
below. 
7.3 Interaction across sectors and levels of the aid program 
This section discusses how increased interaction between governance and other sectors contributes 
to coherence across the aid program. Coherence means consistency of approach, and aid initiatives 
that complement each other and make efficient use of resources.47 Some examples of incoherent 
donor operations are shown in Box 1. 
Box 1 Donor incoherence in decentralised contexts 
› High-level strategic goals relating to service delivery are not shared or consistent between sector 
and governance programs. 
› Sector and governance strategies are developed in isolation from each other. 
› Lack of country program coordination mechanism, and/or structured communication between 
programs. 
› Absence of mechanisms to prevent sector programs being primarily responsive to national line 
ministry preferences and governance programs primarily responsive to the different preferences 
of subnational authorities and central agencies, resulting in inconsistent approaches. 
› Donors engage primarily with national line ministry staff, and fail to engage appropriately with 
staff of central agencies and of subnational authorities. 
› Sectoral programs engage with sectoral staff in subnational authorities, but not senior 
management or corporate areas. 
› Sectoral and governance programs undertake local interventions in different locations. 
› Governance program interventions are not targeting governance blockages important for an 
outcome sought by a sector program. 
› Sectoral programs emphasise direct service delivery and bypass subnational systems, sometimes 
when governance programs are trying to strengthen those government systems. 
Canberra: decision-making and guidance  
Decision-making 
The aid architecture has been designed to increase coherence within and across country programs.48 
A high-level committee, based in Canberra, reviews all country strategies and high-value initiatives, in 
addition to the routine in-country approvals of strategy and design and negotiations with partner 
government agencies. These approval points provide opportunities for senior management to ensure 
governance issues of service delivery are adequately addressed prior to implementation.  
                                                        
47  The AusAID policy for Strategic Program Development states that ‘programming interventions and policy dialogue 
should be coherent, outcomes focused and recognise/leverage the interdependencies inherent in the program 
portfolio’ (AusAID, AusAID policy: strategic program development, 2013, p.3.) 
48  The main formal requirements include: country level situational analysis, country/delivery strategies and initiative level 
designs, performance and quality reporting, reviews and evaluations.  
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Guidance documents  
Previously guidance on preparation of country and delivery strategies (see Sections 6.2 and 6.3) 
contained limited prompts to consider critical governance issues. Some form of guidance would 
support a consistent approach and is likely to result in more appropriate and effective programming.  
The suite of ‘working in partner systems’ guidance provides some formal guidance. Staff experience 
in the field suggests that more could be done to extend the scope and usability of this guidance. 
Attempts to conduct partner government assessments at subnational levels (in Indonesia and the 
Philippines) highlighted that some staff believed the assessments were designed for the national level 
and were not appropriate for subnational level. In Indonesia, assessments were seen as ‘currently a 
compliance exercise and too simplistic … [there is] a gap between [the Australian aid program’s] 
requirements and questions on-the-ground.’ This view was contested by staff in Canberra who 
reported that the assessments had been used successfully at the subnational level.  
Many field officers seek and greatly appreciate practical guidance documents. For example, officers in 
the Philippines reported: ‘Rules and tools … very useful and suitable for this environment compared 
to before—all you need is there.’ The guidance and tools were said to assist staff to look at how they 
connected with other parts of the organisation, including thematic groups and governance programs. 
In this way, they can be seen as a support to coherence across the aid program. Any additional 
guidance and resources should build on the current system through the revision of existing 
documents (based on feedback from staff) and the provision of examples that demonstrate the 
application of policies and tools. 
Practical and timely advice 
Past reviews have identified problems with communication between Canberra and Post 285 including 
inadequate input into designs from Canberra sectoral advisers.286 Yet, in this evaluation, staff gave us 
several examples of Canberra-based advisers influencing program design. For example, the PNG 
governance team reported that the Canberra governance thematic group provided support for their new 
delivery strategy: ‘Recently the engagement with Canberra has helped to redesign the new governance 
program (working as one team).’ These and other examples suggest that the quality and accessibility of 
advice and support from Canberra is improving. Practical and timely advice from Canberra could be 
expected to enable more effective uptake of strategy, policy and guidance. 
Coherence at country level 
In all three countries, senior management had tried to improve coherence in governance and service 
delivery across the country program. The Philippines country strategy was exceptional in that it 
provided clarity on interrelationships between programs and support to align aid approaches. This 
was reflected in the interviews with staff who consistently reported the strategy was a critical 
foundation to the way they worked (see Box 2.)  
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Box 2 Philippines country strategy 
Staff highlighted the following features of the strategy: 
› Governance programs were explicitly related to service delivery. 
› Governance was both a program area and a clear cross-cutting objective to underpin sector 
programs. 
› Several governance programs were explicitly linked to other sector programs. 
› The strategy was flexible and responsive to changes in national government with modular 
approach to programming. 
› The strategy was able to support decentralisation reforms linked to election outcomes and 
subsequent changes in focus. 
 
PNG provided a useful model for placing officers at the subnational level. A recent strategy review 
identified that ‘the [provincial representative] function is the most practical manifestation of the shift 
from coherence between [it being] regarded as an [subnational strategy] responsibility to it being 
regarded as a whole of program responsibility, under the Chief of Operations’ 287 (see Box 3). Another 
review also noted the importance of this role, as well as the need for the aid program to decentralise 
its own support functions.288 
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Box 3 PNG provincial representatives 
The Australian aid program has placed staff in the provinces of Papua New Guinea for almost 
10 years in an effort to support the decentralisation process, represent the aid program and inform 
Australian aid programming. This representation has changed over time.  
Provincial Australian aid staff (2005–07) 
Australia first started to base aid staff in the provinces in 2005 as part of the Sub-National Initiative. 
Six staff were placed in three provinces: Central (two staff), East Highlands Province (two staff), East 
New Britain (two staff). The initial placements were based on prevailing reform and service-
improvement oriented approaches in those provinces at the time.289 In 2007, Australia placed a full-
time officer in Bougainville, and in 2008, placed an education development specialist in Milne Bay 
Province and an adviser in Western Province.  
Provincially-based staff were primarily focused on supporting the implementation of the Provincial 
Performance Improvement Initiative (PPII). The roles of the provincial staff290 were:  
› engaging with the provincial administrator and provincial division managers on the PPII; 
supporting budgeting, spending, human resource and performance management, and local 
implementation of the National Economic and Fiscal Commission Reform of Intergovernmental 
Financing Arrangements 
› coordinating the substantial package of Australia assistance implemented locally and ensuring 
stakeholder awareness and understanding 
› informal ‘on-the-ground’ monitoring of assistance and advising Port Moresby sector and 
governance programs on what was needed to improve local acceptance and implementation 
› developing understanding of the political economy, governance arrangements and mechanics of 
service delivery under the decentralised system. 
Co-located officers (2007–10) 
The role continued under the Sub-National Strategy (SNS), and these officers were referred to as co-
located officers.  
The officers continued their support for PPII (and SNS), coordination of assistance, on-the-ground 
monitoring of assistance, and providing an insight into the politics and mechanics of decentralisation. 
The officers also had more strategic tasks to support the reform process: 
› supporting the Provincial Management Team (PMT) of each province in reviewing and 
strengthening their administrative processes and in developing a reform agenda for more 
effective service delivery 
› acting as a liaison through which PMTs could more easily access technical advisory resources that 
they need to assist them with their respective reform processes 
› providing Australia with an ongoing needs analysis of provincial, district and local government 
requirements 
› assisting in maintaining a focus on key cross-cutting areas within the subnational level of the 
Australian aid program including gender and HIV/AIDS 
› ensuring Australian programs fitted within the coordinated development process of the province. 
The 2009 review of the SNS291 found that ‘co-located officers were contributing to the improvement 
of administration services by supporting provincial efforts to implement the PPII and provide an 
AusAID presence at provincial level.’292  
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The PNG Department of Provincial and Local Government Affairs valued co-located officers because 
they supported PPII implementation and provided ‘our eyes and ears on the ground.’ However, 
uncertainty about the role of co-located officers and perceptions of some PMTs that these officers 
were advisers caused confusion, and led to some concern that the officers lacked the competencies 
required to be public administration advisers. The review recommended that these perceptions be 
addressed by clear communication of the roles and responsibilities of the co-located officers. 
An internal AusAID minute describing the officers’ role at the time states that there was ‘little 
understanding of the roles of the provincial officers and limited cross-sectoral engagement.’ As a 
result, ‘AusAID continued to operate in a siloised manner in the provinces and provincial officers were 
not being used to their fullest potential.’293 
Provincial representatives (2010–12) 
After the 2009 review, in 2010 the position was renamed to ‘provincial representatives.’ These 
officers continued with the same terms of reference but no longer held responsibility for the day-to-
day administration of PPII support.  
They also aimed to increase the level of engagement between their role and other Australian program 
roles, particularly the governance teams. However, more intense collaboration was required and led 
to recommendations to:  
› increase the number of provincial representatives (there are now 12294) 
› increase the seniority of these officers and sector specialisation 
› merge the SNS and governance teams 
› mandate that provincial teams act as the single coordination point for all aid investments and 
sectors 
› require sectors to liaise with the representatives about all investments within the province.295 
Provincial teams (2012–present) 
All these recommendations have been implemented. 
Lessons learned 
The Australian aid program has learned much from working in the provinces. Lessons cited in the 
2012 document296 on refocusing the provincial representative’s role are worth stating here: 
› The program is still learning about decentralised service delivery, and so is the PNG Government. 
› Program coherence does not come easily. It requires a supportive structure, led comprehensively 
by the senior executive, and an active and regular effort on the part of all officers.  
› We have to avoid replicating our sector silos in the provinces. Provincial representatives need to 
be part of a provincial team, not separated into sectors.  
› We need to commit to being in the provinces for the long term.  
› Being on the frontline of service delivery is expensive. However, if we want to extend our reach to 
the poorest regions, we cannot continue to focus on Waigani.  
› The provincial officers have a highly responsible role. Who we choose for these roles is crucial to 
their success.  
› Each province is unique and assistance to each will be dependent on their needs. 
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Interaction between program staff within country programs 
The evaluation found a few examples of programs working together across sectors and within 
subnational geographic locations. However, barriers preventing stronger interaction were also 
described. 
Coherence in the Philippines was supported by an office whose relatively small size enables staff 
interaction. The Philippines had introduced coordination meetings for staff working with the same 
partners in Mindanao to ensure coordination. A number of programs (peace and education) had been 
brought together into one team with regular meetings and unified monitoring and evaluation. The 
education program reported that they were working with the governance financial management 
program on management information systems, design and training for the education department. 
Staff in the Philippines also spoke about challenges for collaborating on such activities, such as the 
existence of silos and some difficulty reporting activities that were intertwined. Staff also mentioned 
that collaboration is resource intensive to coordinate and takes time away from other responsibilities. 
This may be particularly relevant for governance staff, if they are expected to work with sectoral teams 
on decentralisation issues and also have their own programs to manage.  
In Indonesia, staff gave several examples where working across programs was seen to be difficult. 
The education program was reported to be locked in to the national government agenda, which 
prevented them from adopting an approach that was more aligned to other programs. A sectoral 
health program noted that it was ‘difficult to work with AIPD [subnational governance program] as 
they have their own framework—it is hard to work with this.’ Also Program Nasional Pemberdayaan 
Masyarakat (National Program for Community Empowerment), reported similar problems, saying that 
‘currently there is a lack of coherence between this part of the [the Australian aid program] and the 
other sectors. This beginning to change but much more needs to be done.’ 
Coordination and alignment at subnational level 
The challenges described above in securing good coordination between staff and programs were 
revealed quite starkly at the subnational level. Both government partners and implementing partners 
commented on the limited coordination across different aspects of the Australian aid program. 
Subnational governments also reported a lack of coordination with their own plans and priorities. The 
latter problem raises an important point in that organisational coherence within Australian assistance 
may be at odds with good coordination and alignment with partner government priorities. Achieving 
such alignment and coordination is already challenging across the multiple countries in which 
Australia works. These difficulties are intensified if we take into account the numerous subnational 
priorities and processes involved. The reviews of sector initiatives profiled in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 
expand upon this question of alignment and relevance at the subnational level. 
Coordination within aid program 
Implementing partners represent the main ‘presence’ of Australian assistance at the subnational 
level, and their perspectives are important. There was evidence that implementing partners saw a 
problem of coherence: ‘[The Australian aid program] needs to have “one voice” and have cohesion 
and synergy at the local level’ and ‘there are many programs implemented in [this] district—yet there 
is little coordination.’ Interaction between programs is ad hoc. For example, one partner reported that 
‘we get along informally but we do not coordinate in a formal way.’ 
There were examples of strategic coordination, as reported by a partner civil society organisation: ‘In 
ACCESS, AIPMNH and AIPD there’s policy-level interaction. We talk and promote issues together, 
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especially when we want to trigger behaviour change.’ It was clear that unless designs and contracts 
contain built-in requirements to coordinate, it is unlikely to happen: ‘What are the motivations of 
managing contractors to talk to other managing contractors if [they are not] contractually bound to? 
But [the Australian aid program] can initiate [this].’ One participant reported that ‘we could be more 
efficient if we were structured cohesively’ and that combined meetings across different programs 
might be a useful step towards better coordination. 
In PNG, an additional resource that is ‘on-the-ground’ at provincial level is the provincial 
representatives, who can support local-level coordination. Their ability to influence sectoral programs 
has limits since such programs report to staff based in the capital, and not every province has a 
provincial representative. 
Alignment with subnational authorities 
Subnational governments in some locations were positive regarding Australian assistance and its 
alignment with their plans and priorities. For example, as compared with other donors, Australia was 
noted in Indonesia to be ‘most in line with local government programs and coordination is more 
intensive …. [and] more consultative.’ This was also expressed in a province in PNG: ‘It’s easier to 
engage with [the Australian aid program] than the others.’ A provincial government in PNG also 
voiced appreciation of the longevity of Australian support: ‘The others come and go but [Australia] has 
stayed. It’s very important as without them how would we do things? Communities benefit.’ 
Participants also reported that Australia had trust in subnational partners and this was highly valued: 
‘The structure that is put in place empowers us and makes us feel respected.’ Australian support for 
existing service delivery roles was also noted in Indonesia: ‘[The Australian aid program] has helped 
us to organise our roles and responsibilities and functions. It has improved our program 
implementation.’  
On the other hand, subnational governments also commented on the lack of coordination and 
alignment. Participants reported on various issues related to planning and reporting, such as a lack of 
synchronisation with local planning. For example, an Indonesian provincial planning agency reported 
that ‘we hosted a gathering to discuss local planning program. However, donor programs are already 
fixed and cannot be synchronised. Donor programs focus on particular areas, some of which we 
already work in so there can be double-up in some areas. If we knew where donors were 
programming earlier we could allocate our resources to another district.’ One participant in PNG 
pointed to the possibility of an excessive burden being placed on resources and staff if uncoordinated 
initiatives occur in the same location: ‘We are already going, then another program starts—that 
doesn’t help the provinces.’ And in PNG, a reminder that national and local priorities may be different: 
‘We need to remember national priorities may not be the same as provincial priorities.’ 
Reporting was often seen to bypass local authorities. A provincial government representative in 
Indonesia said: ‘For future improvement we need better coordination at the implementation stage. 
Progress reports go straight from [the Australian aid program] to the central government. The district 
and provincial governments need to see these reports.’ 
Coordination and alignment with subnational priorities is important because of the considerable risk 
to the sustainability of service delivery outcomes if sufficient local ownership and capacity is not 
developed. As noted by a provincial planning office in Indonesia: ‘There are people who question 
whether the purpose of the Australian Government is to let things end when they know we can’t 
continue. In the past we had projects … [that] ended and facilities were not looked after and then 
another program [to build new facilities] started.’ This comment points to the risk of repeated cycles 
of aid implementation support when capacity issues are not given sufficient attention and priority. 
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Staff suggestions to improve practice 
Staff gave a range of reasons for limited cooperation and learning in sector programs, and reported 
that programs could actually undermine each other’s work. These problems related to the way 
accountability was focused on initiative-level performance, which limited time and resources for cross-
program work. Teams were said to work in isolation and prioritise relationships with central 
government over local stakeholders. Staff commented on poor knowledge management systems and 
practices (in line with findings of other reviews297) with limited and ad hoc communication and 
information sharing.  
In-country workshops in Indonesia and PNG canvassed broad suggestions for improving aid 
management practices, as well as more specific issues related to increased coordination, 
decentralisation and working at the subnational level. The workshops included a range of program 
staff from governance and other sector programs. Staff advocated doing more of what was working. 
This included: 
› better knowledge management systems and more formal sharing of information between 
programs, provincial representatives, technical advisers and managing contractors. For example: 
» more regular meetings between those working in the same location on selection and 
monitoring49 of subnational partners 
» joint/regional planning, up-to-date provincial profiles and political economy analysis 
» cross-program learning and publishing good practice about ways of working at subnational level 
› better linkages between sectors in management,50 designs, joint monitoring with partner 
government and sharing results of monitoring, analysis, diagnostics, evaluation/reviews51 
› development of in-house expertise in governance issues, especially in relation to the specific 
contexts for programs.52 
At the same time, interviewees recognised that these activities would require time and resources and 
would need to be considered alongside other demands on aid program staff.  
Sharing program evidence to improve choices 
There are a number of ways the Australian aid program can support staff to make choices in 
decentralised contexts. Findings from fieldwork across programs demonstrated different ways to 
invest resources in such contexts and the expected benefits that are associated with such 
investments (Table 7). These examples can be considered in new aid program investments.  
                                                        
49  One staff member suggested a more consistent approach to monitoring of different sectors. 50   Suggestions for management included flexible recruitment and incentives for staff to work across sectors. 
51  Other suggestions included co-location of Australian aid staff as well as with contractors and government, location of 
Australian aid offices in the provinces, and increased engagement with less developed provinces. 52   For example, secondments between DFAT, government and provinces, as well as overseas staff and Canberra/Posts. 
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Table 7 Investment choices and associated benefits 
Investment choices Benefits 
Staff located at subnational level Potential for knowledge inputs to posts in country capitals 
based on on-the-ground experience and exposure 
Technical assistance: additional governance advice for sector 
programs and/or design and evaluation teams 
Designs, implementation and evaluation that are more 
responsive to the governance context 
For initiatives that cover multiple subnational locations: 
• Public financial management review across 
subnational locations 
• Capacity reviews of subnational authorities (human 
resources, technical etc.)  
Evidence base to develop sound strategies for improvement 
in local public financial management 
Evidence base to develop responsive solutions to the breadth 
of local needs, which may vary from location to location 
Detailed local-level analysis and engagement in potential 
field locations to inform designs 
Designs that respond to actual situations at subnational level 
Familiarity with how to work politically within local-level 
locations 
Buy-in and engagement with local leaders 
Well-informed choices of subnational location 
Making available subnational perspectives to evaluation 
teams through fieldwork or other sources 
Greater understanding of performance of programs within 
subnational locations 
For initiatives that involve in-depth engagement in one or a 
small number of subnational locations: 
• Concurrent regular engagement at national level 
• Sufficient personnel to develop individual and 
institutional capacity 
• Sufficient timeframes for change 
• Strategies for development of local systems for 
citizen engagement in service delivery 
Potential to leverage engagement in one location for wider 
influence 
Sustainable capacity development 
Effective citizen engagement in service delivery 
Development of performance incentive mechanisms for 
subnational authorities 
Analysis of existing financing mechanisms between national 
and local level  
Ongoing analysis and monitoring of potential loop-holes and 
perverse incentives associated with a well-intentioned 
incentive structure 
Increased engagement and responsibility taken by 
subnational authorities to meet their mandates 
Potential for uptake by national government of new financing 
mechanisms, for example, output-based approaches 
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8 Conclusion  
Working in decentralised contexts is challenging. It involves working with a large range of government 
and other counterparts. It also involves working in low-capacity subnational settings which often have 
poor financial management, high staff vacancies and turnover, insufficient technical capacity and 
high levels of risk. It requires analysis of, and engagement in, conflicts arising from contested power 
and authority. Finally, it must negotiate unclear roles and, in many cases, limited resources for service 
delivery across all levels of government. This is no easy task.  
This evaluation found that the Australian aid program has recognised and responded to the 
difficulties of working to improve services in decentralised systems. Australian support is changing as 
organisational processes, strategies and structures to make aid more effective in decentralised 
contexts are developed and increasingly used. This could be done more systematically by 
implementing the recommendations and using the practice notes produced as part of this evaluation. 
This judgement is expanded upon and substantiated by assessment against the six evaluation criteria 
below. 
Analysis and learning (improving, but currently insufficient): Analysis of the decentralisation context 
was sound in sector programs. Analysis of the constraints and opportunities in particular subnational 
locations was usually inadequate. Given the variability in the service delivery context across different 
subnational locations, and the importance of local leadership and institutions, this is an area that 
needs further attention. The resourcing implications of ensuring staff have a good understanding of 
conditions at subnational level needs to be considered. Various innovations have developed within 
the aid program to enhance knowledge of subnational contexts, including the use of provincial 
advisers in PNG.  
Policy, strategy and guidance documents cover issues related to decentralisation and service delivery 
unevenly. Country and delivery strategies (now known as aid investment plans and sector investment 
plans respectively) are mostly sound, but thematic strategies could provide greater guidance. 
Guidance for strategy and programming refer to partner governments as a coherent entity and have 
insufficient prompts for staff to consider the different parts of partner governments and the potential 
for competing interests.  
The evaluation found that resources to support sector program staff are needed, including formal 
knowledge sharing and cross-program learning. In addition, greater integration of governance 
capabilities into sector programs is important. This could be achieved through stronger links between 
governance and other sector programs, clearer governance objectives in sector programs, and 
through optimising the role of existing governance advisers for technical inputs and/or capacity 
building.  
Alignment and relevance (mostly appropriate): Australian assistance is strongly and consistently 
aligned with the priorities of partner governments at the national level. Alignment to the priorities of 
subnational authorities is variable. In some cases, there is no attempt to provide support for 
subnational authorities’ roles in service delivery and the priorities of the aid program and subnational 
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counterparts are not aligned, even though support at this level is provided. Stronger consultation with 
subnational authorities during design is one approach to addressing this issue, as are incentive-based 
approaches to subnational participation in aid programs.  
Balance of engagement (varied, mostly not appropriate): Four dimensions of balance were assessed 
in the evaluation. First, Australia needs to ensure engagement at the national level is appropriately 
balanced with engagement at subnational levels. Some programs focus on national engagement 
while others have predominantly a subnational focus. Few programs had a good balance at both 
levels. A dominant focus at one level may be justified for certain programs (e.g. in the case of 
excessive fiduciary risk at subnational level). It is critical, however, that the balance of engagement is 
based on analysis and where possible includes strategies to mitigate any negative consequences 
resulting from unbalanced engagement. The resource implications for working across different levels 
and different subnational locations must also be factored into investment decision-making and 
reflected in program documents.  
Second, at the national level, engagement needs to be balanced between central and sector 
ministries and senior staff need to be well versed in the issues. This evaluation found that 
engagement was weighted towards sector ministries. Policy dialogue with central agencies is 
important in addressing systemic issues that undermine service delivery. On some issues, concurrent 
engagement with sector ministries may also be required as they have the potential to undermine, or 
promote, effective decentralisation.298 It is important for aid program staff to be aware that sector 
ministries may look to retain power and authority. In some cases, there may be valid reasons for this 
and that are important for effective service delivery, however, there may also be other interests at 
play.   
Third, engagement needs to be balanced between elected leaders and local administrations. Some 
initiatives have cultivated political support from local leaders but many initiatives did not pay enough 
attention to this.  
Fourth, work to improve the supply of services needs to be balanced by work to enable users to 
demand better services. Sector programs typically focused on the supply side at the expense of the 
demand side. There were few examples where initiatives successfully integrate efforts to build citizen 
capacity to participate in planning or monitoring services and to hold government and service 
providers to account. Where the demand side is given attention, for example in a large-scale rural 
water and sanitation program in Indonesia, the programs have delivered good results.  
Sustainability (variable success): Sustainability of service delivery outcomes in decentralised contexts 
is challenging. Sector programs have succeeded in improving services but not always in a way that 
gives ownership to local levels of government. This poses a risk for the prioritisation of recurrent 
resources that are needed to sustain improvements in service delivery. It is therefore likely that some 
of the gains made through aid support will be lost over time. This evaluation found some innovative 
ways of working which may improve sustainability as they created local ownership and built capacity. 
Equity (sufficient regarding poverty, insufficient regarding gender): Equity was considered in two ways. 
First, it was considered in terms of outcomes for the poor who do not always receive better services in 
decentralised systems. Australian assistance was found to be well targeted. While subnational 
locations were sometimes, but not always, selected on the basis of socioeconomic need, all initiatives 
were focused on the poor, if not the very poor. Since decentralisation reform processes can often 
produce uneven results, choice of subnational location needs to be carefully considered.  
Equity was also considered in terms of the service needs of different groups including women and 
marginalised people. Few initiatives pay adequate attention to specific issues for women or 
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marginalised groups. This reflects the low level of engagement on the demand side. The evaluation 
found services could be improved through work at the subnational level to promote gender awareness 
and develop strategies to address gender equality. There, are good examples of gender work to 
improve services, such as ensuring women are on decision-making boards in PNG in education and 
health.  
Coherence (improving but currently insufficient): Coherence was considered within three separate 
areas: country programs and sector portfolios; subnational locations; and organisational policy or 
guidance.  
The Philippines had a coherent approach to working in decentralised service systems. Indonesia and 
PNG demonstrate less coherent approaches with governance initiatives not adequately underpinning 
sectoral support, however, in PNG recent efforts are improving the integration of governance and 
health sector programs. Managing contractors and civil society organisations felt that Australian 
support could be better coordinated at the subnational level. This view was shared by some 
subnational government stakeholders in Indonesia.  
Staff confirmed that strategic coordination and collaboration at the subnational level is a challenge 
and difficult to address without the allocation of specific resources.  
Recent guidance for strategic programming, for working in partner systems, and for political economy 
analysis are all useful supports to aid in decentralised contexts.  
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Appendix 1 Policy context  
This appendix provides details of the international and national policy reform contexts of the last 
10 years that inform the Australian aid program’s approach to service delivery and decentralisation. It 
also provides details of Australian aid program’s policy response to these international and national 
reforms.  
A1.1 Decentralisation in international development policy  
There has been an increasing recognition of the need to work with a range of levels of government in 
international development policy, particularly in the aid effectiveness agenda. Donors agreed, through 
the Monterrey Consensus (2003), to substantially increase official development assistance (ODA), 
based on a new partnership between developed and developing countries and an increase in aid 
effectiveness.299 Donor commitments to increase the use of country systems for aid delivery, as part 
of increasing country ownership of their own development, are documented in successive aid 
effectiveness agreements: the Paris Declaration (2005), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), and the 
Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (2011).  
The definition of ‘country systems’ has evolved over time. The Paris Declaration, for example, defines 
‘country systems’ as national arrangements and procedures for public financial management, 
accounting, auditing, procurement, results frameworks and monitoring. Subnational systems are only 
mentioned from Accra onwards. The appropriate recognition of, and engagement with, subnational 
government has become identified more recently as critical: ‘The importance of subnational 
governments as actors in the development process and as active partners in development assistance 
has increased [and] the original notion of ownership has broadened beyond traditional national 
actors to include other stakeholders in recipient countries, including subnational governments and 
citizens.’300 It is further argued in the literature that a reliance on traditional ‘national-centric’ 
approaches to the Paris Declaration principles misses important opportunities to improve aid and 
development effectiveness.301  
The aid effectiveness agenda includes a focus on ‘results’ in the form of measurable impacts on 
development outcomes. This line of thinking has been picked up in the Australian aid program and 
has led to a renewed emphasis on value for money.302 An important consideration for this evaluation 
was whether the drive within the health, education and infrastructure sectors for immediate, tangible 
outcomes (which may offer easy justification of ‘value for money’), may potentially compromise the 
other elements of aid effectiveness described above, namely longer-term efforts towards capacity 
building, institutional reform and political engagement that are an inevitable part of country-driven 
development. 
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A1.2 Relevant trends in Australian aid  
The national policy context in the last 10 years has mirrored the international context, coupling strong 
ODA growth with an increased focus on the effectiveness of aid. During this time, the Australian aid 
program was the subject of a number of important reviews303 which influenced the way the program 
operated in the increasingly decentralised development context. The three major reforms of aid in 
Australia of relevance to this evaluation are:  
› increased use and support to partner government systems  
› increased investment in service delivery and governance  
› increased aid program coherence.  
Increased use and support to partner government systems and processes 
The Australian aid white paper in 2006 recognised that aid programs that are owned and driven by 
partner countries were likely to be more sustainable.304 The Paris Declaration Monitoring Survey in 
2008, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) review in 2008 and an Australian 
National Audit Office (ANAO) review in 2009 all critiqued the then current level of use of partner 
government financial systems and recommended that Australia increase this use.  
The ANAO audit is the most explicit in identifying a way to increase this use of partner government 
financial systems.305 ANAO recommended that Australia develop policies that address the benefits 
and lessons learned to date in the use of government systems, how decisions to use government 
systems are reached, including thorough assessment of potential development benefits and risks, 
and how the more significant risks of using partner government systems are managed.  
The most recent DAC review continues this line of argument. It recommended that Australia increase 
the share of aid delivered through program-based approaches by 30 per cent, and make use of 
partner government systems for design, management, expenditure, monitoring and reporting.306 
Further, it recommended that where use of partner systems is deemed too risky, Australia should 
‘strengthen financial management systems to manage program-based approaches.’307 The 
independent review of aid effectiveness also suggested expanding the use of partner government 
systems, with a cautionary note that the form of aid should be considered carefully before using 
partner financial systems.308 Guidance material for strategy development for the Australian aid 
program reflects these trends:309 ‘Strategies should clearly articulate how we will use programming, 
policy dialogue and partnerships in ways that improve rather than undermine the capacity of partner 
governments. Where assessment identifies weak partner systems, strategies should explore ways to 
strengthen these systems with a view to their use in the longer term.’310  
Corruption, as well as poor management, is a risk when working within partner government systems. 
The 2007 ODE evaluation on approaches to anti-corruption311 in the Australian aid program 
investigated this issue and made a series of recommendations regarding the tracking of anti-
corruption outcomes and providing advisers and counterparts with explicit guidelines on what to do if 
confronted with corruption. 
Increased investment in service delivery  
Support for service delivery has increased over recent years. For example, the 2009–10 ANAO report 
noted a tripling of support for education and doubling of support for health between 2007–08 and 
2010. The increased investment is accompanied by recognition of the importance of governance to 
secure longer-term and sustainable improvements in service delivery. The relationship between 
governance and other sectors is addressed in the comprehensive aid policy framework (CAPF): ‘While 
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there is forecast to be a reduction in the share of total ODA spent on governance, increasingly 
governance initiatives will be integrated into sectoral programs in areas such as health and 
education.’312 The ODE 2010 evaluation313 recommended focusing Australian support to public 
financial management reform on improved service delivery. The evaluation recommended moving 
beyond the Ministry of Finance to working with line ministries and local government. The evaluation 
provided detailed recommendations about the useful focus of Australian support to public financial 
management reform. This should focus on encouraging partner governments to ensure predictable 
and timely allocations to line agencies and subnational governments improve transparency and 
provide resources consistent with costs. The ODE 2012 evaluation314 also recognised the need to 
increase the range of partners to civil society actors in order to expand the reach of services. 
Increased aid program coherence 
The independent review of aid effectiveness noted the need to improve coherence and exploit 
synergies between how the program is working in different areas such as civil society, governance, 
and gender. An internal review of the aid architecture in 2013 looked to clarify definitions and 
structures around policy and strategy in order to improve coherence. This review noted the important 
role of delivery strategies as a key opportunity to consider implications of decentralisation within a 
sector. A key dimension of coherence for this evaluation is the linkage between sector support (and 
staff specialisation) and the governance area, noting that governance is considered both a sector in 
itself, as well as a cross-cutting issue. This is because working effectively in decentralised contexts 
requires a high level of governance knowledge and practice.  
These three reforms all require increased staff knowledge of partner countries, and staff 
specialisation. The white paper stressed the need to strengthen analysis of development issues 
through deeper knowledge of partner countries. This issue was followed up in the ANAO report of 
2009–10, which noted how AusAID devolution had improved knowledge of partner countries.  
The Australian aid program’s response to the international and national reform 
agenda 
The Australian aid program has developed a series of policies and supporting strategies in response 
to the context described previously. These include: 
› Using and supporting partner government systems and processes: The 2012 statement on 
effective aid shows an increase in funding through developing country governments in 2005–10 
from approximately 3 to 8 per cent.315 The CAPF sets a target of 30 per cent of aid delivered 
through country partners systems by 2014.316 
› Increased investment in service delivery: Service delivery is integral to two of the five core 
objectives of effective aid and CAPF, specifically ‘saving lives’ and ‘promoting opportunities for all.’ 
The increased commitment to service delivery can be seen in CAPF’s statement that by 2015–16, 
25 per cent of the aid budget will be spent on education assistance.317 
› Coherence within the aid program: The relationship between governance and other sectors is 
addressed within CAPF: ‘While there is forecast to be a reduction in the share of total ODA spent 
on governance, increasingly governance initiatives will be integrated into sectoral programs in 
areas such as health and education.’318 Coherence has a human resources, as well as a 
programming, dimension. The workforce strategy includes development of sector specialists, aid 
management and aid policy professionals. Currently, competencies for sector specialisation in 
service delivery areas of health and education are strongly sector specific and do not include 
strong reference to governance skills. 
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Appendix 2 Evaluation design and methods 
This appendix provides detail on the evaluation design and methods. It justifies key methodological 
choices, demonstrates their fitness for purpose, validity and credibility as well as acknowledges the 
limits of the approach. It also explains further background to the evaluation criteria applied 
throughout the report.  
A2.1 Conceptual framework 
The evaluation took a ‘systems approach’ to ensure consideration of the breadth of different ‘parts’ of 
partner governments and other actors involved in providing services and across service delivery 
chains (Figure A1). The conceptualisation also incorporated ‘good governance’ aspects of provision of 
basic services, such as demand-side accountability for service delivery.319 The concept of the supply 
side and demand side of service delivery is commonly used to underpin Australian governance 
support programs.  
Figure A1 Conceptual framework for service delivery in decentralised contexts 
 
The supply side of dimensions of decentralisation 
Decentralisation is the transfer of competencies and responsibilities for performing public service 
obligations from the central government to local or subnational governments. 
Different countries have adopted different approaches to decentralisation, and the terms to describe 
decentralisation vary in their use. Below are the three main modes of decentralisation (which can also 
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coexist in a given country, including variation between sectors).53 It should be noted that, in practice, 
political and practical drivers render the categories below much less clear and well defined, 
particularly when there is low capacity to design decentralisation systems. 
Deconcentration: The least ambitious level of decentralisation, where responsibilities are transferred 
to an administrative unit of the central government that is spatially closer to the population where 
service is to be provided, usually a field or regional office. 
Delegation: An intermediate level of decentralisation, where some authority and responsibilities are 
transferred to a lower level of government, but there is a principal–agent relationship between the 
central and subnational government in question, with the agent remaining accountable to the 
principal. 
Devolution: The most ambitious form of decentralisation, where the central government devolves 
responsibility, authority, and accountability to subnational governments with some degree of political 
autonomy. 
Decentralization is not necessarily good or bad. If it is designed well, it can move decision-making 
closer to people and improve governance, including the efficiency of service delivery. If 
decentralization is not appropriately designed or is introduced in environments in which local 
participation and accountability are constrained, its effect can be negative. The key challenge is to 
balance responsibilities with accountability and resources…Two key questions are (a) who does what 
regarding spending, taxing, and monitoring outcomes and (b) who is accountable to whom. 
World Bank, A sourcebook for poverty reduction strategies, World Bank, Washington DC, 2002, 
p.279. 
There are four main dimensions of decentralisation:54  
› Political decentralisation: A process whereby the voice of citizens is integrated into policy decisions 
at a subnational level and civil society can hold the associated authorities and officials 
accountable. Questions for service delivery include: What authority is held at subnational level to 
make decisions about service delivery? Who makes decisions and how are they held accountable 
for those decisions? 
› Administrative decentralisation: The process of redistributing authority and responsibility for 
providing public services from the central or national level of government to a subnational and/or 
local level. Questions for service delivery include: Where does responsibility for planning, providing 
and delivering services and monitoring lie? To what extent are lines of accountability back up to 
national level? 
› Fiscal decentralisation: The decentralisation of government expenditure and revenue-raising 
authority to subnational government structures in line with their allocated functional 
responsibilities Questions for service delivery include: How consistent or stable are any financial 
flows from national level? What authority for revenue raising is available at local level? How 
complex are financial mechanisms at subnational level? 
› Market decentralisation:320 Involvement of non-state providers, including non-governmental 
organisations, community-based organisation and the private sector. Questions for service delivery 
include: How are non-state providers held to account? Are non-state actors incorporated into 
planning and budgeting processes? Are specific services contracted out or full privatisation?  
                                                        
53  These definitions are taken from the glossary of World Bank International Evaluation Group, Decentralization in client 
countries: an evaluation of world bank support, 1990–2007, 2008, p.xi.  
54  These definitions are taken from the glossary of World Bank International Evaluation Group, 2008, p.xi. 
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The demand side of service delivery  
Citizen demands for effective governance represent an important facet to effective service delivery in 
decentralised contexts. Their role is critical to support accountability for the quantity and quality of 
services and who gains access to services. Three areas are of importance:  
› Mechanisms for participation and influence: refers to the structures and processes that ensure 
active participation of citizens in influencing the operations of government. A common 
understanding of citizen participation is voting in elections. However, there are a variety of other 
mechanisms including participation in budgeting, planning, monitoring and social auditing 
processes.  
› Access to information: refers to the extent to which governments, especially at the local level, 
ensure accountability and transparency to their constituents and citizens can access the 
information to understand the role of government and their rights in relation to government 
commitments. Access to information can include public display of budgets and acquittals, user-
friendly information on government policy and processes, and commitments and standards of 
service delivery.  
› Quality of participation and voice: refers to the capability of citizens, as individuals and in groups, 
to be in active in mechanisms for participation available to them, to use available information and 
to express their voice with government to influence the practice of government and service 
delivery. An important component of quality of participation and voice are perceptions of power 
and identity within community members and between citizens and government, including the 
gender dimensions of each of these.  
Social inclusion and gender equity are of importance within the demand side of service delivery. 
These concern the extent to which women, men, girls, boys, people living with disabilities and other 
minority groups are able to participate in decisions, hold service providers to account, and access 
services.  
The political dimensions of decentralisation  
At its core, decentralisation is a political process, often initiated by explicit legislation, and its 
implementation depends on the active engagement of a range of political actors.  
The process of decentralisation is complex and guided in local contexts by formal structures, 
organisations and processes. It is also influenced by informal relationships and power structures at 
both national and subnational levels.  
The pace of decentralisation is often uneven, partly as a consequence of political and bureaucratic 
tensions and differences. It may also be reversed. So even where decentralisation is explicit and 
legislated national policy there is often unevenness in the extent to which it is pursued or actively 
supported. There may be differences between elected political leaders and administrative 
bureaucracies over the scope and pace of decentralisation, and related flow-on effects on service 
delivery. For example, in 2013 in PNG an explicit political decision was made to provide substantial 
budgets direct to politicians to address bottlenecks in service delivery.  
Sector policy and reform  
The process of decentralisation is also influenced by sector policies. These are mandated from 
national-level government line ministries. Such policies may be in line with, or contrary to, 
decentralisation reform. Sector-wide approaches are often used to coordinate donors around such 
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sector policies. However often do not coordinate with other reforms and have a tendency to centralise 
service delivery under a sectoral line ministry.321 
Donor support and entry points 
Australian and other donor support for service delivery in decentralised contexts usually takes one of 
four forms, each with different ‘entry point.’ The first is through sector programs (the key focus of this 
evaluation), and the other three are governance programs directed at contributing to decentralisation 
processes:322 
› Sectoral programs: 
» Support to specific sectors often in the form of support for line ministry deconcentration and/or 
increasing involvement of subnational government, private or non-government sectors in the 
implementation of sectoral policies. May include involve efforts to increase citizen participation 
in the management and monitoring of services. 
› Governance programs that contribute to decentralisation processes, often with expected effects to 
improve service delivery: 
» Support for subnational authorities with a focus on building capacity to undertake designated 
functions. Programs may cover a whole country or a number of selected local government 
authorities. This support may be designed with or without explicit links to national government 
authorities and national reform objectives.  
» Support for local area development through providing multi-sectoral support to specific, 
targeted geographic areas. These programs may support local government authorities, work 
with or alongside them, or operate entirely outside local government structures. These 
programs may also target the demand side to build civil society capacity to hold service 
providers to account. 
» Support to national decentralisation policy reforms through multi-sector, system-wide reforms 
to support changes of laws or regulations, planning and fiscal transfer systems, and human 
resources management. Donor support is usually focused on the central government ministries 
responsible for decentralisation.  
A2.1 Evaluation design and methods 
A mixed methods approach was taken, comprising a desk-based document review, and an in-depth 
inquiry in three countries (Indonesia, PNG and Philippines).  
Document review  
A framework was developed to consider key aspects of service delivery in decentralised contexts. This 
framework was structured from the conceptual framework just described, and also included 
assessment against other evaluation criteria, namely equity and coherence. 
This framework was applied to a selection of strategy and program documents: 
› five thematic strategies covering health; education; infrastructure; water, sanitation and hygiene; 
and governance 
› country strategies from six countries representing the top recipients of sectoral service delivery 
support in health, education and infrastructure 
 95 
› 14 design and 10 evaluation documents of sectoral programs selected from above six countries 
across the three sectors 
› two delivery strategies for health and education in PNG 
› five thematic performance assessment frameworks.  
The sample is described separately in Section A2.3.  
Analytical approach: Systematic qualitative analysis was undertaken using prescribed questions to 
consistently interrogate documents. Prescribed questions were based on the conceptual framework. 
Questions focused on understanding the extent to which documents covered themes related to 
evaluation questions and evaluation criteria. For each prescribed question, documents were rated 1 
(no evidence), 2 (some reference) or 3 (significant content). Where scores of 2 or 3 were achieved, 
quotes from the document were noted as supporting evidence, which were subsequently worked into 
the qualitative analysis presented in this report. 
Strength of the evidence: The strength of the evidence is considered good. The review was systematic 
and based on a sound qualitative approach. The reliability was tested through review by additional 
team members. The inclusion of designs and evaluations from six countries allowed insight beyond 
the evaluation’s fieldwork component. One limitation is the size of the sample, which was limited by 
time and resource constraints as well as availability of relevant documentation. Another limitation is 
the reliance on documents without understanding implementation practice, since the two often 
diverge. These limitations were been mitigated by avoiding drawing strong conclusions from this 
component of the analysis, and triangulating evidence with other methods and sources.  
Beyond the methods described above, other documentation was also reviewed:  
› Policy guidance was reviewed for content on decentralisation and its implications. The review 
focused on guidance material to support ‘program delivery’, strategy and program management, 
working in partner systems; design, implementation and completion and evaluation.  
› A selection of governance evaluations was also reviewed, categorising all recommendations into 
themes to support additional learning to inform practice.  
› Literature including past donor evaluations and documentation on decentralisation and service 
delivery were reviewed to ensure this evaluation built on existing knowledge. In addition, political 
economy analysis of the decentralisation context in the case study countries was undertaken by 
local independent expert partners to provide a foundation for understanding the country 
decentralised contexts. A lighter document review was undertaken of the three other non-fieldwork 
countries. 
In-depth inquiry  
Indonesia and PNG were selected for fieldwork, due to their priority for Australian support, their 
significant allocations to sectoral programs, and substantial investment in sector programs. Both 
operate under decentralised frameworks where subnational government has responsibility for health, 
education and some infrastructure.323 The Philippines was included to provide lessons derived from 
prolonged work in a decentralised context. 
The fieldwork component involved: 
› in-depth three-week fieldwork inquiry in Indonesia and PNG with a focus at both national and 
subnational levels; engagement at national level for one week in Philippines  
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› key informant interviews, workshops and focus group discussions with a range of stakeholders 
were undertaken; question guides were prepared for each stakeholder group, structured around 
the evaluation questions and informed by the conceptual framework, and detailed notes including 
verbatim quotes were typed up for all interviews 
› stakeholder analysis, conducted in collaboration with aid program at post to identify key 
stakeholders in the design, implementation and management of programming and to choose 
relevant sample initiatives and subnational locations 
Table A1 Consultations conducted in Indonesia, PNG and the Philippines 
Groups Focus group 
discussion/ 
interview 
Male  Female  Total 
Australian aid program 
staff 
29  38 35 73 
Implementing 
partners 
12 28 19 47 
Government 
representatives 
74 134 80 214 
Civil society 
organisations 
8 26 24 50 
Service providers 10 20 26 46 
Donors/universities 8 9 1 10 
TOTAL 141 255 185 440 
 
Analysis: Two main forms of analysis were undertaken of the data collected during fieldwork. 
› Qualitative analysis was conducted through systematic coding of meeting notes (141 interviews 
and focus group discussions) in Nvivo software. Analysis was structured according to the 
evaluation questions. Key themes within both the framework of the key evaluation questions and 
unanticipated findings and areas beyond the evaluation questions were captured. 
› A ‘case study’ approach was developed to analyse and profile six sectoral programs at greater 
depth. Details of the sample are shown in Section A2.3. A rigorous methodology was followed 
including development of a series of ‘propositions’ or hypotheses concerning each evaluation 
criteria. The propositions were based on the literature and document review, and were tested 
against evidence in available program documentation and transcripts from relevant interviews. 
Rival explanations were explored, particularly where different sources offered contradictions. This 
process led to preparation of a ‘case study database’ for each case study initiative, which included 
all available evidence ordered by evaluation criteria. The database was then used to develop 
shorter profiles, which are presented in the main report. 
Strength of the evidence: The strength of the evidence is considered strong due to the breadth of 
stakeholders at national and subnational levels accessed during fieldwork (58 per cent male, 42 per 
cent female). The thorough, systematic analytical approach and triangulation of evidence across 
multiple sources, particularly for profiles, gave rigour to the approach. 
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Even so, there are limitations in that the fieldwork was short as compared with the complexity of each 
initiative and the evaluation topic. Two to three intensive weeks in each of Indonesia and PNG 
provided certain insights into these locations but cannot be expected to provide a representative 
sample of the subnational environment. In addition, language and interpretation issues, as well as 
issues about power, were likely to have affected responses, particularly from in-country government 
stakeholders. This risk was partially mitigated through the use of simple language and framing of the 
concepts as they were relevant to each respondent, however the risks were not able to be fully 
mitigated. 
Ethical practice 
This evaluation adhered to an institutional ethical review process. Key ethical concerns were the 
maintenance of independence, impartiality and integrity as well as respect for all participants who 
contribute to the evaluation. A plain language one-page description of the evaluation was prepared 
and was shared as appropriate. Explanation of the evaluation purpose and background was provided 
in plain language at the start of every interview and focus group discussion and informed consent was 
sought in verbal form from all participants and was given. To maintain privacy and confidentiality, 
interviewees and participants in focus groups were told that they would not be identified, and that 
commitment has been maintained in this report. Attention was given to ensuring social inclusion in 
terms of opportunity to participate by women and to ensure participants were at ease, for example by 
encouraging discussion in local language or dialects where this was preferred by participants. 
A2.2 Evaluation criteria 
An overarching framework was developed to assess effectiveness in the context of this evaluation. 
This framework was developed based on literature and evaluations of decentralisation and service 
delivery in decentralised contexts. The sections below present the evaluation criteria in further detail, 
including how each is defined, why it is important and how it was used in organisational, policy and 
strategy and initiative-level analysis. 
Analysis and learning (sufficient/not)  
‘Analysis and learning’ refers to the use of a sound evidence base to inform decisions, and the 
organisational supports available to ensure improvement based on past learning and experience. This 
criterion is important in this evaluation because decentralisation is a highly complex, dynamic 
process, therefore demanding significant depth of contextual analysis to ensure appropriate aid 
choices. 
At the organisational level, this criterion examines the Australian aid program’s progression, based on 
analysis and learning, in moving from a dominant focus on national-level engagement with partner 
governments towards greater engagement in service delivery support at subnational level. Within 
policy and strategy, this criterion addresses if and how evidence about decentralisation and the role 
of subnational government are incorporated into strategy documents, and whether policy guidance 
provides sufficient direction on how to do so.  
At the initiative level, this criterion is aligned with Australian aid program quality standards which 
dictate that designs should be ‘evidence-based’, meaning that they: 
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Have sufficient analysis, including gender analysis, underpinning the programming 
choices made and the program logic to show why the design will work, including an 
analysis of the political realities impacting investment choices. 
Demonstrate how the investment has been influenced by lessons from previous 
experience in the sector, program area and/or country, including lessons learnt by other 
development partners and those contained in evaluation reports and international 
literature.324 
Alignment and relevance 
‘Alignment and relevance’ refers to alignment of the Australian aid program’s efforts with the priorities 
and policies of partner government at national and subnational levels. Alignment is one of the 
principles of aid effectiveness, and its usual interpretation refers to the national level.55 In the context 
of decentralisation, it becomes important also at subnational level. 
In an initiative, ‘alignment and relevance’ includes the following notion of relevance and answering 
questions about what added value Australian support offers and its comparative advantage (quality at 
implementation report template):  
The initiative is the most appropriate way to meet high priority goals that Australia 
shares with its development partners in the given context. 
[The initiative] is relevant to the specific development conditions and social and 
economic context in which it is being implemented. 
Balance 
Working on service delivery in decentralised contexts involves challenging decisions about the 
different levels at which to engage (national and subnational levels), with literature and evaluations 
pointing to the need for a multilevel approach,325 including explicit attention to building capacity of 
institutions at the subnational level.326  
A focus on service delivery also raises questions as to the relative weight of engagement with line 
ministries (usually carrying responsibility for policy, strategic planning and quality assurance) and 
engagement with central agencies and  cross-cutting reforms (e.g. around civil service management, 
human resource management, public financial management and local government and service 
delivery systems),327 especially since ties between these parts of government have been found to 
often be inexistent or weak.328 
Lastly, literature on decentralisation and service delivery points to the necessity of improvements in 
citizen voice and accountability to ensure local service delivery meets needs (including of the poor 
and marginalised),329 hence a focus on how aid choices address the demand and supply side is also 
included. 
Balance is therefore defined across four dimensions: 
› between national and subnational levels 
› between line (sector) ministries and central ministries (cross-functional, administrative or planning 
ministries) 
                                                        
55  For example, the AusAID Investment Design Quality Standards specify ‘the investment takes into account the priorities 
of the partner government’ without any elaboration about which parts of partner government. 
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› between local government (and elected leaders) and local authorities (devolved or deconcentrated 
line ministries) 
› demand and supply side of governance arrangements 
This criterion applies at strategy (across a country program, or within a sector) and initiative levels. 
This does not imply that the Australian aid program should be working at all levels, across all parts of 
government, or across supply and demand in every initiative or sector. Rather, that a balance of 
engagement would be expected, based on sound analysis (which might include what other donors or 
other program areas are doing) and realistic expectations of achievable outcomes. The required 
investments for working on any of these four dimensions must also be weighed up, since each has 
resource implications.  
Sustainability (appropriate/not) 
‘Sustainability’ is interpreted in this evaluation in line with Australian aid program quality systems and 
is focused at the initiative level (quality at implementation report template): 
The extent to which the processes are owned by and provide strengthened capacity of 
local partners. 
The extent to which benefits are likely to endure after the Australian contribution has 
ceased. 
Given the focus on service delivery, the key types of outcomes in question are service delivery 
outcomes. Sector literature points to the challenges of sustaining service outcomes. In the WASH 
sector, for example, often only 50–80 per cent of infrastructure continues to function and provide 
some level of service.56 The education and infrastructure sectors report similar issues around 
maintenance of schools and roads.330 
Key among the above concepts concerning sustainability is ownership (again, one of the tenets of aid 
effectiveness), which in the case of decentralised contexts must include ownership at local level, and 
strengthened capacity of local partners. The investment design quality standards specify that 
consideration of ownership requires that Australian aid program staff: 
Consider capacity issues including the need for baseline assessments and the 
development of capacity development frameworks or strategies which can realistically 
become locally owned in time. 
Equity (sufficient/not) 
Given the overarching purpose of the Australian aid program is to help people overcome poverty, 
‘equity’ is clearly a critical criterion against which to assess effectiveness of Australian support. 
In relation to decentralisation and service delivery, there are also three additional considerations that 
make this criterion important.  
                                                        
56  For example: The Rural Water Supply Network provides evidence across 20 countries of hand-pump failure rates lying 
mostly from 20 to 50 per cent. A recent survey in Ghana estimated that 70 per cent of rural point source water supplies 
functioned at a substandard level and a study in India reports average ‘slippage’ (loss of access to services) at 30 per 
cent across the country. In 2009, World Bank assessed mechanised bore-hole and piped schemes to be 25 per cent 
non-functional.  
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First, there is a lack of consensus in the literature that decentralisation necessarily leads to improved 
services for the poor.331Hence, complex questions arise in terms of how the Australian aid program is 
positioned in relation to decentralisation reforms and ensuring its support leads to outcomes for the 
poor. 
Second, the service needs of particular groups (such as the poor and marginalised) and those of 
women and men are likely to be differentiated, and hence support for development of mechanisms 
for voice and participation of different groups becomes important. The literature suggests that there 
has been limited attention to addressing gender in donor efforts concerning decentralisation.332 
Australian aid program policy dictates that gender and disability be incorporated as cross-cutting 
issues. This is expanded upon in the Australian aid program’s investment design quality standards in 
that both ‘social inclusion’ and ‘gender equality’ are deemed important in the following ways: 
Social inclusion 
• Demonstrate how we will influence advancing social inclusion within the investment—
including as appropriate, but not limited to, people living with HIV/AIDS, people with a 
disability, ethnic and linguistic minorities, rural and remote communities and other 
excluded groups within the given context 
• Integrate social inclusion into outcomes and the consideration of risks and 
sustainability 
• Ensure that outcomes are equitable. 
Gender equality  
• Incorporate appropriate and effective strategies to advance gender equality and 
promote the empowerment of women and girls 
• Ensure the equal access of women and girls to the benefits of the investment 
• Demonstrate how we will influence advancing women’s empowerment within the 
investment; including where appropriate, addressing women’s role in decision-
making and leadership, or empowering women economically. 
Lastly, working at subnational level requires choices about chosen locations (in terms of regions, 
provinces or districts). Given the widely reported unevenness of decentralisation processes across 
countries, the Australian aid program is faced with difficult choices with respect to targeting the 
poorest or working in subnational locations where higher capacity or stronger political leadership is 
present. 
Coherence (sufficient/not) 
For an evaluation focused at the organisational level, ‘coherence’ is an important criterion. Improved 
coherence is expected from the successful implementation of the strategic programming architecture 
within the Australian aid program.  
Decentralisation processes within partner countries are complex and differences between sectors 
and geographical locations can present challenges for donors to in developing and maintaining 
coherent country programs. 
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Within this evaluation, the analysis of this criterion is focused at four levels: 
› within country strategy (including how agency works through governance versus sectors) 
› within sector portfolios 
› within subnational locations 
› within organisational guidance. 
A2.3 Sample initiatives 
Document review sample initiatives 
The sample was chosen to provide diversity across three sectors, six countries and aid modalities 
(including managing contractor, SWaP, multilateral, non-governmental organisations, direct partner 
government execution), to ensure breadth of representation of the ways Australia provides support in 
these sectors across different contexts (and beyond the case study countries and initiatives). Only 
high-value sector service delivery programs (>$10 million) were included. We sought to include some 
documentation for programs included in three case study countries to allow for triangulation during 
analysis, however in an effort to ensure breadth and balance in the sample, avoided skewing the 
sample towards more documents from case study countries than from other countries. We initially 
sought to include design-evaluation pairs (hence why some design documents included were 2007–
08) however it was challenging to ensure the inclusion of current/relevant programs. Since the 
purpose of analysis did not necessarily require matching pairs, this criteria was dropped. 
The final sample was 24 documents (14 designs and 10 evaluations) covering 2007–13, 
representing 61 initiatives (28 education, 21 health and 12 infrastructure). 
The sample of initiatives whose design document was reviewed are shown in Table A2, and for 
evaluations in Table A3. 
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Table A2 Sample initiatives for review of designs 
Sector Country: 
design 
Initiative value, years 
and goal 
Initiative description  
Education Indonesia: 
Australia's 
Education 
Partnership with 
Indonesia 
Value: $500 million 
Years: 2010–15 
Goal: To improve learning 
outcomes for Indonesian 
children. 
This initiative assists Indonesia to achieve its Renstra (Education 
Policy) priorities by contributing to the Education Sector Support 
Program. The initiative will be delivered as earmarked budget 
support (76% of funds), with technical assistance and block grants 
to help strengthen government systems. It has four components: 
› junior secondary school construction and expansion 
› school and district level staff management 
› Islamic school accreditation 
› analytical and capacity development partnership. 
Bangladesh: 
BRAC Education 
Program  
Value: $9.8 million 
Years: 2007–11 
Goal: To make a significant 
contribution to the 
achievement of education 
for all in Bangladesh. 
BRAC would like to expand its primary, pre-primary and post-
primary education programs for the advancement of poor children 
in remote areas. The main objectives of the proposed intervention 
are to 
› create institutional access to deliver an effective low-cost 
quality primary and pre-primary education program 
› expand primary and pre-primary education all over the 
country, especially in remote and unserved areas, catering for 
the education needs of socio-economically, physically and 
geographically disadvantaged children from the poorest 
families 
› supplement government efforts through providing a second 
chance for children of the poor for primary education 
› develop capacity of rural secondary school teachers 
› create an environment that facilitates and values of good 
teaching and learning in secondary schools. 
Solomon Islands: 
Support to the 
Solomon Islands 
education sector  
Value: Not included 
Years: 2010–12 
Goal: To support the 
Solomon Island 
Government through a 
sector-wide approach. The 
National Education Action 
Plan) 2010–12 under the 
Education Strategic 
Framework 2007–15, has 
three strategic goals: 
› to achieve equitable 
access to education 
for all people in the 
Solomon Islands 
› to improve the quality 
of education in the 
Solomon Islands; and 
› to manage resources 
efficiently and 
effectively.  
The Education Sector Program has been implemented since 2004, 
mainly with European Union and New Zealand support, and 
Australia would therefore be joining an existing and well-
established program. 
Given that the program has been operating for a considerable 
period one of the challenges faced by the Australian team was 
making judgements as to what material to incorporate into the 
package given the substantial existing documentation. 
Philippines: 
BEAM-ARMM 
Alternative 
Delivery Model 
(ADM) Project 
Value: $49.4 million 
Year: 2012–17 
Goal: To contribute to the 
alleviation of poverty and 
the emergence of a 
sustainable peace. 
The ADM will provide ‘catch-up’ learning opportunities for pre-
school and elementary school children in remote and poor 
communities without access to government schools. It will 
establish 300 elementary community schools and support at least 
1128 pre-school classes, benefitting about 42 810 children.  
Philippines: 
Muslim and 
Indigenous 
Value: $20 million 
Years: 2011–14 
The Philippines Government and the Australian aid program are 
proposing a flexible response to the specific challenges for the 
Muslim and IP communities through a program of activities to be 
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Peoples (IP) 
education 
program 
Goal: To improve equitable 
access to and quality of 
education for boys and girls 
in disadvantaged IP and 
Muslim communities. 
funded by a grant of $20 million over 3 years. The objective of the 
program is to provide better access to an appropriate, policy driven, 
sustainable and quality education for boys and girls in Muslim and 
IP communities, stimulating a community led demand for 
education services. 
Health Indonesia: 
Australia–
Indonesia 
Partnership for 
Maternal and 
Neonatal Health 
(MNH) 
Value: $46,000,000 
Years: 2008–11  
Goal: To ensure selected 
provincial and district 
governments have 
mechanisms in place to 
manage national, local and 
donor resources to achieve 
national target levels for 
priority indicators. 
The partnership will have three components: 
› service delivery and community engagement 
› health systems support  
› system reforms in performance and accountability.  
The partnership will provide funding for provincial and district 
government work plans for activities designed to reach MNH 
program targets. 
Bangladesh: 
Design Summary 
and 
Implementation 
Document: 
Australia’s 
Support to the 
Bangladesh 
Health, 
Population and 
Nutrition Sector 
Development 
Plan (HPNSDP) 
Value: $72.4 million 
Years: 2011–16 
Goal: To ensure quality and 
equitable health care for all 
citizens by improving 
access to and use of 
health, population and 
nutrition services. 
This program is supported by development partners under sector-
wide approach mechanisms. Australia’s assistance towards the 
HPNSDP will be a contribution to a pooled funding mechanism 
together with like-minded donors. 
Solomon Islands: 
Support to the 
Solomon Islands 
health sector  
Value: $71 million 
Years: 2012–16 
Goal: To achieve improved 
central and provincial 
management processes; 
sustainability of financial 
support; and better health 
service performance. 
This initiative will support the health sector-wide approach to 
strengthen Solomon Islands Ministry of Health and Medical 
Services’ leadership capacity, outcome focus, public financial 
management and health information systems. 
PNG: PNG Health 
System Capacity 
Development 
Program (HSCDP) 
Value: $60,000,000 
Years: 2011–15 
Goal: To strengthen key 
partner performance, 
functions and systems, and 
incentives within PNG’s 
health system to better 
deliver rural services (with 
a particular focus on five 
provinces.  
HSCDP aims to deliver the majority of its support at the subnational 
level, with modest support to national functions. Provincial support 
will comprise approximately 75% of the HSCDP operational budget. 
Support to national functions will comprise the remaining 25%.  
Vietnam: Vietnam 
delivering better 
health initiative 
Value: $22 million 
Years: 2009–11 (phase 2) 
Goal: To enable the 
Vietnam Government to 
coordinate, manage and 
finance the health sector 
more effectively. 
The initiative has three components:  
› Human resources (HR): Improve the quality, efficiency and 
equity in health service delivery through addressing selected 
health human resource issues in partnership with the Asian 
Development Bank 
› Health financing (HF): Improve equitable and affordable 
access to health care in partnership with the World Bank 
› Institutional partnerships: Improve the Vietnam health sector’s 
evidence-based approach to HR and HF policy development, 
implementation and monitoring and evaluation through 
sustainable partnerships between Australian and Vietnam 
institutions. 
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Vietnam: Health 
Human 
Resources Sector 
Development 
Program 
Value: $11 million (Aus. 
component) 
Years: 2008–15 
Goal: To improve health 
status and progress 
towards the health-related 
MDGs and Vietnam 
development goals. 
The program loan will support key policy reform actions in health 
workforce management and financing; and the project loan will 
finance investments directly linked to and supportive of the policy 
actions.  
Infrastructure Indonesia: Design 
Summary and 
Implementation 
Document Water 
and Sanitation 
Initiative (WSI) 
Value: $300 million 
Years: 2009–11  
Goal: To improve the living 
standards of the poor by 
improving their access to 
more effective and 
sustainable water and 
sanitation services thereby 
contributing to the 
Indonesian Government’s 
achievement of MDG 
Goal 7. 
The WSI was announced by the Australian Government in December 
2008. Its core objectives are to: 
› expand access to water supply and sanitation services, 
particularly for the poor, women, and children in schools 
› make water and sanitation services more sustainable by 
supporting sector reform and capacity building 
› improve the health and quality of life of the poor and 
vulnerable by increasing their understanding of good hygiene 
practices, as well as by expanding their access to water supply 
and sanitation services. 
The approved funding for WSI is $300 million, of which $100 million 
will be channelled through multilateral development agencies and 
$200 million to bilateral country programs, including Indonesia.  
Philippines: 
Provincial Road 
Management 
Facility (PRMF) 
Value: $100 million 
Years: 2009–13 
Goal: To increase 
economic growth and 
improve public access to 
infrastructure and services 
in southern Philippines. 
The PRMF has two main components: 
› Capacity building for road sector planning and management: 
with the intended intermediate outcome that provinces have 
institutional, financial, operational, planning and management 
capacity to develop and implement road sector plans in 
support of broad-based sustainable social and economic 
development. 
› Road network rehabilitation and maintenance: with the 
intended intermediate outcome that provincial roads are being 
rehabilitated and sustainably maintained on an annual basis. 
PNG: Transport 
Sector Support 
Program Concept 
Design Document 
Value: Not specified57 
Years: 2006–11 
Goal: To contribute to 
improved governance and 
performance in PNG 
Government’s delivery of 
transport infrastructure 
services in support of 
broad-based economic 
growth through a flexible 
and responsive program of 
activities in a manner that 
fosters transition from 
external to internal 
funding. 
This initiative would be achieved through 4 components: 
› Line agency public sector reform and governance: To support 
operational reform in the transport sector agencies through 
improved public administration and sector coordination 
› Strengthened central agency support: To strengthen linkages 
between the transport sector agencies and central agencies so 
that service delivery and reform programs are actively 
supported 
› Provincial transport services: To support improved 
performance of provincial, district and local-level governments 
to deliver transport services in selected locations 
› Prioritised transport asset maintenance: To support delivery of 
an affordable, contestable and prioritised national transport 
network. 
 
                                                        
57  This concept design does not stipulate the level of Australian financial support for TSSP, because this will depend 
entirely on the PNG Government’s commitments on a year-by-year basis. However, it is suggested that Australia’s 
financial commitments could be similar to expenditures it has made in recent years ($50–60 million per year). 
 105 
Table A3 Sample initiatives for review of evaluations 
Sector Country: 
evaluation 
Initiative value, years and goal Initiative description  
Education Indonesia: 
Australia–
Indonesia 
Basic 
Education 
Program 
(AIBEP)  
Value: $387.6 million ($200 million 
loan. $187.6 million Grants) 
Years:2006–10  
Goal: To support the Indonesian 
Government in improving equitable 
access to higher quality and better 
governed basic education services in 
the targeted, disadvantaged areas. 
AIBEP comprised a loan and grant for expansion of 
access; and grant financed training and capacity 
development.  
 Bangladesh: 
Support to 
BRAC 
Education 
Program (BEP) 
Value: $39,165,497 
Years: 2007–11 
Goal: To make a significant 
contribution to the achievement of 
education for all in Bangladesh. 
BRAC’s Education Program includes a wide-reaching 
range of components, interventions and innovations. 
These include non-formal primary education (some of 
it implemented through over 500 partner NGOs), pre-
primary education, a small number of BRAC-run 
formal primary schools, a program of support to 
secondary education, an adolescent development 
programme and community learning centres.  
The BEP is recognised in the Bangladesh 
Government’s Sixth Five-Year Plan 2010–15.  
 Philippines: 
Strengthening 
the 
Implementatio
n of Basic 
Education in 
Selected 
Provinces in 
the Visayas 
(STRIVE)  
Value: $20.3 million 
Years: 2005–07 
Goal: To develop, support and 
strengthen education management 
and learning support systems for 
improved access to quality basic 
education. 
STRIVE Stage 2 was designed as a vanguard initiative 
which aimed to develop and test support systems for 
school-based management, human resources 
development specifically in-service education and 
training and the equitable provision of learning 
resource materials. STRIVE Stage 2 was envisioned to 
be one of the strategic avenues to support the 
successful implementation of Basic Education Sector 
Reform Agenda (BESRA).  
 Indonesia: 
Nusa Tenggara 
Timur Primary 
Education 
Partnership 
(NTTPEP) 
Value: $27,415,571.82 
Years: 2004–08 
Goal: To improve the quality of 
education as part of Indonesian 
Government reforms. 
NTTPEP was a bilateral, stand-alone project. To 
improve education service delivery, the partnership 
implemented a comprehensive, highly targeted 
capacity building program, utilising the existing cluster 
groups of teachers, supervisors and principals. 
 PNG: 
Education 
Capacity 
Building 
Program 
(ECBP); 
Basic 
Education 
Development 
Project (BEDP); 
Primary and 
Community 
School 
Textbook 
Distribution 
(Textbook)  
Value: $161 million (total for all 3 split 
as follows: ECBP $104.25 million; 
BEDP $49.6 million and Textbooks 
$7.467 million) 
Years:  
ECBP 2004–09 
BEDP 2004–10 
Textbook 2009–10 
Goal:  
To strengthen the capacity of the 
national education system at the 
national, provincial and district agency 
levels in order to achieve quality 
improvements in education service 
delivery. The BEDP goal is to 
contribute to the effective 
implementation of quality and 
equitable primary schooling in PNG. 
ECBP provided technical assistance and operating 
expenses for a wide range of activities supporting the 
national Department of Education, schools and other 
education sector institutions. BEDP worked with 
provincial governments, school Boards of 
Management and communities to build capacity to 
manage infrastructure provision and maintenance, 
providing grants to nearly 3000 primary and 
community schools and new infrastructure for over 
300 schools (out of about 3500 such schools in the 
country). Textbook bought and distributed 539 000 
text books, providing a set of basic books to every 
community and primary school in the country. 
Health Solomon 
Islands: 
Value: $21.8 million 
Years: 2001–07 
The three components of the project sought to 
› further develop and strengthen the capacity of 
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Ministry of 
Health 
Institutional 
Strengthening 
Project (HSIP)  
Goal: To improve the health of the 
Solomon Island’s population by 
strengthening the management and 
operational capacity of the Solomon 
Islands health sector. 
senior Headquarters staff in core management 
areas 
› improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
primary, preventive and promotive service 
delivery 
› develop the National Referral Hospital’s role as 
the major acute referral hospital for the Solomon 
Islands and improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the hospital’s service delivery.  
The project was delivered through traditional project 
aid, delivered through an Australian managing 
contractor and supplemented by a significant Health 
Sector Trust Account used to purchase essential 
drugs and supplies and in the early years to pay staff 
salaries. 
Vietnam: Avian 
Influenza Joint 
Program (AIJP) 
Value: Phase II US$17 647 992 
(pooled funding) 
Years: 2007–11 (phase II) 
Goal: To reduce the health risk to 
humans from avian influenza by 
controlling the disease at source in 
domestic poultry, by detecting and 
responding promptly to human cases, 
and by preparing for the medical 
consequences of a human pandemic. 
AIJP was developed by the Vietnamese Government 
together with UN Agencies to address the immediate 
emergency support needed to control the current 
outbreak. A two-phase approach was agreed at the 
outset. The emergency phase, or phase I, of the AIJP 
was implemented from October 2005 to July 2006 
and its objectives were mostly achieved while 95% of 
budgeted assistance was delivered. The second 
phase continued the implementation, and included 
support for planning and longer-term capacity building 
to respond to emerging infectious diseases in animals 
and humans.  
Infrastructure Indonesia: 
Third Water 
and Sanitation 
for Low-Income 
Communities 
Project 
(PAMSIMAS); 
Water Supply 
and Sanitation 
Policy 
Formulation 
and Action 
Planning 
(WASPOLA)  
Value: $54.5 million (PAMSIMAS) 
$10 million (WASPOLA) 
Years: 2006–14 (PAMSIMAS) 
2009–13 (WASPOLA) 
Goal: To increase the number of low-
income rural and peri-urban 
populations accessing improved water 
and sanitation facilities and practicing 
improved hygiene behaviours as part 
of GoI’s efforts to achieve the water 
and sanitation MDGs (PAMSIMAS). 
To improve access for Indonesians, 
particularly the poor, to adequate and 
sustainable water supply and 
environmental sanitation services, 
contributing to increased economic 
growth (WASPOLA). 
PAMSIMAS is a national Indonesian Government 
program partially funded by a World Bank loan and 
Australia co-financing.  
The WASPOLA Facility is an Australian initiative 
implemented by World Bank’s Water and Sanitation 
Program and the Indonesian Government.  
Vietnam: Three 
delta towns 
water supply 
and sanitation 
project: 
Independent 
Completion 
Report (2008) 
Value: $78,572,000 
Years: 2001–08 
Goal: To improve the welfare of 
residents of Bac Lieu, Ha Tien and Sa 
Dec urban wards and communes by 
rehabilitating and extending water 
supply, drainage, wastewater and 
solid waste management facilities and 
services and to develop the capacity 
of local institutions and community 
groups to manage these systems on a 
sustainable basis. 
The project has three main components covering the 
three towns, with a fourth component in project 
management. The objective of each town component 
emphasised that infrastructure improvements should 
be closely integrated with community development 
and institutional development subcomponents.  
Philippines: 
Provincial 
Road 
Management 
Facility (PRMF) 
Value: $100 million 
Years: 2009–14 
Goal: To promote economic growth 
and improve public access to public 
services in the Southern Philippines. 
PRMF is a bilateral grant over 5 years that aims to 
rehabilitate and maintain a core road network in 
selected provinces and strengthen provincial 
government systems.  
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Fieldwork case study initiatives 
The sample of initiatives selected for fieldwork case studies was selected to demonstrate the diversity 
of ways, including new ways, in which Australian support is engaging in decentralised contexts. 
(Table A4). Further details of the programs themselves are contained in the main report. 
Table A4 Initiatives selected for fieldwork case studies 
Sector Program Descriptions 
Health Indonesia: Australia–Indonesia Program for 
Maternal and Neonatal Health  
Health service delivery focus, working in 14 districts 
in one province in eastern Indonesia 
PNG: Support to provincial health authorities  Support to three pilot ‘provincial health authorities’ 
who are responsible for both hospitals and health 
centres at local level 
Education PNG: Specialised support provision in school 
infrastructure 
Provision of school infrastructure in all 
20 provinces through an external contractor 
Philippines: Strengthening the Implementation of 
Basic Education in Selected Provinces in the 
Visayas  
Support at subnational level to the national 
education reform process which involves 
deconcentration of education management to 
regions and divisions 
Infrastructure Indonesia: Water and Sanitation Hibah Demand-led support to local governments to invest 
in water and sanitation services for the poor 
through an output-aid modality 
Philippines: Provincial Road Management Facility Support to provincial authorities and national 
department for local government to manage 
maintenance of roads 
Governance programs 
The following section provides an overview of the governance programs that have been supported by 
the Australian aid program in the three focus countries of the evaluation. This information is provided 
to assist the reader contextualise the sector-specific initiatives and country case studies discussed in 
the evaluation report. The subsections are:  
› governance initiatives in Indonesia  
› governance initiatives in the Philippines  
› governance initiatives in PNG. 
Summary of Australian aid-supported governance programs in Indonesia 
The Australian Government has supported 11 governance programs in Indonesia from 2002 to the 
present. The initiatives are presented below according to governance program type. Most of the 
programs are listed according to a single category. Three initiatives are listed twice (ACCESS, LOGICA 
II, and AIPD) under both support to subnational authorities and support for local area development.  
Support to national decentralisation policy reforms:  
› SMERU Research Institute (an independent not-for-profit institute for research and public policy 
studies): 1998–2013 
› Government partnerships fund: 2010–15 
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› Australia–Indonesia partnership for justice program: 2011–15 
› Australia–Indonesia partnership for electoral support: 2011–15. 
Support for subnational authorities: 
› Australian Community Development and Civil Society Strengthening Scheme (ACCESS) Phase I: 
2002–08 
› Local Governance Innovations for Communities in Aceh, Phase II (LOGICA 2): 2009–11 
› Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Decentralisation (AIPD): 2010–15 
› Provincial Governance Strengthening Project (PGSP): 2011–13. 
Support for local area development: 
› Australian Community Development and Civil Society Strengthening Scheme (ACCESS) Phase I: 
2002–08 
› Australia-Nusa Tenggara Assistance for Regional Autonomy (ANTARA): 2005–10 
› World Bank Indonesia’s Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (National Program for 
Community Empowerment): 2007–11  
› Local Governance Innovations for Communities in Aceh, Phase II (LOGICA 2): 2009–11 
› Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Decentralisation (AIPD): 2010–15 
› Australian Community Development and Civil Society Strengthening Scheme (ACCESS) Phase II: 
2008–present. 
Summary of Australian aid-supported governance programs in the Philippines 
The Australian Government has supported 10 governance programs in the Philippines from 1999 to 
the present. Again, the initiatives are presented below according to governance program type. Two 
initiatives are listed twice: the Partnership for Economic Governance Reforms has program elements 
that support both national and subnational reform and the Philippines-Australia Local Sustainability 
Program supports both subnational reform and local area development.  
Support to national decentralisation policy reforms:  
› Philippines–Australia Human Resource Development Facility (PAHRDF): 2004–09 
› Partnership for Economic Governance Reforms (PEGR): 2005–09 
› Local Governance Development Program (Phase I): 2006–07 
› Australia World Bank Philippines Development Trust Fund: 2009–16 
› Philippines–Australia Human Resource and Organisational Development Facility: 2010–15 
› Philippines–Australia public financial management program: 2011–16. 
Support for subnational authorities: 
› Philippines–Australian Local Sustainability Program (PALS): 1999–2009 
› Local Governance Development Program (Phase I): 2006–07 
› Provincial Road Management Facility: 2009–14 
› The Asia Foundation partnership Philippines: 2011–14. 
Support for local area development: 
› Philippines–Australian Local Sustainability Program (PALS): 1999–2009 
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› Philippines–Australia Community Assistance Program (PACAP): 2005–10 
Summary of Australian aid-supported governance programs in Papua New Guinea 
The Australian Government has supported 14 governance programs in PNG from 2003 to the 
present. The initiatives are presented below according to governance program type.  
Support to national decentralisation policy reforms:  
› PNG–Australia Law and Justice Partnership: 2009–14 
› PNG–Australia Economic and Public Sector Program: 2009–15 
› Strongim Gavman Program: 2009–15 
› Australia Awards in PNG: 2009–15 
› Economic and Public Sector Governance Twinning Initiative: 2010–13 
› PNG–Australia Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Transport Sector: 2010–13 
› Implementing the Papua New Guinea Liquefied Natural Gas Project Joint Understanding: 2010–13 
› Electoral Support Program: 2011–13 
Support for subnational authorities: 
› PNG Sub-National Initiative: 2003–07 
› Sub-National Strategy: 2007–12 
› Non-State Actors Community Program—Strongim Pipol Strongim Nesen: 2011–13 
› Provincial and Local Level Governments Program: 2011–15. 
Support for local area development: 
› CARE Integrated Community Development Program: 2009–13 
› Church Partnership Program Phase 2: 2010–16. 
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Appendix 3 Review of country strategies 
This appendix provides the detailed review of country strategy documents. As background, the status 
of decentralisation in the six countries is shown in Table A5. Each country has followed a different 
path, with variation in the degree of control retained at central level, the type of decentralisation, the 
rate at which the reform has been pursued and the degree to which subnational government or 
authorities are responsible for service delivery.  
Table A5 Status of decentralisation across six recipient countries 
Country Status of decentralisation Subnational roles in service delivery 
Indonesia Recent effort to strengthen decentralisation in 2000; 
Devolution as type of administrative decentralisation 
Overall process of decentralisation = ‘Big Bang’333 
Provincial and local governments have 
responsibility for service delivery, but ability 
to fulfil these functions is limited by human 
and financial capacity334 
PNG Recent effort to strengthen decentralisation in 1995;335 
Devolution as type of administrative decentralisation336 with 
some elements of deconcentration 
Overall process of decentralisation = ‘Gradual’  
Primary responsibility for the delivery and 
financing of most public services lies with the 
provincial and local governments337 
Philippines Recent effort to strengthen decentralisation in 1991; 
Devolution as type of administrative decentralisation 
Overall process of decentralisation = ‘Big Bang’338  
Services in healthcare, social services, public 
works, education, and housing devolved to 
local level339 
Vietnam Recent effort to strengthen decentralisation in 1994; 
Deconcentration as type of administrative 
decentralisation340  
Overall process of decentralisation = Gradual341  
Education, health and social welfare are 
largely provided by provincial and local 
governments342 but devolving authority and 
resources to local levels has been resisted343 
Solomon 
Islands 
Effort to strengthen decentralisation in 1980s;344 Political 
decentralisation without corresponding devolution of 
adequate powers, functions, staff, budgets and clear lines 
of accountability and adequate support and supervision 
from the National level345  
Overall process of decentralisation = ‘Gradual’  
Most service delivery remains the 
responsibility of central government due to 
lack of provincial capacity346  
Bangladesh Recent effort at strengthening decentralisation in 1975347; 
Deconcentration as type of administrative 
decentralisation348 
Overall process of decentralisation = Gradual349 
Local government currently plays a limited 
role in service delivery, particularly in health, 
education and water and sanitation  
Indonesia 
The Indonesia country strategy (2008–13) provides good coverage of decentralisation and Australia’s 
response. It provides analysis of the decentralised context, description of challenges faced at 
subnational level and articulates strategies to address issues arising in this current context. The 
strategy also takes into account Australia’s role as a small donor within a middle-income country and 
the need to consider carefully the value-add of Australian support. The analysis concerning service 
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delivery covers how responsibility has been devolved to provincial and local governments but that 
‘this increase in authority has not been matched with the human capacity to delivery, or with the 
financial discipline, accountability and the infrastructure required for effective service delivery.’350 
The strategy recognises that Australia’s support should use ‘local systems that deliver larger 
Indonesian programs’351 towards improving service delivery, ‘particularly at decentralised level of 
government.’352 Different subnational roles are identified within particular sectors, for example: 
‘Under decentralisation reforms, responsibility for delivering public education is shared between the 
national, provincial and district levels of government.’353 Capacity gaps at subnational level are also 
identified. For example, concerning health it is noted that ‘under decentralisation, local governments 
struggle to find, fund and successfully manage the human resources required to implement their 
mandate.’354 
The country program strategy clearly articulates an approach to work in selected provincial and local 
governments to enhance capacity and public financial management,355 and dedicate resources to 
increase knowledge of partner systems and the decentralised environment ‘drawing on analysis of 
Indonesian systems (budget, public expenditure management, decentralisation and capacity), ailing 
service delivery and growth.’356 The strategy also describes the commitment to a ‘decentralisation 
support facility’ with aims to improve alignment and coordination of assistance, strengthen evidence-
based policy through use of financial incentives357 and build capacity of citizens to demand better 
governance.358 Lastly, the strategy articulates a concurrent focus on national and subnational levels, 
and support for service delivery in provinces with high levels of poverty.359 
PNG 
Decentralisation in PNG involves devolution with some elements of deconcentration. The 1995 
reforms maintained a decentralised system, but recentralised political power. Provincial governments 
have responsibilities for basic rural services in education, health, village courts and some transport 
infrastructure. The national level retains most law and justice responsibilities, hospitals, major 
transport infrastructure and upper education. The substantial constituency funding provided to district 
members of parliament bypasses provinces and complicates decentralisation. In some provinces, the 
entire health sector is covered by provincial health authorities, and many areas have a significant 
church health and education presence.360 
PNG strategy documentation contains some mention of decentralisation. The country program 
strategy of 2006–10361 was superseded by the Partnership for Development Agreement in 2008. 
This agreement, with accompanying schedules for four priority outcomes in 2012, comprises the 
current strategic framework guiding Australian support to PNG.58 The current Partnership Agreement 
and accompanying schedules has limited reference to subnational roles in service delivery.  
The Partnership Agreement of 2008 includes a commitment to contribute to improved governance 
and build ‘effective national institutions and the public sector workforce capacities.’362 Yet the 
agreement also suggests that choices need to be made between governance and service delivery 
improvements in its advice to ‘balance governance improvements with service delivery 
improvements.’363 The one reference to subnational government concerns the need for ‘focus on 
subnational levels of government and service delivery’364 and there is no reference to 
decentralisation.  
                                                        
58  The previous country program strategy contained clear recognition of the decentralised system of government with a 
pillar of the strategy to improved service delivery and stability, which included strengthening decentralised service 
delivery. 
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Of the three relevant schedules related to sectors covered in this evaluation, health and education 
contain the most detail on the role of subnational government. It was absent from the schedule on 
transport infrastructure, understandably given its focus on national roads.  
The schedule on education contains a full annex describing the distribution for roles and 
responsibilities for education at different levels of government, however it is not clear how Australian 
support (aside from through separate governance support) addresses the needs of these different 
roles and responsibilities, particularly those at subnational level. Instead support is to be focused on 
‘education subsidies, infrastructure and materials.’365. It is not clear how this approach is responsive 
to the decentralised context, or to evidence such as the findings of reviews about constraints in 
subnational budgets and capacity.366  
The schedule on health and HIV/AIDS by contrast does include clear direction on how Australia 
support will address the decentralised context, including ‘technical assistance to strengthen 
provincial and district capacity’367 and supporting critical reforms through ‘financing to provincial 
health authorities.’368 Also, there is reference to ‘support to civil society organisations, churches and 
commits to increase demand for better service delivery.’369 In addition, the schedule confirms that 
75 per cent of technical assistance deployed to support implementation of the National HIV and AIDS 
Strategy 2011–15 will be targeted at subnational level.370  
Philippines 
The Philippines Aid Program Strategy 2012–17 contains detailed coverage of decentralisation and 
role of subnational government in service delivery. The strategy has one of its strategic objectives to 
strengthen basic services for the poor, and includes a cross-cutting governance objective: ‘Supporting 
the foundations for accountable, transparent, effective and inclusive governance.’371 This strategy 
provides analysis of key issues arising as result of decentralisation. For example, it notes that ‘weak 
governance persists at both the national and local levels. Local governments account for almost a 
third of total government expenditure and deliver most basic services.’372  
The strategy notes specific problems with current decentralised service delivery: ‘1. a high degree of 
fragmentation among local governments—there are more than 43 000 local government units across 
the country; 2. a significant mismatch between local government responsibilities and their ability to 
fund public services; 3. weak accountability for local government performance.’373 The strategy also 
provides clear guidance on how Australian support will be targeted to address two of these major 
problems; funding at local level and accountability for their performance.  
Finally, it is the only strategy reviewed here that refers to the political cycle, and notes under the risk 
management area that the 2013 elections ‘could see changes in the political landscape at 
subnational and legislative levels, which may impact on the current administration’s ability to deliver 
on its [decentralisation] reform agenda.’374  
Vietnam 
The Australia–Vietnam Joint Aid Program Strategy 2010–15 has limited mention of decentralisation 
or subnational roles. It should be noted that this strategy has a lesser focus on service delivery than 
the three countries discussed above, however the strategy does focus on water and sanitation as a 
basic service, and infrastructure development within its focus on economic integration.  
The strategy does note governance as a cross-cutting theme for sector areas: ‘effective governance—
by helping the Vietnamese Government modernise its institutions so they can support the next stage 
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of the country’s development (institutional strengthening is a cross-cutting issue for all of Australia’s 
sector programs).’375 Within water and sanitation, it is noted that: ‘Australia will also continue to 
focus on improving financial management, planning and oversight in this sector.’376 However, there is 
no analysis or discussion of capacity, authority or financial management at subnational levels. The 
only mention of this area is under ‘risk management’ where it is noted that: ‘weak capacity in certain 
parts of government, including at local level, may also inhibit the progress of critical reforms’377 and 
that fiduciary risk assessments will be undertaken at national and subnational levels. 
Solomon Islands 
Historically there have been initiatives to legislate for greater provincial autonomy which were not 
implemented due to changes in governments or political instability. Hence, while there has been 
some devolution of authority and control from central to provincial government, there has been no 
transfer of powers, functions, staff or budgets, and service delivery remains the responsibility of 
central government.378 Service delivery to rural areas is generally financed by central government and 
includes roles played by provincial government, churches, donors and NGOs especially for health and 
education.379 
The Solomon Islands–Australia Partnership for Development, which was signed July 2013, sets out 
cooperation to achieve objectives of the Solomon Islands National Development Strategy 2010–20 
and national sectoral plans. Focus is directed towards building ‘capacity for effective national 
institutions’380 and while the partnership ‘recognises that over 80 per cent of the population live in 
rural areas’381 there is no mention of subnational contexts, nor the role of provincial governments in 
development programs. Priority outcomes defined in the Partnership for Development include the 
need to ‘balance government improvements with service delivery improvements’,382 placing the two 
in tension, rather than reinforcing one another. Subsequent schedules for priority outcomes might be 
expected to discuss decentralisation and subnational roles but were not yet prepared.  
Bangladesh 
The Australia–Bangladesh Aid Program Strategy 2012–16 contains limited mention or analysis of 
decentralisation or the role of subnational authorities and their relevance for service delivery. In 
Bangladesh, although decentralisation has been in process for a long time, local government 
currently plays a limited role in service delivery, particularly in health and education,383 the two core 
sectors in which Australian support is directed. The mode of decentralisation so far has largely been 
in the form of deconcentration,384 and subnational government accounts for only 3–4 per cent of total 
government expenditure.385  
The country program strategy acknowledges the need for Australia ‘to more effectively support 
government policy reforms and ensure that programs operating outside of the government remain 
closely linked to its priorities and long-term goals.’386 It is noted that Australia will ‘work to strengthen 
governance systems that support service delivery so gains are sustainable.’387 However, the strategy 
does not contain analysis of the current decentralisation process or issues around capacity of 
authorities at subnational level, nor question how the commitment to significant support for: ‘service 
delivery through local civil society partners’388 is (or is not) related to strengthening partner 
government and local authorities.  
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Acronyms and abbreviations 
AIPD  Australia–Indonesia Partnership for Decentralisation 
AIPMNH  Australia–Indonesia Partnership for Maternal and Neonatal Health 
ANAO  Australian National Audit Office 
BEDP  Basic Education Development Project 
BESRA  Basic Education Sector Reform Agenda 
CAPF  comprehensive aid policy framework 
DepEd  Department of Education, Philippines 
DFAT  Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
DILG  Department of the Interior and Local Government 
HCDP  Health Capacity Development Program 
IndII  Indonesia Infrastructure Initiative 
MDG  Millennium Development Goals 
MoF  Ministry of Finance 
MoHA  Ministry of Home Affairs 
MoPW  Ministry of Public Works 
NGO  non-government organisations 
ODA  Official development assistance 
ODE  Office of Development Effectiveness 
PDAM  local government-owned water company, Indonesia 
PHA  provincial health authorities 
PNG  Papua New Guinea 
PRMF  provincial road management facility 
SPF  service provision facility 
WASH  water, sanitation and hygiene 
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